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KANTIAN STUDIES

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BY

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PREFACE

THE studies of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* contained in this volume were written for the most part before I wrote the last two sections of the book published in 1943 with the title of *A Treatise on Knowledge*. My aim was to clear my mind in regard to Kant's main doctrines and to see, if I could, what they implied and where they broke down. But I also wished to inquire whether by any modifications of his doctrines or by further hypotheses it would be possible to retain what seemed most valuable in his system; and thus these studies are in effect prolegomena to the speculations contained in the last section of my earlier book and are part of the argument for the views there put forward.

It may assist the reader to see the train of thought which I follow if I indicate in the shortest possible way what seems to me to be most valuable in Kant's system and where its difficulties lie.

The parts of his doctrine which I find it hard not to accept are his arguments that all consciousness is a partial or incipient or would-be apprehension of order in a matter which is diverse or manifold, that our judgements of reality have reference both to the matter and to the order, that the order implies universality and necessity, that both the matter and the order belong to mind, that the forms of time and space which are individual unitary and systematic are the basic elements of the order, and that, since experience is one, what is intelligible in experience must accord with the form of what is sensible. To these points I would add that there is much which seems to me true in Kant's later doctrine (explained in Chapter II) regarding the parity to be assigned to mental and physical events.

On the other hand, I do not find that Kant anywhere explains how that which is known to one mind is known to others also. His doctrine of noumena, which is discussed in Chapter V, does not seem to offer an adequate answer, and his later doctrine about the relation of mental and physical events, though it has implications bearing directly on the problem, is not developed nor properly incorporated in his system. If he had even had a satisfactory account to offer of the mind's knowledge of itself, it might have

led to an enlargement of his view of what knowledge is. But in this respect too there seems to be an error in his system, the consequences of which are traceable in many directions.

There may, I think, be some students of Kant who are sympathetic to the point of view which I have referred to thus briefly, and, if so, they may find this book useful.

A. H. S.

September 1946

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KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE FORMS OF SPACE AND TIME AND OUR CONSCIOUSNESS OF OBJECTS

KANT claims that his doctrine regarding time and space solves three problems. In the first place, it makes intelligible the mind's possession of *a priori* knowledge regarding the temporal and spatial nature of objects. Secondly it removes certain perplexities which trouble the mind in its reflections on the infinity of the universe in respect of time and space and the infinite divisibility of its parts. Thirdly, for philosophers who suppose (rightly, as Kant thinks) that the mind is not aware of physical objects independent of perception, this doctrine provides the only means of maintaining the distinction between the real and the imaginary.

The first claim is in the forefront in the Aesthetic. The second is touched on in the passages of the Aesthetic where Kant refers to the difficulty of conceiving time and space as infinite self-subsistent nonentities and there is a passing reference to it (as we shall see) in the first edition version of the Refutation of Idealism in the Paralogisms (A 377); but it is only fully expounded in the Antinomies. Our concern in this chapter and the next will not be with these two claims, but with the third.

This third claim, despite certain references to illusion, is not set out in the Aesthetic¹; it is one of the consequences which as Kant says in the Paralogisms (A 378) were not at the time foreseen when the conclusion of the Aesthetic was being independently established. It is a claim which is made with emphasis in more than one passage of the *Prolegomena*; thus at the end of § 49 (Mahaffy, Trans. p. 101) it is stated that 'if space and the phenomena in it are something existing out of us, then all the criteria of experience beyond our perception can never prove the actuality of these objects without us'; and again in the supplement (id., p. 147) Kant says that 'in Berkeley's system . . . all experience is mere illusion, whereas with me space and time (in connexion with the Categories) prescribe *a priori* the law of all possible experience, and this law gives us the sure criterion for distinguishing truth from illusion'. The claim is unaltered when Kant

¹ There is a brief reference to it at the conclusion of Remark III added in the second edition, B 71.

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comes to revise his Refutation of Idealism in the second edition of the *Critique*: there he insists that according to the dogmatical idealism of Berkeley, objects in space are mere products of the imagination, but that the foundation for this kind of idealism has been destroyed in the Aesthetic (B 274). It seems thus clear enough that in Kant's view the problem of distinguishing the real and the imaginary is closely linked with the problem of the kind of reality which should be attributed to time and space. This side of his doctrine is very relevant to the points which are raised by Hume's doctrine of belief and we may be helped in the appreciation of what Kant is attempting to do if we remember the difficulties of Hume's account.¹

While Kant held steadily the thesis that idealism was only tenable if it rested on his view of time and space, the working out of the thesis takes different forms and shows stages of development. In studying what he says we may begin with the Paralogisms passage in the first edition of the *Critique* (A 367-80). To many readers of this section it appears that there is little in it to distinguish Kant's position from that of Berkeley, and indeed it has been held that in the passage A 377 Kant is admitting that his arguments do not touch the idealism of Berkeley and is promising a later refutation.² Since there is some dispute regarding the different philosophical positions to which Kant refers, it will be well at the outset to note what he says in this connexion. The general term 'Idealist' is taken to cover all who think that the mind is not aware directly of independent objects in space, but only of its own perceptions. Kant himself accepts this position, so far ranging himself with Berkeley and Hume; thus in A 367 he says: 'We can rightly affirm that only what is in ourselves is immediately perceived' and in A 375 (footnote) 'we must note well the paradoxical but true proposition that there is nothing in space but the mind's presentations (*was in ihm vorgestellt wird*)'. If we start from this position it is possible to hold (1) the view that there may be spatial objects independent of us although we cannot be certain of their existence—a view referred to as 'empirical idealism' in A 369 and A 372 and as 'sceptical idealism' in A 377; or (2) the view that there cannot be such independent spatial objects. The second view may be held on two grounds:

[1] A study of the difficulties here referred to will be found in my *Treatise on Knowledge*, Chapter I.

[2] Cf. Kemp Smith, *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 305.

(a) because space and time are taken to be forms of intuition for the reasons given in the Aesthetic, (b) because the notion of independent spatial and temporal objects involves the difficulties discussed in the Antinomies. When the denial of independent spatial objects is combined with the doctrine of the forms of space and time, we have Kant's own view; it may of course receive support from the antinomies of space and time. If, however, the denial of independent spatial objects is based solely on the antinomies, without the doctrine of space and time as forms of intuition which provides (in Kant's view) a solution of the antinomies, such idealism is referred to by Kant as 'dogmatic idealism' (A 377). It is this view (not Berkeley's) which Kant says he will consider in the Antinomies. (It is important to notice that the view which rejects the notion of independent spatial objects may also be held on the ground of the subjectivity of our perceptions without criticism of space and time or any doctrine of their nature; this is the position which Kant, though not making the point expressly, evidently attributes to Berkeley.) Opposed to all forms of idealism is the view referred to by Kant (A 369) as transcendental realism, which supposes that we perceive directly spatial objects which are independent of our sensibility. Those who start with this view, Kant thinks, are driven in the end to take up empirical idealism (A 369). Lastly Kant considers that his own idealism allows of the supposition that there may be an unknown cause both of our outer perceptions and of those which are inner (A 372); he adds, however, that it does not concern the discussion (*von ihm aber ist auch nicht die Rede*).

Kant begins the exposition of his own position by commending the view that no inference can be made from our perceptions to the existence of independent spatial objects, but he argues that nevertheless the transcendental idealist can be an empirical realist or dualist in the special sense that he can allow the existence of matter without going beyond self-consciousness (A 370). For the mind's presentations (*Vorstellungen*) are of two kinds, outer and inner, the first being presentations of outer objects related to each other in space, the second presentations of myself or my thoughts; both kinds are on the same level and therefore we can say that 'external things exist just as the self exists, and both rest on the immediate witness of self-consciousness' (A 370-1).

It is important to see the limitations of the claim made for external things when it is said that 'they exist just as the self

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exists'. By using sometimes the term 'self' and sometimes inner states or thoughts (*Gedanken*) Kant's words now and again appear to suggest that just as we are aware directly of a non-phenomenal self which is the subject of our inner states or thoughts so we are aware directly of non-phenomenal objects to which our outer presentations belong as states to a substance. But such a statement does not seem to be intelligible in itself (for it is difficult to see how our presentations can be regarded as states of independent objects) nor is it compatible with Kant's general teaching, and indeed in A 379 he makes it clear that if we think of a 'substance' of outer things and a 'substance' of the self standing respectively in relation to our outer and inner perceptions, in either case the 'substance' is only phenomenal.

At the same time it must be recognized that Kant has not worked out properly the questions connected with the statement that external things exist just as the self exists. For though in the main he keeps to his point that it is parity in the phenomenal sphere of which he is speaking, a passage in which he touches on the question of things in themselves suggests that he is inclined on the basis of phenomenal duality to suppose that there may be a duality in noumena, although the supposition does not seem to follow from his argument. In A 372 he says: 'We can allow that something is the cause of our outer intuitions which in a transcendental sense may be outside of us', and he refers later to 'the transcendental object alike in respect of our inner and of our outer intuition' being 'equally unknown'. If Kant is insisting that what is outer as well as what is inner consists of states of the self, he does not seem justified without further argument in supposing that there is necessarily a different cause for the two kinds of states. Indeed he recognizes this in certain passages of the *Paralogisms* section itself. Thus in A 358-9 he points out that 'the something which lies at the basis of external phenomena . . . might be also the subject of our thoughts', and later he says more clearly that 'the human soul is not sufficiently distinguished from matter in respect of its substratum, if we consider matter (as we ought to do) simply as phenomenal'. The point need not affect the discussion of the present section (Kant himself says that it is not relevant to his argument) but it bears on his statements in the *Prolegomena* regarding the distinction between himself and other Idealists. When for example in *Prolegomena*, § 13, Remark III, Kant is apparently contending that he believes in things in

themselves and Berkeley does not, we must remember that in the Paralogisms section of the *Critique* he neither establishes a case for things-in-themselves as specially related to spatial phenomena nor regards the question of things-in-themselves as important for marking the distinctive features of his own idealism.

If the doctrine of things-in-themselves is set aside, we come back to the point which we have seen that Kant makes elsewhere, namely that the important feature of his idealism is the status which he assigns to time and space, with the consequences following from it. He explains his position in the passage which begins in the middle of A 373. First he recalls the doctrine of the Aesthetic that space and time are a priori presentations residing in us as forms of our sensible intuition and anteceding the union with sensation which yields the determined sense of an actual object; the function of these forms being to give us the presentation of objects in spatial and temporal relations (A 373). He goes on immediately to say that the 'something' which is intuited in space ('matter' or 'the real') necessarily presupposes 'perception' (*Wahrnehmung*); it is perception which marks the actuality of something in space, and without it imagination is powerless to picture or produce anything (id.). We should note as a plain indication of the direction of Kant's thought that so soon as he comes to refer to his doctrine of time and space he thinks of the contrast between perceiving actual objects and imagination. In the next sentence he says: 'It is accordingly sensation (*Empfindung*) which, after it has been related to the one or the other form of our sensible intuition, indicates something actual in space or time.'

Before going further we must consider the function which Kant is assigning to sensation and perception in the determination of real objects. At first sight it looks as if his doctrine is that in sensation we have the feeling of reality, and that we place in the time or space order of real things whatever comes to us with this feeling. If so the doctrine is on one side akin to Hume's view that what we 'assent to' is primarily an impression, that assent is given because of its superior vividness or of some indescribable feeling which it provokes, and that in this superior vividness or in respect of this feeling we must find the distinction between impressions and imaginary ideas. But if we look more closely it is apparent that Kant's doctrine is different. In general it would not be in accord with what he says elsewhere that he should give this function to sensations. In the *Prolegomena* for example (§ 13,

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Remark III) he says that 'the difference between truth and dreaming is not ascertained by the nature of the representations which are referred to objects, for they are the same in both cases' (Mahaffy, Trans. p. 44). But we need not look beyond the present passage. Kant does not say that sensation (*Empfindung*) alone indicates actuality, but sensation when it has been brought into relation with the form of space or time. Strictly it is perception (*Wahrnehmung*) which indicates actuality, and it has this function because in it sensation is joined with the forms of intuition. That Kant was in the habit of regarding the functions of sensation and the forms of intuition as inseparable or reciprocal can be seen from the way in which he expresses himself a little later: 'Only that can count as an actual spatial object which is presented in space and conversely what is given in space, i.e. presented in space by perception, is an actual spatial object' (A 375). The doctrine is that when the mind thinks of elements of the manifold of sense as having a determinate place in the single scheme of time or space, it is thereby thinking of the actual; if the sense elements were not thought of as having such a place in time or space they would not be regarded as actual; and again if only the scheme were apprehended there would be nothing actual. This statement needs to be qualified by combination with the doctrine of the categories, which we shall have to consider later. It will be found that by themselves the manifold of sense and the forms of intuition do not constitute the actual, though both are necessary factors of its constitution.

We can now see what Kant has to say about the relation of the actual to the imaginary. Continuing the passage A 373 he says: 'If there be given sensation (we call it "perception" if it is directed to an object in general without determining it) then it is possible to follow the lead of sensation and to picture in imagination many an object which outside the imagination has no empirical place in space or time' (A 374). We may note in passing that the obscure remark about perception apparently means that *Wahrnehmung* is *Empfindung* into which there has entered the thought of an object; the object is not made determinate because *Wahrnehmung* in the abstract is divorced from the categories (compare *der unbestimmte Gegenstand* in B 34). The chief point, however, to be considered is the way in which Kant draws the contrast between the real and the imaginary and the implications which seem to follow in regard to his doctrine of inner and outer sense.

We have seen that he describes the real as some part of the manifold of sense which is united with the form of space or time and given a determinate place within it. What he says in regard to imagination is that its objects have, outside the imagination, no empirical place in space or time. The meaning is (if we consider space particularly), that while the objects of imagination may be spatial or extended (for imagination copies the actual) they are not judged to belong to the single real space, location in which is the mark of the real object. In other words, though there is no space which is outside us or independent of us in the 'transcendental sense' (as Kant says A 373) yet within our consciousness there must be from the first a distinction between 'real' objects located in the one 'real' space, characterized by fixed determinations, which provides a scheme in which anything real has a determinate location or series of locations, and those unreal objects of imagination to which the mind assigns (in the sense of judging or believing) no such place in the space scheme. When we have once recognized our immediate consciousness of real objects which are conceived in these terms, we can see how the imagination has the basis for its work of copying and construction. But the power of imagination carries with it the possibility of illusory or deceptive presentations (*trügliche Vorstellungen*). How the mind can detect and guard against such illusion, whether it comes in the form of dreams or in mistakes of judgement in connexion with the so-called deceitfulness of the senses, is a problem, Kant indicates, which has to be reckoned with by all theories of knowledge (A 376).

The significance of Kant's doctrine is apparent if we look to the position of Hume. The difficulty which perplexed Hume, as we saw, was how to explain the fact that we come to think of anything solid and permanent, if at the outset we are conscious of no more than the fleeting contents of our own impressions. Part of Kant's answer, the part provided here in conjunction with the doctrine of the Aesthetic, is that something else is present to consciousness from the first, namely our intuition of the forms of a single space and a single time. If we look at the matter from this point of view, it is perhaps easier to see why it is that in the Aesthetic, Kant constantly insists on some kind of priority which belongs to our consciousness of space and time. Since he supposes that we have the notion of actuality from the first and that it is dependent on the intuition of space and time as a scheme to which actual things belong, he cannot follow Hume, for example, in thinking that we

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have impressions of coloured points and that our idea of space is no more than that of relations between them. Our thought of space and time, in his view, is that of something which is ready for the actual when it comes to be. What he wants to say, perhaps, is not that the intuition of space and time is antecedent to sensibility, but that in the beginnings of consciousness we have the thought of space and time as something which antecedes any part of our experience. Unless the mind has this intuition at the outset, it is difficult to see how the contents of impressions each with its separate and imperfect space and time could yield it through any process of construction. The intuition by the mind of a single space and time is something which, if it does not wholly constitute its consciousness of the real as opposed to the imaginary, is at least an indispensable element in perceiving the distinction.

Kant's doctrine may be further illustrated by contrasting it with a different theory of space. If we turn to the theory that there are various kinds of physical space it may be observed that provided the various spaces are thought of as standing in an intelligible relation to each other and forming a real unity, the theory is, so far, not incompatible with what Kant has to say about the relation between the real and the imaginary. It can still be said that an imaginary spatial object does not belong to any part of the unity of the spatial universe. But if the various spaces are not thought of as a unified whole, the imaginary object is no longer distinguishable from the real in the respect that it is judged to have no intelligible place in the unity of the spatial whole. For real objects also may be in the same case. It would be going too far to say in consequence that the theory of various and unrelated spaces allows of no distinction between the real and the imaginary, but it seems to make the distinction more difficult. It can still be said that we judge immediately that some objects of consciousness belong to the realm of real spaces and real spatial objects while other objects of consciousness do not. But the distinction seems to have lost much of the point which belongs to it if the realm of real spaces is not taken to be an intelligible whole, and it is particularly so when the realms of real and imaginary are both alike thought to fall within consciousness. It is at any rate on these lines that Kant is thinking when he contends that the notion of the unity of space is intimately connected with our judgement that objects are real.

We may now consider the bearing of Kant's doctrine on his

views regarding inner and outer sense. It is clear from the whole argument that when Kant goes on in the passage we have been considering (A 374) to refer to inner and outer sense he does not mean simply consciousness (or a *Vorstellung*) of something in the one case temporal and in the other extended. In dreams and other workings of the imagination we have *Vorstellungen* of the extended, and therefore if that which is extended is an object of the outer sense, it would be necessary to say that the objects which we see in our dreams are objects of the outer sense. But Kant has told us that the object of imagination has no empirical location in space and on that account it has to be distinguished from the object of outer sense. The statement which we might expect from Kant would be that through the outer sense we apprehend objects as belonging to the 'real' space-order and through the inner sense we apprehend objects in the 'real' time-order; imagination is not a 'sense', though it has the power of copying the features of what is apprehended by sense and can therefore give us extended and temporal objects but not objects which have a place in the real space- and time-order.

There are however cross-currents in Kant's thought which prevent him from stating the matter thus. At the outset he has directed his argument against Descartes, contending that if the mind is directly aware of its own states, it is just as directly aware of another class of *Vorstellungen* which have as their content not states of the self but objects in space. He is occupied here with a division of consciousness into awareness of states of the self and awareness of something which is taken to be other than the self. We shall have to comment later on the argument, but for the moment we may confine ourselves to seeing how it affects Kant's account of inner and outer sense. The attempt to establish a parallelism between awareness of states of the self and awareness of objects in space leads him to think of inner sense as related to the first and outer sense as related to the second kind of awareness. At the same time he wishes to retain the connexion of inner sense with consciousness of the temporal and of outer sense with consciousness of the spatial, and hence there arises the curious doctrine that while time belongs directly to our inner states, it belongs only mediately to objects in space.

We find yet another way in which Kant distinguishes inner and outer sense in his *Anthropologie*. Here he is anxious to make the point that outer sense is connected with our apprehension of actual

objects in space, and so far what he says agrees with the meaning which he assigns to outer sense in the first Refutation of Idealism. But instead of opposing inner sense to outer as equally consciousness of the actual but of a different order of the actual, he describes the inner sense as consciousness not only of states of the self but of the products of imagination. What of course he is thinking is that in seeing a ghost (to take one of his examples), the mind has before it something which in contrast to objects in the 'real' space-order falls on the side of what the mind in its normal state would regard as internal to itself (*Anthropologie*, § 24).

One point of interpretation may be referred to before we pass on. It seems inappropriate that Kant should use the expression *der innere Sinn* for awareness of states of the self, when it covers for example awareness of our own thoughts. In the passage in the *Anthropologie* previously referred to Kant shows himself conscious of the inappropriateness of the expression, and remarks that there are not various organs of inner sense but 'the soul is its organ'. Similarly in the passages discussed earlier where Kant is insisting on the importance of *Empfindung* and *Wahrnehmung* in our consciousness of the actual, these words too seem inappropriate in relation to consciousness of states of mind. (The translation of *Empfindung* by 'sensation' makes the inappropriateness seem greater than it is, but even if *Empfindung* is recognized as including 'feeling' the addition will not remove the difficulty.) But if we try to get at Kant's thought, we must think of the expressions he uses in relation to his whole doctrine. The important point to bear in mind is that when he is dealing with intuition (*Anschauung*) he is thinking of consciousness as concerned with what is individual and particular. Space and time are individual wholes of which all the parts are individualized, and it is in virtue of this nature of space and time that everything which has genuine location in one or the other is at once individual and real. But because space and time as 'forms' have no content, there must be something in our consciousness providing the content. This something which provides content in space and time is what Kant has in mind when he speaks of *Empfindung*. In this usage it becomes a term which is not tied to sensation or feeling but covers consciousness of anything which can take its individual place as a content of space or time, and as such it will cover consciousness of states of mind regarded as occurring at a particular point in time. As a natural consequence this wider meaning of *Empfindung* and *Wahrnehmung* carries with

it a corresponding enlargement of the meaning of *Sinn*. The point is of general importance in relation to Kant's doctrine of *Anschauung*.

We may now pause to take stock of the results which have so far been reached in the earlier version of the Refutation of Idealism. The aspect of Kant's argument with which we have been principally concerned is this. He has been considering the content of consciousness and the relation of various factors which we must recognize as appearing within it. In his inquiry he reaches the result that the notion of a single space and time as a scheme to which objects and events belong is not a notion which can be regarded as in some way superimposed on an earlier state of consciousness from which it was missing, or as a construction made on the basis of the earlier consciousness. Further, the notion of a single space and time is not only present from the first, but is in integral relation to the whole content of consciousness. The recognition in general of the distinction between the real and the imaginary (whatever happens in particular cases) is immediate and depends on the fact that at the outset there is some content of our consciousness which is given as located in the space- and time-order and also that at the outset we recognize the power of our own imagination to provide a content which has not this location. Consciousness of the space- and time-order is a constituent of our thought of the actual, and it enters into imagination in the sense that imagination is recognized for what it is because its content is apprehended as disjoined from the order of space and time. We may be in doubt in regard to particular cases, but there could be no doubt except on the basis of some immediate recognition of the difference between that which belongs to space and time and that which does not. If Kant is right the ground is cut away from theories which suppose that we have a content of consciousness which in some way we come to attach to the real space- and time-order. We do not come to do this at all, and it is useless to speculate about a process which does not occur.

Before we leave this side of Kant's argument there are two comments which should be made, though they both concern points which must be reserved for later discussion. In the first place we must repeat, what has already been pointed out in passing, that the account is not to be regarded as complete until it has been supplemented by the doctrine of the categories. Secondly we may observe that there is a difficulty in store for Kant in connexion

with this doctrine of the nature of our consciousness of reality. By his doctrine that consciousness of reality is essentially related to consciousness of the space- and time-order, the whole question is raised whether there is no consciousness, equally to be described as consciousness of reality, of that which has no location in space or time. If the question were simply how we can be conscious of God as real, Kant might stand firmly on his rejection of the ontological argument. But the same difficulty arises in regard to our consciousness of a self which precisely because space and time are its forms of perceiving is not itself a member of the space and time order. In this important respect judgement on the validity of the doctrine that consciousness of reality is confined within the limits of intuition must be reserved.

So much for one side of the doctrine of the first-edition Refutation. Kant has contended that when we contrast the real and the imaginary we have in mind a space- and time-order and connect with it the first but not the second. The space- and time-order he regards as a form or scheme provided by our intuition, and though he differs from Berkeley and Hume in the function which he assigns to it, he ranges himself with them in so far as he holds that we cannot be aware of anything other than our own *Vorstellungen*. The question arises whether in the progress of his thought he is content to leave the matter thus, or whether he thinks that these are yet other factors which consciousness introduces (and, we should perhaps add, rightly introduces) into its notion of the real. It is this question, with reference first to the earlier Refutation of Idealism and then to the later, that we shall next consider.

II

THE TWO REFUTATIONS OF IDEALISM

It was said in the last chapter that Kant ranges himself with Berkeley and Hume in so far as he holds that we cannot be aware of anything other than our own *Vorstellungen*. In the first-edition Refutation of Idealism he argues that in taking this view he attributes to external objects a like status to that which he attributes to states of consciousness. External objects only differ from states of consciousness in being a distinct class of *Vorstellungen*. They are the *Vorstellungen* of the external sense while states of consciousness are the *Vorstellungen* of the internal sense. Now we do not hesitate to say that consciousness is real, and if external objects have the same sort of being as consciousness, we can and ought to say that they also are real. It has already been pointed out (p. 4) that in so far as he links what he says to the notion of the thing-in-itself Kant's statements are unsatisfactory. But apart from this point we may criticize his contention that he is giving parity of status to objects in space and states of the self. When we think of objects we can conceive of the objects as the content of our thinking, and when we think of the status of the self we can also conceive of the states of the self as the content of our thinking; in this sense, as alike contents of our thoughts, the objects and the states of the self can be given parity of status. But in putting the matter to ourselves thus and comparing the different contents of thought we have left out of account the thought of which they are the content. It was precisely because whatever status be given to the contents of thought we are always left with an activity of consciousness with which we have still to reckon, that Descartes considered our awareness of the activity of consciousness was on a different footing to our awareness of external objects. Kant's answer does not seem to dispose of this point.

There is yet a further aspect of the matter which disturbs Kant's account. It is plain that the moments of apprehension in which we are conscious of spatial objects are themselves objects of internal sense in so far as they are states of consciousness. If we are to make the distinction of internal and external sense we must say that the activity of external sense is something which occurs in time and is apprehended by internal sense. But if this is so, external sense and its contents are, so to say, enclosed within

internal sense and form part of its content. In that case Kant is no longer able to maintain that there is parity of status between the objects or contents of internal sense on the one hand and those of external sense on the other, and the force of his argument is lost.

Now the last point, though he did not take it into account when he was thinking about the problem of idealism in the Paralogisms, was present to Kant's mind in another context. In the Aesthetic (A 34=B 50, a passage where there is no alteration from the first edition) he contends that 'all *Vorstellungen* whether they have outer things for their objects or not, still in themselves as determinations of the mind belong to inner sense', and he makes this contention the basis for the view that time belongs immediately to our states and only through them to objects in space. But to make objects in space merely contents of determinations of the mind is to give up the notion of parity of status with the self. What then becomes of Kant's answer to those who are dissatisfied with the status which is being assigned to the external world? The different standpoint is clearly due to the fact that Kant is not here thinking of the necessity of arguing the problem raised by Descartes.

We may now turn to the second-edition version of the Refutation of Idealism to see how it takes up the point neglected in the first-edition version. But first it is worth while to notice that the references to Berkeley and Descartes are somewhat confusing. Kant speaks as if there is no need for him to concern himself with Berkeley because the answer to his form of idealism has already been given in the Aesthetic; the task before him concerns Descartes and is to show that we have an indubitable experience of external objects. The remark is curious because it would seem that if Kant has yet to show that we have indubitable experience of external objects the answer to Berkeley has not been supplied. The explanation is that with reference to Berkeley he is thinking of the difficulties in the analysis of consciousness which come from failure to recognize our intuition of space and time. But in fact the working-out of this point is found not in the Aesthetic but in the Paralogisms passage, for though the short Remark III in the Aesthetic touches on the points about imagination raised in the Paralogisms, it does so only slightly. Accordingly it would have been better if Kant had not regarded the later Refutation as a substitute for the whole of the earlier version, but only for part of it. In any case what he has to say in reference to Descartes

will of course contribute also to the definition of his position as against Berkeley.

The whole section is obscure, and it would seem as if Kant either had not finally cleared his own ideas or found great difficulty in expressing himself; at least that is the impression suggested by the fact that he cannot let the matter rest but comes back to it in a footnote in the Preface, re-wording one sentence and continuing with an exposition in regard to which it is difficult to see whether it is a re-statement of the doctrine of the main text or something more. Accordingly it is proper that any interpretation should be put forward with diffidence.

The clue perhaps, as has been already implied, is that Kant is still struggling to establish the thesis of the earlier Refutation that there is a parity in the status of the self and external objects, and that he has come to see the point in which his first exposition failed. We saw that he was satisfied with the position of regarding states of self and external objects as alike contents of presentations, and neglected to observe that the existence of the presentation itself remained as something distinct from its content, and could not be put on a parity with it. In the later Refutation this existence of the presentation (*Vorstellung*) is the point taken by Kant at the outset and his argument starts from the consideration that it is a fact which is determined in time. What he wishes to demonstrate is that the existence of determinations of the self as facts in time does not mean that we must put them on a different level to external objects, the latter being left with the status of contents of our presentations; on the contrary so soon as we realize that we think of determinations of the self as facts, we see that external objects are regarded and must be regarded as facts which are on the same level as the determinations of the self and belong to the same time series.

The argument which Kant advances for this position is imperfectly stated. It should be realized at the outset that the Refutation of Idealism is not self-contained. Apart from the expansion which is found in the footnote to the Preface of the second edition, it depends for its interpretation on the other sections of the *Critique*, notably on the First and Second Analogies and on what Kant says regarding the nature of the self in the Paralogisms; and much of Kant's meaning in these passages can easily be overlooked or misconceived. In order to elucidate his position, it will perhaps be useful to begin by considering the view which is ordinarily

attributed to him and the difficulties to which it is exposed. His doctrine becomes more sharply defined when we separate it from other views, and ask whether it is itself exposed to the difficulties which they involve.

Kant says that 'I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time', and goes on to say that 'All time-determination presupposes the existence of *something permanent* in perception' (B 275). The expression 'something permanent' is naturally enough taken to mean something which remains the same in contrast to other things which are changing or succeeding each other. Further the reference to perception (*Wahrnehmung*) is thought to imply that no time-determination is possible unless something permanent is in fact being perceived. But then it follows, as is pointed out by H. W. B. Joseph in his essay entitled 'A Comparison of Kant's Idealism with that of Berkeley',¹ that Kant's statement that 'All time-determination presupposes the existence of something permanent in perception' must not be taken at its face value. For Kant presumably desires to prove that physical things exist independently of my perceptions and may change unperceived by me; he is bound therefore to hold that they have time-determinations, which do not presuppose anything permanent in perception. Accordingly it is thought, on this interpretation, that Kant means to affirm that any consciousness or perception of time-determinations presupposes perception of something permanent. His argument then appears as an argument based on a certain view regarding the condition under which alone perception of the time-determinations of anything is possible. In passing it may be observed that what Kant says in Remark II does not accord very well with such an interpretation. Here he seems to suggest that the view which he has put forward is confirmed when we turn to the conditions under which empirical perception of time-determinations can take place. The implication is that the argument as previously stated is not drawn from the conditions of perception but from the conditions which reflection attributes to time-determination in general. However that may be (we shall return to the point later) the remainder of the argument is taken to rest on an unjustified assertion that the permanent which is necessary for perception of time-determinations is not to be found in me. The conclusion is drawn that there must be a permanent external to me, and this is the world of things in space.

¹ *Essays in Ancient and Modern Philosophy*, p. 212.

Criticism of the doctrine thus attributed to Kant may take two directions. On the one hand it may be held that the point at which the argument fails is the assertion that in distinction to transient states of consciousness there is no permanent self of which it is possible to be aware. On the other hand criticism may be directed against the premiss that it is impossible to be aware of time-determinations apart from perception of something which is permanent. The first point has a bearing on any interpretation of Kant's doctrine and will be better discussed when his doctrine has been restated. The second relates to the view of Kant's meaning which we are now considering, and a discussion of it may serve to bring his proper doctrine into clearer relief.

The view that awareness of time-determination presupposes perception of something which is permanent has some plausibility. One reason for accepting the view is that awareness of time-determination is thought of in terms of awareness of change. When we think of change we think that it implies the continuance of something identical in that which is changing, and that in consequence it is necessary to perceive something permanent when we are conscious of change. But even if this were allowed (and, as we shall see, the contention is doubtful) it would still be necessary to recognize that change is not the only form of time-determination. There is also succession. Now in regard to succession it is necessary to think of the continuity or permanence of time itself, but it is not *prima facie* obvious that it is necessary to think of anything else which is permanent. It may well seem that something occurs and ceases to be, and then something else occurs; and that it is possible to recognize that the one occurrence is before the other without the necessity of perceiving either anything identical in the two occurrences or something else which continues unchanged during the time occupied by the two occurrences. In fact there seems more to be said for the doctrine of Hume¹ that in order to be aware of continuing identity it is necessary to be aware of succession than for the doctrine that in order to be aware of succession it is necessary to be aware of continuing identity. But if this is so it cannot be said that consciousness of the time-determination of our states involves perception of something permanent. If we are content to regard the states as merely

¹ *Treatise on Human Nature*, Book I, Part IV, 'Of Scepticism with regard to the Senses'.

successive, no permanent needs to be perceived in order that we may be conscious that one state occurs before or after another.

It might, however, be said by someone who followed the interpretation of Kant which we have been discussing, and wished to defend his doctrine, that when Kant speaks of being conscious of the time-determination of our states he refers to more than consciousness of succession. In so far as the states are recognized by me as being *my* states, there must be something identical which holds them together, and since no identity can be found underlying the states, we must look for it elsewhere. But apart from the objection that this answer is inappropriate to Kant's general doctrine which finds the unity of our presentations in the synthetic unity of apperception or the 'I think' which accompanies them, it seems obvious that the identity of anything must be found in itself and not in the identity of something else. It is true that in some cases we perceive the changing determinations of something which remains identical only through its relations to something else which does not change. Thus in perceiving the movement of a body we perceive a change of relations to another body which, relatively to it, is regarded as stable. In passing it may be remarked that what is true of motion is not necessarily true of all change, for motion is essentially connected with change of relations to other things in space. (Change of colour for instance is not perceived by reference to something else.) But the important point is that even in this case that which is dependent on something other than the moving object is not the consciousness of its identity but the perception of its changes. It is not in virtue of consciousness of its movement that we are aware that the object which moves continues to be the same object, and therefore the unchanging character of other objects is not what enables us to know *its* identity. If then the something permanent which is external to the object is required for the perception of the object's successive states and not for consciousness of its identity we come back to the question whether consciousness of succession demands the perception of something permanent. As to this it seems, as we saw above, that there is no such necessity. We must not be misled by a comparison with movement in space which is a special case having nothing in common with the succession of mental states.

We may note that if these considerations are correct, it is unnecessary to discuss the question whether permanence can be

found in the self. The argument attributed to Kant fails apart from that question. If our states are merely successive it seems that their time-determinations can be perceived without reference to anything permanent. If we think of them as more than a mere succession it is not by reference to something external to them that we do so.

It seems clear then that if the Refutation of Idealism is interpreted on the basis we have considered, Kant's doctrine cannot be defended. What we have now to ask is whether such an interpretation is right. On a further examination of what is said in the Refutation and elsewhere in the *Critique* it may appear that Kant is working with an altogether different set of ideas from those which are attributed to him.

In the first place we must go back to a point which has already been taken (see p. 15 *supra*). It is clear that the basis of Kant's argument is the reflection that we are aware of our own states of consciousness as occurring in time. It is this point, as we have seen, which distinguishes the approach to his problem which we find in the second Refutation from the approach which we find in the first. Now in the text of the Refutation it is obscure what use is made of the observation that our states occur in time. It looks as if Kant first asserts that anything which occurs in time is only given a date by reference to something permanent which can be perceived, and then goes on to say that this permanent something cannot be in me. It is alleged (e.g. by H. W. B. Joseph) that the last is an unproved assertion, because Kant has not shown that there cannot be a permanent self. But this is to neglect the reason which Kant himself advances for saying that the permanent cannot be in me. What he says is that this permanent cannot be something in me precisely because my being in time can only be determined through it. It is essential to notice that the reason is *not* that something permanent is required and that no permanent can be found in me. It is the quite different reason that we cannot but think of the self or states of consciousness as determined in relation to something permanent which is external to them.

It seems that Kant has in mind the consideration that inasmuch as we assign time-determinations to the self or its states we must think of a time-order in which the existence of the self and its states is included, which extends beyond their existence, and is itself permanent. He says himself in the footnote to the Preface of the second edition (B xxxix) that there is some obscurity in the

expressions which he has used in the text, and he rewrites the third sentence of the Proof as follows: 'This permanent cannot be an intuition in me. For all determining grounds of my existence which can be found in me are presentations, and as such need a permanent separate from them in relation to which the change of presentations (and consequently my own existence in the time wherein they are changing) can be determined.' We may notice a significant point in passing. In the second sentence of the Proof in the text Kant has said: 'All determination in regard to time presupposes the existence of something permanent in perception (*Wahrnehmung*).'¹ As it appears that the 'something permanent' is the time-order itself, the reference to *Wahrnehmung* may in this context mislead us. It is true, as we shall see later, that Kant does not believe that we can be conscious of time without some relation to *Wahrnehmung*, but in so far as he is thinking at this point of the time-order as such,¹ it would be more natural for him to speak of *Anschauung* rather than of *Wahrnehmung*. Now we notice that when he rewrites the third sentence in order to make it clear that the whole reference is to the permanent time-order, he does not say that the permanent cannot be a perception in me (*Wahrnehmung*) but that it cannot be an intuition in me (*Anschauung*). We shall see later that we need to be careful in construing Kant's references to perception, but the rewritten passage shows at any rate that the reference at this point to perception does not tell against the view that what Kant has in mind as the basis of his argument is the permanence of the time-order itself.

If we still have any hesitation in regard to this basic consideration from which Kant is starting, it is surely dispelled by his further remarks in the footnote to the Preface. At every point the argument turns on the reflection that anything in myself of which I am determinately conscious (or, in other words, of which I have an intuition) is necessarily related to the time-order which is external to me. Thus (when Kant discusses the objection that I can only be aware of my presentations of what is external to me and therefore it must always be uncertain whether anything corresponding to these presentations does or does not exist externally to me, his answer is as follows. In inner experience I am conscious of my existence in time and consequently of the determination of my existence in the time-order, and this is more than being simply conscious of my presentation; it is one and the same

¹ What is said here is subject to the later discussion of this passage; see p. 25.

thing as the empirical consciousness of my existence which only becomes determinate through relation to something which is at once indispensable to my existence and is external to me. Consciousness of my existence in time means consciousness of a relation to something external to me, and it is therefore experience not fiction, sense not imagination which indissolubly connects the external with my inner sense.

We should notice the points in this account which are especially significant. Kant's answer to those who say that our presentations may be imaginary is that when I have a presentation I am conscious of the determination of my existence in the time-order and 'this is more than being simply conscious of my presentation'.¹ The point he is making is that even if a presentation is imaginary or (it would be better to say) has an imaginary content, its significance for us is not exhausted by its imaginary content; the presentation is also a determinate moment of consciousness occurring at a certain time and we are aware of it as such. In the latter aspect it is not imaginary but real, and consciousness of its reality is inevitably connected with consciousness of a real time-order to which it is related as to something external.² Further we should notice the absence of any reference at this stage to physical objects. Kant says that consciousness of my existence in time means consciousness of a relation to something external to me ('Dieses Bewusstsein meines Daseins in der Zeit ist also mit dem Bewusstsein eines Verhältnisses zu etwas ausser mir identisch verbunden'). The statement is dependent on what goes before, and can only follow if time is taken as the 'something outside me' to which Kant refers. We may observe that Kant comes in effect to say that time is the object of external sense. The statement sounds paradoxical in relation to some of the accounts which

¹ Contrast Hume's view in regard to the simplicity of impressions, discussed in my *Treatise on Knowledge*, Chapter I. Kant is contending that when I have an impression I am conscious of more than the content of the impression, which is all that Hume considers.

² When we consider this part of Kant's thesis we should observe how like it is in form to Descartes's exposition of the *Cogito ergo sum*. Descartes points out in effect that the act of doubting is not something which can be doubted, and Kant insists that the state of imagining is not itself imaginary. What Descartes says in regard to the impossibility of eliminating the fact of thinking Kant says in regard to the impossibility of eliminating the time-order in which the fact of thinking occurs. If we think of the time-order as the content of a *Vorstellung* we find we are thinking of the *Vorstellung* of which the time-order is the content as itself occurring in a time-order; we must always have for a *Vorstellung* a time-order distinct from or external to the *Vorstellung* itself.

Kant gives of the distinction between internal and external sense, but is intelligible if we remember the conflicting strains of his thought in this matter which were discussed in the last chapter. Here Kant is concerned to insist on the independence and objectivity of the time-order, and from this point of view he easily thinks of it as the object of external sense.

With the help of the elucidation in the Preface the meaning of Remark I in the text is more readily seen. In this passage Kant is concerned with following up the line of thought which is directed not towards showing that there is no permanence in the self but rather towards showing that anything determinate which can be said to be or belong to the self is placed by our thought in an objective time-order. He allows that I seem to be conscious of an *I am* which 'expresses the consciousness which can accompany all thinking' and that this *I am* 'immediately embraces in itself the existence of a subject'. But this existence is not something of which we have knowledge or experience. We can only have experience of anything if we have intuition of it, and intuition involves placing it in the time-order. Thus we come back to the point that so far as we are conscious of anything *determinate* in the subject we must think of it with reference to time which is external to it.¹

In order to appreciate the significance of this initial step in Kant's doctrine we may pause to notice how far he has moved from the position of Berkeley and Hume. It is the comparison with Berkeley which is here the more instructive, since Berkeley has a side of his philosophy which brings him nearer than Hume to the point which Kant is making.

The basis of Berkeley's account of physical objects is that they only exist as the content of our ideas or perceptions. When he comes to reflect on the difficulties which seem to arise if we surrender the notion that they persist even if they are not perceived, he evidently hesitates between two doctrines. On the one hand he is inclined to say that they persist in the consciousness of God, but on the whole he seems to prefer a different solution. In accordance with this solution his explanation of the seeming persistence of physical objects is that there is a persisting order or system in the occurrence of our ideas. He did not see, as Hume did, that there is a difficulty, if this be the whole nature of physical objects, in explaining the genesis of the idea which we have of

¹ The discussion here of this passage is only provisional. For a further discussion see p. 37 et seq. below.

their identity and continued existence. But he held (and here he seems to show more insight than Hume) that not all the objects of our consciousness can be simply the contents of the consciousness itself. There are two orders of existence and two orders of consciousness which are entirely different. He makes the point clear in the first edition of the Principles. Thus in § 142 he says:

'After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless, inactive objects, or by way of *idea*. *Spirits* and ideas are things so wholly different, that when we say "they exist", "they are known", or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing alike or common in them; and to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our faculties, we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle, seems as absurd as if we should hope to *see a sound*.'

In the first edition he refers only to spirits but in the sentences added to the same paragraph in the second edition he considers more generally what objects of consciousness there are which have this different way of existence and are known in a different way from that in which physical objects are known. He summarizes them as '*spirits*, and *relations*, and *acts*', and in regard to relations in particular he says: 'It is also to be remarked that, all relations including an act of the mind, we cannot so properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion, of the relations and habitudes between things.'

Now when Berkeley is advancing the doctrine that 'the relations and habitudes between things' cannot be taken to be contents of our consciousness and dependent upon it, it looks as if he is coming to the same position as that of Kant. It is indeed obvious when we think about it that the relations between our ideas, their sequence and system, cannot be on the same footing as the contents of our ideas, and that if we apprehend the sequence of our ideas, let alone their 'habitudes' our consciousness cannot be by way of ideas, in Berkeley's sense of the term. But in spite of what he says it seems that he had not really grasped the position. If he had, he would have seen that the time in which the sequences of ideas occur must be something of which the *esse* is not *percipi*. The temporal relations of our ideas to those of other spirits—for this is an integral part of the plan in which perceptions occur—cannot be deemed to be objective unless time is also so deemed. Had Berkeley seen this he could not have left standing the passage

regarding time in § 98 of the Principles where he says that time is nothing abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, and goes on later to remark that 'the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind'. If what he says is true, it could not be held that the ideas of one spirit occurred at the same time as, or earlier or later than, the ideas of another spirit, and such a result would seem to wreck the conception of the organized plan in accordance with which perceptions occur.

If the passage as a whole is attentively considered it will be seen that Berkeley has no conception of time as something of which the *esse* is by no means *percipi*, and that he fails to see that it is the objective condition of the system of our own perceptions and those of all other minds which he himself postulates. As regards the question why nevertheless he arrives at the result that 'the relations and habitudes between things' are the object of notions and not of ideas, the answer is doubtless to be found in the cryptic statement that all relations 'include an act of the mind'. His editor, Campbell Fraser, suggests that here is 'a germ of Kantism' and that he is thinking of, without analysing 'that activity of mind which constitutes relation'. But if this is what Berkeley is thinking, it should be observed that such a view does not make the relations independent of the activity of mind which apprehends them, and therefore does not fit his conception of consciousness by way of notions. No doubt he thinks that by recognizing that there is activity of mind in relating he puts relations on the side of *percipere*. But if the relations between my perceptions, i.e. the time-order and system in which they occur, are objective facts they cannot be constituted by the activity of my consciousness in conceiving them. The relations apprehended must be distinguished from the apprehension of them, and Berkeley's reference to relations as including an act of the mind fails to elucidate the distinction. We should notice, however, that a different interpretation may perhaps be nearer the mark. It seems possible that when Berkeley refers to relations as including an act of the mind, what he is thinking of is that the system of relations between ideas must depend on a mind, but this mind is the mind of God. Such a view is much more consonant with the position which Berkeley is beginning to work out. But it is clear at any rate that he has not Kant's insight into the connexion of the problem with time and the implications of this connexion.

The foregoing comparison with Berkeley has perhaps been useful if it has served to elucidate the significance of the new line of thought which Kant is following. But so far we have considered only the initial step in his argument. We have yet to ask how he connects the fact that time is external to our states of consciousness with the externality of the physical world. Now at first sight it seems that both in the text and in the Preface, Kant passes from the one point to the other without argument or even explanation. It is, however, at least clear that in his own mind he connects closely the notions of time and of what is perceived or perceivable in time. We noticed earlier (see p. 20) that the second sentence of the Proof in the text introduces a reference to perception ('All time-determination presupposes something permanent in perception') and we remarked that the reference to perception might mislead us in regard to the nature of his argument. It may mislead in this way. Kant is first occupied in showing that any state of consciousness is included in something external to itself, and here he relies on the fact that the self or any state of the self is included in time. That is to say this part of his argument is drawn, not from the relation of states of consciousness to what is perceived in time, but from their relation to time itself. Accordingly when Kant expands the argument in the Preface, he refers, as we saw, to intuition rather than to perception. But of course for his final conclusion the connexion of the intuition of time with perception is all-important. What we have therefore to ask is what connexions he believes to exist between time and that which is perceived in it, and what bearing they have on his argument for the reality of the physical world. Kant himself is so little explicit that we have to deduce his position from his general doctrines rather than from what he says in the text.

There are certain features of his doctrine which in their bearing on his account suggest three different lines of thought. All these lines converge on the same conclusion and we may believe that Kant had them more or less clearly in mind. The first touches the question of the time-relations between states of consciousness and objects of perception, the second the dependence of intuition on perception, and the third the notion of permanence. We will consider these in order, beginning with the first.

When Kant was writing the first Refutation he did not see clearly the two elements in what he called a *Vorstellung*, the activity of consciousness on the one hand and the object or content of

consciousness on the other. He therefore did not take account of the possibility that while states of consciousness might be *Vorstellungen* in the full sense of activities of consciousness possessing a content, external objects might only be *Vorstellungen* in the limited sense of contents of consciousness. If he had more clearly realized the position he could not so confidently have asserted the parity of what he called respectively objects of internal sense and objects of external sense. As it was he was content to call both alike *Vorstellungen* and, inasmuch as he regarded them as being on the same footing, he found no difficulty in the matter of the time-relations between them. Both could be thought of as being in the same time-order, even though this time-order was phenomenal or internal to consciousness, and their time-relations could be conceived in a way no different from that in which the time-relations of mental events and physical objects are conceived by a realist.

But when in another context (A 34 = B 50) to which we have already referred (see p. 14 above) he realized the difference between an activity of consciousness and its object or content and took the view that external things were themselves contents of internal states, he was confronted by the difficulty of thinking of time-relations between external things and states of consciousness. The solution which he adopts in this passage is to say in effect that there are no time-relations between external things and states of consciousness; instead of thinking of time-relations *between* them we must think that because external things are contents of states of consciousness, their time-determinations *are* the time-determinations of states of consciousness. Such a solution, however, could not really commend itself to him. His habitual way of thinking was to hold that the mind does not and cannot conceive that the time-determinations of objects are the same as those of the acts of consciousness in which they are apprehended. He recognized that we think of the time occupied by the duration or change of objects as different from the dates of occurrence or duration of the moments in which we apprehend them; the moments of apprehension and the objects are thought of as belonging to the same time-order, as having different time-determinations within it, and as having also genuine time-relations with each other because they are different and not identical events. In recognizing that the mind thinks thus he was at one with Hume, but unlike Hume he held that this way of thinking was not an error into which the mind

was led by the influence on imagination of certain factors in experience, but a basic necessity of experience itself. That this was Kant's position is plain when we study the Second Analogy and notice its insistence on the fundamental distinction between the sequence of apprehension and the sequence of physical events.

It is worth while to pause for a moment and consider the doctrine of the Second Analogy, since it coincides neither with the first Refutation nor with the passage in the Aesthetic nor with the second Refutation. It seems that it may be best described as an unsuccessful attempt at once to keep the standpoint of the passage in the Aesthetic and to maintain the notion of time-relations between moments of apprehension and objects apprehended. The latter part of the doctrine (i.e. the attempt to treat moments of apprehension and objects apprehended as distinct and to preserve time-relations between them) appears at the beginning of the second paragraph, which was the start of the first edition (B 234 and A 189). Kant says:

'Apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive. The presentations of the parts follow each other. Whether they follow each other also in the object, is a second point for reflection which is not included in the first. Now we can call everything, even every presentation so far as we are conscious of it, an object; but what this word means in relation to appearances not merely in so far as they (as presentations) are objects, but so far as they indicate objects, is a matter for deeper inquiry. So far as appearances, regarded only as presentations, are as such objects of apprehension, they are not to be distinguished from apprehension, i.e. reception into the synthesis of imagination, and we must say, the manifold of appearances is always produced successively in the mind.'

In a later sentence he goes on to say:

'Although appearances are not things-in-themselves and, notwithstanding, are the only thing which can be given to us to be experienced, I must show what sort of connexion in time belongs to the manifold in appearances, while the presentation of the manifold in apprehension is always successive.'

What Kant is saying differs from the first Refutation because it recognizes a distinction between the act of apprehension and the object or content of apprehension. The former is what he has in mind when he refers to 'appearances regarded only as presentations' and says that 'they are not to be distinguished from apprehension,

i.e. reception into the synthesis of imagination'. The latter (the object or content of apprehension) is referred to as what presentations 'indicate', or as 'the manifold in appearances' in contrast to 'the presentation of the manifold in apprehension'. The difference from the passage in the Aesthetic is that the time-determinations of the two are not identified; it is indeed a basic necessity for the argument of the Second Analogy that they should not be. Moments of apprehension and objects are regarded as having different determinations in the one time-order. On the other hand we find as Kant proceeds that he is unable to surrender the doctrine expounded in the Aesthetic that objects must be regarded as internal to presentations. In B 236 = A 191 he writes:

'But as soon as I raise my concepts of an object to the plane of transcendental meaning, the house is no thing-in-itself but only an appearance, i.e. a presentation, the transcendental object of which is unknown; what then do I understand by the question: How is the manifold connected in the appearance, if the appearance cannot be regarded as a thing-in-itself? Here that which belongs to the series of apprehension comes to be regarded as a presentation, but the appearance which is given to me, despite the fact that it is no more than a complex of these presentations is regarded as the object of them, with which my concept which I draw from the presentations of apprehension must agree.'

The point to be especially noticed is Kant's contention that the object is no more than a complex of presentations although at the same time it is regarded as the object of these presentations.

We must ask how we are to interpret this statement and what are its implications, the main question being whether or not it is compatible with the view that moments of apprehension and objects apprehended are distinct and can have genuine time-relations with each other. If we refrain from laying any stress on the word 'regarded' (Kant's expression is *als der Gegenstand derselben betrachtet*), it seems that Kant wishes at one and the same time to say that the object is a presentation and the object of a presentation, or the content of an act of apprehension and something separate from apprehension. But to make the object a presentation or the content of an act of apprehension would seem to be incompatible with maintaining the distinctness or separation of apprehension and object which alone would make genuine time-relations between the two possible. If on the other hand we give full weight to the word 'regarded', the doctrine is apparently that objects are presentations but the mind makes presentations serve a

double purpose, regarding them first as states of consciousness and secondly as objects with their own time-determinations. But to say this is not to maintain that genuine distinctness of the time-relations of objects and the moments of apprehending them which Kant presupposes, but rather to assert that the mind indulges in the fiction of this distinctness. We shall see later (see Chapter III) that a similarly uncertain position is adopted by Kant in the first-edition Deduction of the Categories, and we shall consider some further points in regard to it in that connexion. But in the meantime the main point to be taken is that at whatever expense of consistency Kant is clear that the separateness and relation in time of moments of apprehension and objects must be retained as a basic factor in experience.

We can return now to the second Refutation. In the first Refutation Kant did not see clearly the distinction between acts of apprehension and their contents or objects. In other contexts he seems to mark the distinction but he takes it for granted that the mind can only be conscious of two things, its own momentary acts of apprehension (or other mental states) and the contents which are internal to these moments of apprehension. (In the second Refutation he recognizes that the mind in being conscious of its own states must be conscious of the time-order to which they belong, and that this time-order cannot be thought of as itself either a moment of apprehension or its content.) But moments of apprehension and their contents are the two senses in which he uses the word *Vorstellung*, and therefore he is bound to say that the time-order is not a *Vorstellung*. If now it is necessary to hold, as Kant thinks it is, that physical objects are related to acts of apprehension in the way of being in the same time-order and having their own determinations within it, he can only conclude that they have an independent status in the objective time-order. But if they have this independent status they cannot be acts of apprehension or the content of acts of apprehension, and it is necessary to say of them, as was said of time itself, that they are things without me and not mere presentations of things without me. This is the conclusion which the Refutation explicitly states.)

We have followed one line of thought which seems to be relevant to Kant's conclusion, in whatever degree it was clearly present in his mind, and to possess some cogency. The second which we shall consider is the line of thought referred to above (p. 25) as connected with the question of the dependence of intuition on perception.

Here we approach the matter in a different way, starting from the deficiency in the notion of time if it is considered by itself alone. It is important not to be misled by Kant's expressions in the *Aesthetic* and to think that he regards time itself as being something which can be perceived. What we can perceive is not time but events temporarily determined. In the First Analogy Kant tells us explicitly that time in itself cannot be perceived. The statement is made in the opening paragraph of the first edition (A 183 = B 226) and is repeated in the same words in the paragraph added in the second edition (B 225). Now this position has some bearing on the statement that when we perceive our own existence or our states, we are aware that they are determined in a time which is external to them. The externality of time to the states means that it exists before they begin and after they have ceased. But if time cannot be perceived, we must, in order to be aware of the time existing before and after the states, perceive the contents of this time. In this way it seems to be necessary in order to perceive the time-determinations of a state of consciousness that we should perceive something other than this state of consciousness itself.

The argument so stated seems precarious and it needs elucidation. In the first place, although it may be right to say that time itself is not perceived, there is some sense in which we can be conscious of time without being conscious of events forming the content of time. To take one point only, it is part of our awareness of an event perceived as occurring in the present that we think there will be succeeding time; but we do not perceive future events. It remains true, however, that so far as relation to the future is part of the time-determination of a perceived event, we think of the future as that which will contain events capable of being perceived. Thus if we think of a year or many years hence, part of our consciousness may be the thought of so many succeeding winters and summers or the earth's revolving course round the sun; and if it is not the thought of these things something else must take their place to mark our imagination of the lapse of time.

Now if Kant's thought is moving along these lines, we can see more precisely the part which the reference to perception plays in his argument. His doctrine is not only that we cannot *perceive* time without a content, but that we cannot *think* of time except as that which has events, such as might be perceived, as its content. That is to say, he thinks we are bound to hold that time is nothing

except the form of that which we call the content of time.) When therefore he says in the Proof of the Refutation that: 'All time-determination presupposes the existence of something permanent in perception' he does not mean—as in the interpretation referred to earlier (see p. 16 above) he was supposed to mean—that consciousness or perception of time-determinations presupposes perception of something permanent. He means that if anything has a determined place in the time-order there must be time external to it, and since there is no such thing as empty time there must be contents of time external to it. The point that the determined *existence* of anything in the time-order necessitates the existence of other things besides it appears in almost every sentence of the Proof.

But there is still the difficulty of the reference to perception in the second sentence of the Proof; Kant seems to say that nothing can have determined existence in the time-order unless something other than itself is actually being perceived. When, however, we read further it looks as if the reference to actual perception can be somewhat differently interpreted. Kant expresses his meaning more carefully in two later sentences where he writes: 'Consequently the determination of my existence in time is only possible through the existence of actual things, which I perceive as external to me. So consciousness in time (sc. consciousness of my existence in time) is necessarily connected with consciousness that determination in time is thus rendered possible.' What Kant seems to have in mind is this. My existence could not be determined in time unless actual things external to me existed; I in fact have perceptions of external things, and so far as I am conscious of my existence in time I think of the existence of external things as standing in necessary connexion with the time-determinations of my existence. That is to say, the point Kant wishes to make is that when I am conscious of my existence as dated in time, I must have the thought in my mind that there are external things; I need not perhaps perceive them at the moment, but I should not have the thought of them unless I had had perceptions of existence external to the self. The support for what he is saying is found when it is taken in conjunction with his doctrine that it is impossible to conceive of empty time.

The argument that when we think about the time-order and the relation of our existence to it, it is necessary to suppose other existences than our own merits careful consideration. But it seems .

that there are two ways in which the argument might be met without there being any necessity to suppose the reality of the physical world. In the first place it might be held that even though there were no physical world, time would not be empty because states of consciousness endure or the self endures throughout time. (The argument contained in Remark I which has a bearing on this point has already been referred to (see p. 22), but it will need more examination.¹) Secondly it is possible to suppose that if no single self is permanent there is always a succession of selves to provide the content without which time could not exist. In seeking to know whether the *Critique* furnishes any answer to these points we must begin by considering the third line of thought referred to earlier (see p. 25), namely the doctrines connected in Kant's mind with the notion of permanence.

Kant's references to 'something permanent' in the Refutation must be read in connexion with what he says on the subject of substance or the permanent in the First Analogy. His account is not altogether easy to follow, but the clue to it seems to be that he is seeking to derive the elements contained in the notion of substance from the characteristics which must be attributed to time itself. We have already seen (p. 30 above) that both the original opening of the First Analogy and the opening of the second edition put in the forefront of the argument the observation that 'time in itself cannot be perceived'. Kant believes that this determines the way in which we must think about time and its contents. Time is only the form of that which we speak of as occupying or filling time, and the characteristics which we ascribe to time must be thought of as belonging to something else than time itself. (We may notice in passing that this derivation of certain *a priori* notions which we possess in regard to objects from the *a priori* form of time is an important part of Kant's general doctrine; we shall see more of it later.) If then we wish to understand Kant's notion of the substance of physical things, we must study the characteristics of time from which the notion is derived.

In what sense is time permanent? It is not permanent in the sense that time can be divided into a substratum and its accidents and that the substratum can be regarded as remaining the same while the accidents change. If the notion of the permanence of the physical world is derived from reflection on time it cannot be connected with the notion of substance and its accidents. Hence,

¹ See p. 37 et seq., *infra*.

we find Kant saying in B 229, 230 = A 186 that many misconceptions arise if we divide existence into inherence (the existence of accidents, which is regarded as a particular kind of existence) and subsistence (the existence of substance). If we do not follow this line of thought, how then are we to think of the permanence of time? Time is thought to be permanent in the sense that it is a contradiction to think that there are moments in which there is no time. We think that any moment of time is different from every other since it stands in a different relation to the moments which have been and will be. We think also that the existence of time is subject to the condition that the moment of its existence involves the non-existence of other moments. Past, present, and future cannot exist together. If we try to think of its existence in any other terms we are not thinking of existence in terms of time or of phenomenal existence, but of noumenal existence; but when we employ the principles of the Understanding it is phenomenal existence with which we are alone concerned. Lastly the notion of continuity of time is involved as follows. We cannot think that the present moment in which time exists began before the moment in which it was existing was ended. To think this would be to think that past and present exist together. Nor on the other hand can we think that there is a non-temporal interval between the lapse of the preceding and the coming to be of the present moment.

Now if time has these characteristics and if time is a form and can only exist in so far as there is something of which it is the form, it is necessary that there should be something which is fully endowed with the characteristics of time. Kant thinks that what is required is provided by the existence of the physical world. The physical world is permanent in the sense in which time is permanent. There is no moment in which it does not exist, and therefore in its existence the permanence of time is maintained. At every moment it is different from what it was at every other. For even if we think of a lapse of time in which the physical world remains unchanged, the relations of every moment of its existence in the lapse of time to the moments which were before and to those which come after are constituted by different intervals and are therefore different. It is plain enough that it exhibits the diversity or differentiations of time. It might be added that we find it impossible to think that the change which takes place at the end of the supposed unchanging period was not preceded by a continuous series of changes in this period itself; for how other-

wise could change come to be? But if this characteristic can be said to be derived from the form of time it must be related to its continuity as well as to its diversity. As to the continuity of the physical world, we think that the condition of a present state of existence is that the previous state has ceased to exist and the future state is not yet. There must be continuity of succession in the sense that we can neither think that a past state and a present state overlap nor that they are separated by an interval.¹

It is ideas such as these which Kant has in mind when he refers to 'something permanent in perception'. His doctrine is that we could not think of the determination of anything in the time-order unless experience in general were such as to offer for perception something about whose nature we must think in the way described; for otherwise we should not have the notion of the time-order itself. We must think of something permanent other than time. But the notion of the permanent is not the notion of the unchanging or even the notion of something which is in part unchanging and in part changing. Kant uses in the First Analogy the expression 'only the permanent is subject to change', and it is easy to think of this dictum in a way which would misrepresent his doctrine. For instance we may take, as an illustration of what Kant is supposed to mean, an object of a certain shape which changes its colour but not its shape; we say of it that it is the same object despite the change in its colour because its shape and other qualities remain unchanged. It is by using such illustrations that we are led to think that when an object changes in all perceptible respects there is something (matter) which is unchanged. But this is exactly the notion from which Kant says that misconceptions arise. The permanence of colour in its changes—in the sense in which Kant uses permanence—has nothing to do with the continuance of anything else. It is colour which is permanent; and this means that there is always colour in a continuous succession in which one colour replaces another. This in the sense in which Kant thinks of permanence in change, and it cannot be illustrated by reference to anything which is not changing, for the permanence in question is derived from the fact that there is always something which is different, not from the fact that there is always something which is the same.

But now a point arises which needs to be considered. It may be

¹ The derivation of the continuity of the physical world from the continuity of time is worked out in the conclusion of the Second Analogy, A 207 = B 252 et seq.

stated as an objection to Kant's doctrine. He insists, it can be said, that we must think of the characteristics of time as belonging to that which is the content of time. But we can think of events as occurring at different moments in the time-order without thinking of any continuity of the one event and the other. Does this not imply that we can think of the contents of time as temporarily determined without thinking that they must possess all the characteristics of time itself? To argue thus, however, is to mistake Kant's meaning. He holds that in order that any event may be thought of as dated, we must think of a single and unbroken time-order; but since we cannot think that time is empty, a single and unbroken time-order is impossible unless it has a continuous content. This is in his mind when he writes in A 189 = B 232:

'Substances (in the phenomenal world) are the substrates of all determinations of time. The beginning of some substances and the passing away of others would destroy the one condition of the empirical unity of time, and phenomena in that case would belong to two times in which, side by side, existence would pass; which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must be placed, not as coexistent but as successive.'

But if we can think of time as filled, we can then think of a continuous time-order in which discrete events are placed, if it so happens, at intervals from each other, without the necessity of thinking of continuity between the events themselves. It is true that Kant believes we must hold that each event, if it is physical, is continuous with some preceding events of which it is a new modus and with future events which will replace it. But the determination of the event in time is not dependent on its relation to the series of events of which it is one of the members; it may be simply apprehended as occurring at a certain point in the concrete succession of events which occupies time. What is required is not the thought of its particular continuity but the thought of the continuous concrete succession which leaves no moment of time empty.

The point considered in the last paragraph prepares us for a doctrine which is a further step in Kant's argument. Not everything, he holds, which is determined in time is such as to exhibit the full nature of time. The physical world has the essential permanence and continuity of time, but against this permanent and continuous background states of consciousness and even individual minds appear as discrete events which come and go and have no

continuity of succession. We should not be able to think even of their determination in time, if we did not think of the permanent succession of the physical world. We shall proceed to consider Kant's own statement of this doctrine, but it is interesting first to notice how far, if the doctrine is indeed his, he has departed from his initial presentation of the nature of time. We have noticed already (p. 21 above) that in effect he comes to think of time as the object of the external sense. We see now that when he thinks of time not in the abstract but in close connexion with its content he finds that, so far from being particularly the form of states of consciousness which he calls objects of the internal sense, it is only in spatial objects that it has its proper and necessary expression.

The doctrine that only the physical world and not states of consciousness or individual minds can provide the content required by the notion of time needs to combat with three alternative possibilities. It must maintain that neither (1) states of consciousness, nor (2) a self to which states of consciousness belong, nor (3) a succession of selves can be regarded as permanent and continuous. In considering these points it is important to keep steadily in mind the notion of permanence and continuity with which, as we have seen, Kant is working.

Beginning with the question of the permanence or impermanence of states of consciousness, we may ask at the outset what kind of proof there can be of any answer which is given; and here it is instructive to consider what proof Kant offers of the permanence of the physical world. In the First Analogy (A 189 = B 227) he affirms that the proposition 'substance is permanent' is tautological, but he evidently recognizes that he is concerned with another proposition which is not tautological but synthetic and requires a proof or deduction. Now there are really two synthetic propositions involved in his account which are not distinguished; one is the proposition 'a permanent exists' and the other the proposition 'the physical world is permanent'. Kant seems to think that he has proved the second proposition in the only way in which it can be proved, that is, by a deduction from the possibility of experience; by which he means that it has been shown to be a condition of any time-determination. But what is demanded by time-determination is the existence of a permanent, and not the permanence of the physical world. The first proposition is established by the deduction from experience, but not the second, unless something can be added to the proof. It is in fact a pre-

supposition of Kant's argument in the Analogy that the physical world is such as to be at least compatible with permanence, in the sense in which he uses the term, while mental states are not. In other words his argument is that time demands a permanent existent, and that the physical world must be this permanent existent because states of consciousness do not possess the permanence which is required.

Kant does not discuss this presupposition, but it seems on reflection that it is legitimate for him to adopt it. Physical objects present themselves for perception and thought as a series of modifications in which one state replaces another and is itself in turn replaced, and if reflection demands an ultimate permanence there is no incongruity in attributing this permanence to them. It is not the same with states of consciousness. When we perceive a succession of states of consciousness we do not seem to perceive or think of them as successive modifications of a single state. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle asserts that pleasure is not a *γένεσις*, 'a coming to be something out of something else'. Now it is just this notion of continual *γένεσις* which is an essential part of Kant's concept of permanence. In rejecting the permanence of states of consciousness, he generalizes (it would seem legitimately) the observation which Aristotle thinks is obvious in regard to one particular state. It follows that if states of consciousness are so regarded they do not provide the required basis for the notion of time.

The foregoing train of thought seems to be the proper support for Kant's argument. But it cannot be said that it is developed in the Refutation itself. Indeed his conduct of the argument indicates that it was not clearly present in his mind. If we look at the Proof and the following Remark I it is apparent that when he refers to 'my existence as determined in time' he does not distinguish the time-determination of my states and the time-determination of the self regarded as a whole existence. But he evidently works with the presupposition that states of consciousness which come and go cannot provide the required permanent, and he assumes that if we are to look for a permanent in consciousness we shall only be able to find it, if at all, in an underlying self which is permanent and changeless. The argument against the existence of a permanent and changeless self as an object of consciousness we shall consider in the next paragraph. At the moment we are concerned with Kant's tacit dismissal of the possibility that the permanent can be

found in states of consciousness. It is obvious, if the argument of the First Analogy is rightly apprehended, that we cannot refuse to find permanence in states of consciousness simply because they come and go. Physical states no less than states of consciousness come and go. As we have seen, it is in the continuous succession of the coming and going of physical states, which takes the form of continuous replacement of one state by another, that Kant finds the permanence of the physical world. But if so, he should consider the application of the same argument to states of consciousness, and recognize that their evanescence does not of itself destroy the permanence of succession which is the permanence properly required for the notion of time. The argument against regarding states of consciousness as the permanent depends not on their evanescence but on the point that they cannot be taken as being continuous in the sense required. Kant's failure to see this point indicates his precarious grasp of his own doctrine.

We can now consider the second alternative which needs to be rejected if Kant's argument is to stand. This is the view that though states of consciousness are not permanent, yet there is a self to which they belong, and this self can be regarded as permanent and therefore capable of providing the required content for the time-order. As we have just noticed, it is the view which Kant proceeds to examine in Remark I of the Refutation. Plainly it employs a different notion of permanence from that which he adopts in the First Analogy. It takes substance in the sense in which the substance of the self is discussed by him in the Paralogisms, not in the sense in which he thinks of the substance of the physical world. Kant himself indicates clearly the meaning and derivation of the notion of substance when it is applied to the self. In the Criticism of the First Paralogism he refers to the pure category of substance and remarks (A 349):

'Of anything in general I can say, it is substance, in so far as I distinguish it from bare predicates and determinations of things. But in all our thinking the I is the subject in which thoughts inhere as determinations and this I cannot be employed as the determination of anything else. Consequently everyone must necessarily look on himself as substance, and on his thoughts only as accidents of his being and determinations of his state.'

It is clear that he is referring here to the notion which we saw (p. 33 *supra*) that he set aside in relation to the First Analogy as the source of many misconceptions, viz. the logical antithesis of

subsistence and inherence. In the First Analogy it is set aside because it has nothing to do with the permanence of the world which is required to complete the notion of time. So also in the Paralogisms passage Kant goes on immediately to point out that the idea of permanence cannot be deduced from substance so conceived.

'But what use', he says, 'am I to make of this concept of a substance? That I as a thinking being continue for myself, and that it is my nature neither to come into being nor to perish, can in no way be concluded from the concept; but this is the only way in which the concept of the substantiality of my own thinking being can be of use to me, and apart from this the concept is not needed.'

If we pay regard to this difference in the concept of substance we see that the argument against the view that the substance of the self can provide the required content for the time-order may take two directions. The first is that which is indicated in Remark I of the Refutation, though perhaps the passage contains also a suggestion of the second. It may be stated in the form that this logical concept of substance is in no way connected with perception or has no content for intuition and therefore will not serve to give what is necessary in order that we should have intuition of the form of time; only the other notion of substance which, as we have seen, *is* connected with perception will serve for this purpose. This seems to be the interpretation of the following passage in Remark I:

'It is true that the presentation "I am" which expresses the consciousness which can accompany all thinking is something which immediately includes the existence of a subject in itself; but it includes no cognition of this subject, and consequently no empirical cognition, i.e. experience. For experience embraces beside the thought of something existing, intuition as well; and in this case it must be internal intuition, in relation to which (that is to say in relation to the time connected with the internal intuition) the object is determined.'

Particular states of consciousness, we may say, only occur at moments in time and therefore are incapable of sustaining the time-order as a whole, while the logical notion of substance is not sufficiently concrete to sustain it.

The other direction which the argument may take is suggested by passages in the Paralogisms. If we waive the argument that the self is not an object of which we can have intuition we can criticize the contention which connects the self with permanence. As we have seen the notion of the permanence of the self is different

from the notion of the permanence which Kant attributes to the physical world. But there is the common element which can be expressed by saying that there is no time in which that which is held to be permanent (in either sense) can be conceived as not existing. The question now arises whether we are entitled to think of the self as complying with this description of permanence.

The point is discussed by Kant in the first edition version of the Third Paralogism. He is discussing the question of the numerical identity of the self at different times, and he begins by examining an argument which seems to point to the identity of the self through all time. The argument is set out as follows (A 362):

'Now I myself am an object of the internal sense and all time is simply the form of the internal sense. Consequently I relate every one of my successive determinations to the numerically identical self, in all time, i.e. in the form of the internal intuition of myself. On this basis the personality of the soul must be regarded not as inferred but as a completely identical proposition of self-consciousness in time, and that is the reason why it is valid *a priori*. For it says in truth only that in the whole time wherein I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of that time as belonging to the unity of myself; and it is one and the same thing whether I say that this whole time is in me as an individual unity or that I am present, with numerical identity, in all this time.'

Kant's answer to the argument is this:

'Identity of person must therefore inevitably be found in my own consciousness. But if I consider myself from the standpoint of someone else (as an object of his external intuition) it appears that it is this external observer who for the first time considers me in time, for in apperception time is only presented in me. Although therefore he allows an I, which accompanies all presentations throughout time in my consciousness and indeed with complete identity, he will not conclude from it to the objective permanence of myself. For since the time in which the observer places me is the time not of my own but of his sensibility, it follows that the attribution of identity to myself which is a necessary element in my consciousness is not a necessary element in his, i.e. it is not a necessary element in the external intuition of myself as a subject.'

This passage is full of interest. In the first place it shows that Kant when he is still adhering to the doctrine of the first Refutation has begun in a particular context to recognize the externality of the time-order which he takes as the basis for the second Refutation. He states the position by referring to the point of view of an external observer, and he says implicitly that it is only when we think of ourselves from a point of view in which time appears

as external to us that we really are aware of the self as being determined in time. In spite of this, however, he seems unable to abandon entirely the view which regards time as internal to each percipient and therefore makes the existence of a common time impossible. Secondly we notice that the outcome of the passage seems to be negative. It does not show that the self cannot endure through all time, but that the argument which attempts to show that it must so endure is not valid. But if this is so it may seem that it does not help to establish the point required by the argument of the second Refutation, viz. that the self cannot provide the permanence which is required for the content of the time-order. At the most it seems open to Kant to say that if the permanence of the self is so precarious a tenet of thought, it is incongruous to suppose that we must regard its permanence as the basis of our thought about time. The self certainly seems far less apt than the physical world for having this function assigned to it. But the passage suggests a third reflection. The point which Kant does not notice, though he seems near to noticing it, is that we inevitably regard ourselves and others as placed in one and the same time-order, within which our time-determinations have relations to the time-determinations of others.¹ It is this which makes it necessary to regard time as external to ourselves and therefore makes it impossible to find the basis of the time-order in the self. It is one of the weaknesses of Kant's position that he does not reflect sufficiently on our awareness of other selves and the implications which this awareness must have for a theory of knowledge. He could, it seems, have found reinforcement for the doctrine of the second Refutation at this point in the argument if he had carried farther the train of thought contained in the Third Paralogism.

We can now come to the third possibility which we said earlier (see p. 36) that Kant's argument ought to face. It is the possibility that the permanence and continuity required for the content of time may exist not in my states of consciousness nor in my self regarded as distinct from my states, but in a succession of selves. The point need not detain us long. It is clearly difficult to regard different selves as a series of *modi* each continuously replacing the other in such a way as to leave no empty stretch in the time-order. If we were not inclined to allow such continuity to the states of

¹ The point was touched on when we were considering the difficulties of Berkeley's view of time. It concerns the temporal relation of our ideas to those of other spirits. See p. 23.

consciousness of the individual, we shall be still less inclined to allow it to the consciousnesses of a succession of individuals. But it is such continuity, as we have seen, which Kant's doctrine of time essentially requires. It should perhaps be added that if we take the other notion of permanence which we have discussed and regard time as filled by a number of selves each existing in all time, the position is open to all the difficulties attending the view that the basis of time is in the permanence of the individual self regarded as a logical subject with the possible exception that a meaning could be assigned to the notion of the externality of time in reference to the individual self.

To complete this account it is necessary to consider further one passage in the text of the Refutation itself. In Remark II, as we have already noticed (p. 16 *supra*), Kant suggests that his argument is confirmed when we consider the conditions under which empirical perception of time-determinations can take place. We took his observation as supporting the view that his main argument is not based on the conditions of empirical perception, but we did not discuss the appropriateness of his references to empirical perception, regarded as a supporting argument. It seems when we reflect on what he says that it is misleading. He remarks that we cannot perceive any determination of time except through a change in external relations (motion) to something permanent in space, and he takes as an example the movement of the sun with reference to terrestrial objects. Here it is evident that he is taking permanence in the sense of duration without change, and that he falls back on the dubious proposition that the time-determinations of something which is changing cannot be perceived apart from perception of something else which does not change. He surrenders the notion of permanence on which the whole tenor of his argument is based and employs not a confirmatory argument but one which is inconsistent and invalid. It would be wrong, however, to think that this necessarily invalidates the interpretation which has been offered of his meaning as a whole. It is characteristic of Kant to produce supporting arguments which are hastily conceived, and it is all the more natural that this should happen when he is moving, as we have seen, slowly and with hesitation towards a new position which involves much recasting of his earlier views.

We may close this long discussion of the doctrines connected with the second Refutation of Idealism by reviewing briefly Kant's

new position, the steps by which he has reached it, and some of its implications. The point on which we found that he insists from the first is that consciousness of real objects is intimately related to the consciousness of a single time- and space-order. Within this general view it seems that there is room for two different doctrines and that with much uncertainty and obscurity he moves from the one to the other. According to one view the time and space to which spatial objects are conceived as belonging are the content of ideas or *Vorstellungen*. It is implicitly allowed that the ideas themselves occur in time, but their occurrence in time is itself the content of our consciousness, i.e. in the Kantian phraseology our internal states are phenomena; accordingly ideas *qua* states of consciousness and spatial objects are thought of as being alike contents of conscious ideas or *Vorstellungen*, and as such they stand on a like footing in relation to the conscious mind. Time and space are thus thought of as forms which condition the contents of ideas. The misleading points in this statement are what later Kant came to see. According to the other view it is necessary in considering states of consciousness or objects of 'inner sense' to lay stress on the point that these states are facts occurring in time. Looking at the matter in this way Kant decides that spatial objects are parallel to inner states in the sense that they also are facts occurring in the time-order, and that this time-order is in some sense external both to the inner states and the objects. If we ask in what sense Kant thinks of the time-order as 'external' the answer is best obtained by reflecting on the different status which is conferred on objects according as the time-order is thought of as external or not. If the time-order is external and both inner states and objects are thought of as existing in it, then objects can be thought of as persisting even though the particular inner states in which they were apprehended have come and gone; if on the other hand time is not external but is just the form of the content of inner states, there is no time in which objects can exist independently of inner states and no way of comparing their duration with that of inner states. What Kant in his second position is anxious to insist on is that apart from the question of the existence of objects we must think of a time-order which is external to our states, and, if this is admitted, it is possible for us to think intelligibly of objects as persisting in independence of our inner states.

But when we have thus stated the difference between the two accounts, we are confronted by the fact that despite their difference

they have a common element of great importance. Kant does not show either in the *Critique of Pure Reason* or in his later writings any disposition to give up the doctrine that time and space are ideal or forms of consciousness. Now in the first account, since he does not see that our consciousness of our own moments of consciousness as occurring in time implies that time is external to the moments of consciousness, it is apparently suggested (though, of course, the problem is not present to his mind—for if it had been, he would have seen the difficulties of the implication) that time and space emanate as forms from our momentary consciousness and govern its contents. The difficulty in regard to the interpretation of the second account is that though Kant has seen the necessity of regarding time as external to our moments of consciousness, he does not in the *Critique of Pure Reason* attempt to consider how this new point affects his view that time and space are nevertheless still to be regarded as forms of consciousness. What we can do, however, is to see what his position seems to imply. The implication seems to be that we must recognize and distinguish two forms or aspects of consciousness, viz. (a) consciousness which has a temporal character and appears as a series of inner states, and (b) consciousness which is the source of time as well as space, and accordingly cannot itself be an occurrence in time. It is in virtue of its being the content of consciousness (b) that consciousness (a) is called phenomenal.

Looking at the matter from this point of view we can say that in the first account the distinction of the two kinds of consciousness is altogether ignored, and the doctrine of the nature of objects is thereby affected. Objects are said to be *Vorstellungen* or what consciousness presents to itself in spatial form, but the question is not asked what kind of consciousness it is of which they are the contents. It is taken for granted that it is the temporal consciousness referred to as (a) above. But if objects are constituted as the contents of fleeting temporal states of consciousness, there is no persistence or permanence in them, and the problem is then how to account for the notion, which we undoubtedly have, of objects which are permanent in contrast to our fleeting states of apprehension.

The second account on the other hand leads directly to the stage of distinguishing the two kinds of consciousness. In accordance with its doctrine it is possible to hold that objects are not simply the content of temporal states of consciousness. This seems to be what Kant has in mind when he says: 'The perception of the

permanent (i.e. of the permanent which is contrasted with the flow of my states as determined in time) is only possible through a thing outside me and not through the mere presentation of a thing outside me' (B 275). When it is said that the permanent outside me is not a presentation (*Vorstellung*), the presentations referred to (as is plain from the preceding sentences in their final form) are the temporal states of consciousness, i.e. consciousness (a)¹. It does not appear that Kant is contending that the permanent is outside consciousness altogether. For the 'permanent' referred to is not a thing in itself, but something which is temporal and spatial, and since it is temporal and spatial it must, on the Kantian doctrine, belong to consciousness which bestows the forms of time and space. But there is still no explicit distinction of non-temporal consciousness and consciousness as a series of states in time. What Kant has done is no more than to affirm that objects are independent of consciousness so far as consciousness is a phenomenon in time. He has therefore brought matters to a point at which many questions arise regarding the relation of the two aspects of consciousness which the doctrine seems to imply, but the questions are left unanswered in the *Critique*.

At this stage we may simply note a few points which are suggested by the consideration of Kant's later account.

1. If the two kinds of consciousness are distinguished in the way which the account seems to suggest, it is not necessary to hold that the working of the non-temporal consciousness can be apparent to us apart from relation to states of consciousness in time. By itself it has not the character of that which we recognize as consciousness. It might perhaps be nearer to the spirit of Kant's general doctrine to regard it as an activity of creation rather than an activity of consciousness. In some way the mind creates for itself objects with a temporal and spatial character of which it comes to be aware in relation to the form of *moments* of its own

¹ The preceding sentences as revised in the Preface to the second edition run: 'This permanent cannot be an intuition in me. For all the factors determining my existence which can be found in me are presentations (i.e. I, as an object in time, exist as a series of presentations) and as such need a permanent distinguishable from them in relation to which their changes and consequently my existence in the time wherein they change can be determined.' It is the presentations of the self as a series of states in time belonging to *me* from which objects are distinguished when it is said that objects are not presentations. They are not apprehended by *Anschauung* of myself (this seems to be the meaning of the sentence 'the permanent is not an intuition in me') but they are still apprehended by *Anschauung* and dependent on consciousness.

consciousness. Though objects are the product of a non-temporal activity of mind, it only becomes conscious of objects when it envisages itself as having moments of consciousness in the time series. The table of *Vorstellungen* in the Dialectic (A 320 = B 377) where Kant refers to the species of *Vorstellungen mit Bewusstsein* and by implication seems to entertain the notion of *Vorstellungen ohne Bewusstsein* suggests that this line of thought is not alien to his mind.

2. If Kant's thought is moving in this direction it would seem further to clear the way to a change in the conception of temporal *Vorstellungen* and their relation to objects. In his earlier account objects were regarded as the contents of *Vorstellungen* in the sense of temporal acts of consciousness, and it seemed to follow that they could not be regarded as having a being in the same time-order as the *Vorstellungen* themselves, with a capacity for duration which might outlast that of a *Vorstellung*. If we follow out Kant's later doctrine, it seems possible to abandon the supposition that the only way in which there can be an object of consciousness is that the object should be internal to consciousness. It will remain true (according to the implications of Kant's view) that all objects are internal to a consciousness which is non-temporal. But so far as that way of consciousness is concerned which we regard as conditioned by the form of time, i.e. so far as our temporal moments of consciousness are concerned, we are not obliged to think that objects are internal to this aspect of consciousness. We can think of such moments of consciousness as apprehending a reality which is not internal to them, and if this is so the notion will no longer be valid that because objects are present to momentary consciousness they can have no being apart from this consciousness. It may be that so far as the momentary consciousness is sensation it only apprehends a momentary state of the object.

3. But if this view be taken that objects are not necessarily internal to our momentary or sense presentations the question arises what attitude must be adopted towards such arguments as those of Berkeley. It is certainly difficult to maintain that everything which is present to consciousness in our sense experience belongs to the object and not to our consciousness, and there is much to be said for the view that the *esse* of physical objects is *percipi*. Kant himself constantly appears to endorse the arguments of Berkeley in this respect. To take one passage only, in his discussion of the views of those who desire to reject the

ideality of time, he remarks that 'they do not hope to be able to demonstrate the reality of space, because the doctrine of Idealism is against them' (A 38 = B 55). Kant is faced with the necessity either of refuting the doctrine that the *esse* of physical objects is *percipi* or of showing how it is compatible with his own position.

4. It must be borne in mind that the consciousness which is contrasted with temporal states of consciousness is still a *human* consciousness or activity. It is necessary to say this because it is responsible for temporal and spatial phenomena, and according to Kant time and space belong to human intuition. Further it seems to be implied in this view that the non-temporal consciousness is always an individual consciousness.

5. The account provokes the question in what way the fact of our consciousness that other minds exist besides our own should be fitted with Kant's doctrines. It seems possible to think of my states of consciousness and the physical world which I perceive as the content of an individual consciousness which is not temporal, but it does not seem possible to think of other minds as the content of an individual consciousness whether it is temporal or not.

6. These last considerations raise the question whether Kant's account is not leading logically to the concept of a non-individual consciousness with which individual consciousnesses are in some way connected. We shall have to consider this question later. But here we should notice that if it has to be entertained, it may seem to have a bearing on Kant's argument for the reality of the physical world. His argument proceeds on the basis that neither the states of consciousness of an individual, nor an individual self, nor a succession of individual selves can be adequate to our notion of time. But it may now seem possible to suggest that the postulate of non-individual and universal consciousness introduces an alternative which would make the argument no longer tenable. Such a suggestion, however, does not seem to have much weight, since it is open to the objection that a consciousness which is conceived to be non-temporal cannot itself be the required content for the form of time.

It is at least evident that Kant's account raises many questions which need to be discussed. We shall find ourselves returning to the discussion of them later¹, but in the following pages we shall in the first instances consider certain other aspects of his doctrine as a whole.

¹ An attempt is made in Chapter III of my *Treatise on Knowledge* to work out some implications of the line of thought which Kant has suggested.

III

THE DOCTRINE OF THE FIRST-EDITION DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES

IN the first version of the Transcendental Deduction Kant is concerned with the question of what we think, or of the judgements which we make, in regard to the physical world. This is not a different question in his view from that of our consciousness of objects. He does not suppose (and in this he seems right) that we can have in the first place something which can be called consciousness of objects and that subsequently we think or judge in regard to those objects. Thinking or judging must enter into any consciousness which we have of an object. He also considers that thinking or judging involves diversity of the content of consciousness and the holding together of this diversified content in some sort of unity. Further he considers that the unity or synthesis of the content of consciousness exhibits certain forms or features which he wishes to trace and catalogue. This is the problem which he has in mind when he is producing his list of the categories. But he also reflects on the general conditions of synthesis, starting with an account of the way in which he supposes the mind is provided with the material on which it works, and explaining how the faculties with which it is endowed enable it to perform its task. His reflections are embodied in his account of the three syntheses, and it is this section of the Transcendental Deduction which we shall now consider.

In one respect at any rate Kant's starting-point seems to be here the same as that of the earlier version of the Refutation of Idealism. As we have seen, in that section of the *Critique* physical objects are regarded as contents of *Vorstellungen* and as having no existence outside the *Vorstellungen*. At the outset of his account of the Syntheses he makes the following statement:

'Whatever may be the way in which our presentations arise, whether it be through the influence of external things or through internal causes, whether they come into being *a priori* or empirically as phenomena, in any event they belong as modifications of the mind to internal sense. Because this is their nature all our cognitions are finally subject to the formal condition of the internal sense, namely time, in which they must all be arranged, combined, and brought into relations. This is a general remark which must never be forgotten since it is the ground of every-
thing which follows' (A 99).

This passage makes it plain that Kant thinks that the things which we call objects have no being outside our temporal *Vorstellungen*. But we notice that there is no division of *Vorstellungen* into those of internal and those of external sense. The presentations to which he refers certainly cover presentations of external objects, but they are all regarded as belonging to the internal sense. Doubtless his purpose is to mark the point that no objects of which we are conscious can have being apart from consciousness. But if 'internal sense' is used with this general significance, we cannot use 'external sense' in such a way that it can be properly antithetical to 'internal sense'; 'external sense' will need to be a subdivision of internal sense opposed to the subdivision which should now be called 'internal' internal sense. It is apparent that Kant's usage leaves room for much ambiguity. In particular it is not clear whether or not he is propounding the view of the first Refutation, that there are two sets of data with which consciousness is provided, the data of inner sensibility and the data of outer. What he says here is compatible with the view that there is only one kind of data, but the same data are regarded by the mind sometimes in one way and sometimes in another. To the question what his view actually is on this point we shall return in the sequel.

Another ambiguity must be noticed. When Kant speaks of our presentations as being 'arranged combined and brought into relations' in time, the question arises whether the arrangement is that of presentations regarded as facts of consciousness occurring in time or whether it is a temporal arrangement attributed to the contents of the presentations. The passage immediately following the sentence quoted above seems to suggest that it is the first meaning which should be attributed to his statement. 'Every intuition', he says, 'comprises a manifold which yet could not be presented as such unless the mind distinguished the time in the succession of impressions one after another. In order to change this manifold into a unity of intuition (as for instance in the presentation of space) it is necessary first to run through the manifold and then to hold it together.' If the temporal distinctions which the mind apprehends are in respect of its impressions (as facts of consciousness), the arrangement referred to before is apparently the time order of the succeeding impressions rather than a time order attributed to their contents. In the Second and Third Analogies Kant distinguishes the two time-orders and discusses the relation between them. At this point he is apparently

content to assume that there is only the time-arrangement of succeeding states of consciousness to be considered; but it is hard then to see how the reference to the unification of the parts of space is to be taken. There is in fact reason for doubting, as we shall see later, whether he is really thinking of the unification of states of consciousness as occurrences in the time-order. Space does not seem to be unified by us in terms of the temporal order in which we are conscious of parts of space. Further, unification in time interpreted on these lines would apparently lead to the assignment of an altogether different status to the forms of time and space respectively. We need only to observe that spatial *Vorstellungen* regarded as facts of consciousness can be taken to exist in time, but they cannot be taken to exist in space. It follows that time on this view has the status of something which contains *Vorstellungen* within it, whereas space can only be the content of *Vorstellungen*. This is indeed a view which is suggested in the Aesthetic (as we saw in the last chapter—see p. 14), but it does not necessarily follow that it is the doctrine of the Transcendental Deduction.

Let us now consider what Kant says in regard to the part played by imagination in the next following passage which he calls the Synthesis of Reproduction in the Imagination. His account is far from being clear. At the outset (A 100) he refers to the mind's habit of recalling a presentation in imagination upon the occurrence of some other presentation with which it has become associated. He is concerned to insist that unless there were some regular order or connexion in presentations such recall of an associated presentation could not occur. So far it would seem that he is not showing that imagination contributes to the ordering of our experience, but that order in experience is the condition of the working of associative imagination. Further it does not appear that what Kant says runs counter to Hume's doctrine; for Hume supposed that we connect certain ideas with certain impressions in consequence of the regular concomitances which are found in impressions. But Kant has more to say bearing on both these points, though the meaning of what he says is difficult to determine. He reaffirms the position that the phenomena which display order are themselves 'only the play of our presentations which in the end amount to determinations of the inner sense'. In the next sentence he says:

'If we then could prove that even our purest intuitions *a priori*

produce no cognition, except in so far as they contain a union of the manifold which is such as to make a general synthesis of reproduction possible, it follows that this synthesis of the imagination is grounded before any experience on *a priori* principles, and we must suppose that there is a pure transcendental synthesis of imagination which itself lies at the foundation of all experience, inasmuch as experience necessarily presupposes the reproductibility of phenomena.'

He proceeds thereafter to illustrate the impossibility of having a complete presentation without the faculty of reproduction by reference to a simple example; even if I draw a line in thought, I must apprehend manifold presentations one after another, and if I lose what precedes I cannot have a complete presentation of the line.

The distinction is clear, in this account, between the imagination which produces the transcendental synthesis and the non-transcendental imagination which requires the transcendental imagination as its basis. But in other respects the passage is puzzling because it begins with a discussion of the working of what may be called associative imagination and the way in which it is conditioned by a transcendental synthesis of imagination, whereas in the conclusion the topic seems to be the working of the faculty of reproductive imagination which is a necessary condition of the transcendental synthesis of imagination, and this reproductive imagination seems to be equivalent to memory. The difficulty of following Kant's argument is increased because in the next section (the Synthesis of Recognition in Concepts) he alludes to the importance of memory as if he were passing to a fresh point.

It is possible, however, that we may come nearer to his meaning if we begin by recognizing that he has in mind four operations of the imagination which should be distinguished. (1) There is first the faculty of reproduction. This is no more than the power of recalling an earlier presentation in the sense that we have what Hume would call an 'idea', the content of which is like that of an antecedently received impression. Such reproduction is an element in memory, but it does not in itself amount to memory. (2) Memory proper is the second operation of imagination. It comprises more than an act of reproduction because, as Kant says in A 103, we must be 'conscious that what we are thinking now is the same as what we thought a moment before', or in the phraseology of A 115 there must be 'consciousness of the identity of those reproductive presentations with the phenomena by which they were given, i.e. recognition'. (3) The next form of imagina-

tion is that associative imagination which is referred to at the beginning of the section. It is not mere reproduction although it could not function unless we had the power of recalling earlier presentations. It is not memory ; for when (to take Kant's example) on seeing red cinnabar I think of it as heavy, I am not thinking of an occasion on which I had the sensation of heaviness. What I am doing is to imagine heaviness as an attribute of this piece of cinnabar, the heaviness of which I have never experienced and therefore cannot *remember*. (4) Lastly there is the transcendental synthesis of imagination, which provides in Kant's words 'such a combination of the manifold as to render a constant synthesis of reproduction possible'.

Now the difficulty in Kant's account is that these distinctions are not all made plain and he seems to pass from the argument that the transcendental synthesis of imagination is a necessary condition of associative imagination (3) to saying that it is a necessary condition of reproduction (1). Thus he says in A 101: 'There must be something to make this reproduction of phenomena possible by being itself the foundation *a priori* of a necessary synthetical unity of them', and two sentences later (in the passage quoted above, p. 51) he seems to be arguing that the transcendental synthesis is necessary because it makes reproduction of phenomena possible, and reproductibility of phenomena is the condition of the possibility of experience. On the other hand the conclusion of the section seems to suggest that reproduction instead of being the outcome of the transcendental synthesis is itself that which makes the transcendental synthesis possible. Or indeed the interpretation of the passage may well be that Kant is simply contending that there could be no unity of experience without memory. The transcendental synthesis is then simply the creation of a single whole of experience by means of memory. But to say this is to attribute far less to the transcendental synthesis than that sequence, concomitancy, and rule of law in phenomena which Kant first said was the work of the transcendental imagination. All this obscurity arises from the failure to set out clearly the distinction between reproduction and the activity of the associative imagination. It seems that Kant's meaning could be better expressed as follows. Reproduction is the basis on which the transcendental imagination works, while the synthesis affected by the transcendental imagination is the condition (a) of associative imagination, (b) of memory in the proper sense of the term. It

seems necessary to look at the matter in this way since it is difficult to see how, without reproduction, the transcendental imagination could perform the task which Kant assigns to it.

We can now turn to the examination of Kant's account, as thus stated, and we may begin by considering his assertion that a transcendental synthesis is necessary as the basis of associative imagination. It has already been noticed that when Kant says that order and regularity in phenomena are necessary if the association is to operate he does not at first sight seem to say more than what Hume allows. His claim is, however, that there must be more than order and regularity which are empirically apprehended; a synthesis founded on *a priori* principles is necessary and such a synthesis can only be provided by the imagination. His position, he tells us, rests on the view that phenomena are only the play of our presentations. What Kant has in mind is evidently that our presentations, so far as they consist in impressions, do not provide the mind with those objects which are the necessary basis for the working of the associative imagination. Impressions are disjointed and fragmentary, coming and going with irregular time intervals (e.g. according as I turn my head, close or open my eyes, or exercise attention), and need to be supplemented by imagination before I have ideas of particular objects.¹ If we try to think of impressions by themselves they are a phantasmagoria so confusing that they suggest no association. It is only when gaps are filled in by imagination of impressions which we (and others) might experience and would necessarily experience under certain conditions, that we can regard a group of impressions as an object and consequently associate with it certain qualities and occurrences. It is for this reason that Kant maintains the necessity of postulating the work of the transcendental imagination, and assigning to it a particular place and function. Associative imagination, his argument runs, must have as its basis the thought of objects; if we are to have the thought of objects the play of our impressions must somehow be supplemented and brought into a scheme which has a content wider than actual impressions; and this work of supplementing and organization can only be assigned to the transcendental imagination. The significance of his contention is the more apparent if we remember Hume's

¹ That Kant assigns this function to imagination is perhaps brought out most clearly in the footnote to A 120 where he says: 'It has occurred to hardly any psychologist that imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception.'

attempt to explain the genesis in our minds of the notion of identical and continuing objects. Hume thinks that the notion comes to us through our conviction that there is order or causal connexion in nature; but it is apparent that his account of the origin of the idea of order or causal connexion itself is much less plausible if we suppose it to arise at a stage of consciousness in which we are without the notion of identical and continuing objects.¹ Here we have exactly Kant's point, i.e. that it is difficult to believe that the operations of the associative imagination can proceed unless they are based on that conception of a world of objects, which can only come about through the work of the transcendental imagination.

Before considering the argument further let us turn to the line of thought which leads to the conclusion that the work of transcendental synthesis is a condition of memory. It might seem that here the case is rather different. Whatever may be thought about the necessity of order and regularity in phenomena as the basis of associative imagination, it appears harder to say that without such order and regularity there could be no memory of the past. Would it not be possible to remember former impressions even if they were single and isolated? It may be conceded that unity of experience, the idea of a single consciousness, and also the idea of a single time order in which the remembered phenomena takes its place are necessary to memory. But in saying this we seem hardly to have got so far as that synthesis of imagination founded on *a priori* principles, antecedent to experience, which Kant has in mind as the basis on which memory rests.

In order to discover Kant's thought we must recall the passages already referred to (see p. 51 *supra*). His central idea becomes plain in the account of the third Synthesis, i.e. the Synthesis of Recognition in Concepts, where he is concerned directly with the importance of the notion of objects. What he says is that 'unless we were conscious that what we are thinking now is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of presentations would be vain'. [Sc. we should in such a case have reproduction but not memory.] 'Each presentation would in its present state be a new one, and in no wise belonging to the act by which it was to be produced by degrees, and the manifold in it would never form a whole, because deprived of that unity which consciousness alone can impart to it' (A 103). In this section, as in

¹ See the discussion of this point in my *Treatise on Knowledge*, Chapter I.

that preceding it, Kant's thought tends to slide back to the simple assertion that memory is necessary to unity of experience, but the references here and in A 115 to identity in presentations and to recognition mean that he is thinking of the part played by the idea of objects in relation to the work of memory. We must remember that the 'Synthesis of Recognition in Concepts' is concerned first and foremost with the concept of objects. When he speaks of the identity of different presentations, what he means is that presentations occurring at different moments refer to the same object. Recognition again is the consciousness that what I am now thinking of or what I now experience in an impression is the same object which entered into my experience in the past. His point is that the way in which memory works implies that consciousness does not confine itself to the momentary and passing presentations in which it occurs but thinks of other existences which have a different time duration.

Whether Kant is justified in supposing that without the idea of objects memory could not operate is a dubious point. It is no doubt true that in much of our remembering we have the thought of objects encountered in the past. But it seems that we can remember a momentary feeling or an isolated sensation, and if that is so we cannot say that memory is impossible without the thought of objects. Kant is justified in saying that throughout the activities of consciousness, including a large part of the operations of memory, we find the thought of objects taking a place. But even if we say that the thought of objects has to be resolved into the thought of regularity and system in our presentations, it seems going too far to say that the regularity and system are indispensable to memory. We must content ourselves with saying that the valuable point in his account is his recognition of the important part which we find played throughout our experience by the notion of objects or alternatively by the notion of regularity and system.

We now come to Kant's discussion of the nature of our thought regarding objects and the question of the equivalence of the notion of objects and of the notion of regularity and system in our presentations. His meaning is very obscure, and we may first make a brief survey, without comment, of the chief points which he seems to be setting out. The section on the Third Synthesis begins with what amounts to a reaffirmation of the view that we are only conscious of the series of our presentations (A 103). Our experience of a world of objects is formed on that basis, memory of course

being indispensable in order that we may retain past presentations and think of them as part of the unified content of consciousness. The unification of the content of consciousness depends further on concepts, as we can see if we think of such an instance as the unification of successive acts of addition in the concept of a given number. It is pointed out that the notion of comprehension expressed in the word *Begriff* suggests that the *Begriff* unites what has been perceived successively into a single presentation. We may hardly realise, however, that there has been such a process, for what we think of is the result, namely the single presentation or object. It must now be asked, says Kant, what is meant by an 'object of presentations'. In searching for the answer to this question he insists that we must not look for objects outside our faculty of presentation (A 104). The object can only be conceived as 'something in general = x ' (*etwas überhaupt = x*). Later this 'something in general = x ' is referred to as 'the non-empirical, i.e. transcendental object = x ' (A 109). The thought of the object is connected with the thought of necessity, for the object is regarded as that which prevents our cognitions from being haphazard or arbitrary and causes them to be determined in certain *a priori* ways; in so far as cognitions must refer to an object, they must necessarily in relation to this object agree with each other, i.e. they must possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object (A 104-5). Further, he says that the concept of that unity of rule which determines the manifold and confines it to conditions which make the unity of apperception possible, is the presentation of the object = x (A 105). In A 108-9 there is a very obscure passage. Kant remarks that all presentations (*a*) have an object, (*b*) can themselves be the objects of other presentations. Phenomena are the only objects which are given to us immediately, and that which in our cognition of phenomena is immediately related to the object is called intuition (sc. intuition is the cognition of these phenomena as objects). But these phenomena are not things in themselves, but only presentations which in turn have their object, an object which accordingly cannot any longer be 'intuited' by us, and therefore may be called the non-empirical, i.e. transcendental object = x . Part at least of Kant's meaning seems to be this. We are immediately aware of the series of our presentations. These presentations are thus objects—for we have noticed that presentations can be the objects of other presentations. Since they constitute an object directly apprehended,

we can be said to have 'intuition' of them; i.e. presumably they are an intuited object of the inner sense, and of course as such are phenomenal. But the presentations thus intuited also have their object, or, we may say, they are taken to relate or refer to something; but this reference we make to an object does not carry with it any intuition on our part of an object beyond the presentations; it is the transcendental concept of objectivity which furnishes a rule for the content of the presentations and binds them into a unity.

The above are some of the leading statements which Kant makes and we may begin by considering them, though we shall have to notice others as we proceed. The whole account is so obscure that it lends itself to several different interpretations and it is not easy to decide in favour of any one. However, it seems that at least we can see two elements which enter into Kant's thought; whether both are retained in a consistent doctrine or whether he tends when he passes to one to forget the other is one of the points in the problem. In the first place he lays great stress on the contention that the thought of objects is closely related to the thought of some necessary order or system in our presentations, and secondly he indicates that it is related to the thought of something which is independent of our presentations. Now inasmuch as both points are made by Kant we expect to find them connected and to learn from him whether it is the 'something' independent of our presentations which produces system in our presentations, in what way it does so, and how we are conscious of its operation; or if he regards the relation as reversed in respect of our cognition and thinks that the system in our presentations leads to the thought of something independent of them, we expect to learn how this comes about. A full explanation would make it clear what is the nature of the system we discover in our presentations, what is the nature of that which is thought to be independent of our presentations, and what is the connexion between them. It cannot be said, however, that Kant makes any of these points clear, and it is difficult to feel any certainty in regard to his position. Though all three points must of course be considered in connexion, we can begin by inquiring what he has in mind when he thinks of the order or system which we attribute to our presentations.

Here at once we discover an initial ambiguity. It is in effect the ambiguity which we noticed in connexion with Kant's account of the first synthesis (see p. 49 above); but now that it has reappeared

in relation to the problem of our consciousness of objects we must consider it more fully. The question is whether, when Kant refers to the fact that our presentations are 'arranged united and brought into relations with each other', the arrangement which he has in mind is an arrangement of our presentations as events occurring in a time order. He seems to be saying this, but we should expect him to be saying something which is not the same, namely, that the arrangement instead of being that of our presentations as events is rather an arrangement of their contents. Of course we must bear in mind that an arrangement of presentations as events would not be possible without reference to their contents, and that therefore in a sense the arrangement of them as events is also an arrangement of their contents. When we say that our presentations are so arranged that presentation α is always followed in our experience by presentation β , the statement would be meaningless if we disregarded the contents of the presentations; what we mean is that a presentation with one particular content always follows a presentation with another particular content. But the important point of difference is this. The theory which supposes that the arrangement present to consciousness is that of presentations as events affirms that the arrangement of contents is solely with reference to the order of occurrence of the presentations in our minds, whereas the opposed view insists that we conceive an arrangement of the contents of presentations without thinking of the occurrence of the different presentations as members of the temporal series of our mental states. The difference and its implications will be more apparent when we consider the two views in detail in the attempt to see how far each can be intelligibly stated, and which it is that we ought to ascribe to Kant.

In the first place then, let us consider the view that what we are aware of when we think of objects is an arrangement of our presentations as events in time, an arrangement which displays a certain degree of necessity or at least of habitude (to use Berkeley's expression) as regards the concurrence or sequence of the presentations. The view seems to be substantially that held by Berkeley, despite its inconsistency (as we noticed in the last chapter) with his doctrine of time, and if it is also to be attributed to Kant there is indeed, as has been maintained¹ 'really a remarkable extent of agreement' between the two philosophers. Our doubt in ascribing the view to Kant arose (see p. 49 above) because it seemed to be

¹ See H. W. B. Joseph, *Essays in Ancient and Modern Philosophy*, p. 224.

out of harmony with his account of the temporal relations which we discover in objects as opposed to the order of our apprehension of them, and also with his general account of our consciousness of space. But in order to judge more clearly how far the view in question departs from Kant's normal doctrines, we should consider the way in which, if its implications are followed out, it must deal with the time determinations of objects and with their space-relations.

As regards the first point, the time-determination of objects, it may be said that the objective time-relations can without difficulty be resolved into the subjective. There are two different cases to be considered, but the answer will be in effect the same for both. In the first the notion of continuity in objects is concerned; we think that certain states of an object which we have perceived stand in necessary relations of sequence to other states which we have not perceived. Here it may be said that when we think of this time-arrangement of the states of the object, what we really have in mind is a necessity regarding the occurrence of our impressions, not indeed a necessity confined to actual impressions but one which extends to impressions which we imagine we should have in certain circumstances. The unseen stages in the progress of a shadow on a dial or of a stone which rolls down a hillside can be stated in terms of impressions which we should have had in a certain necessary order if we had been present and observing. The changes are held together by the mind and regarded as changes in an object because the mind has the concept of a rule controlling impressions which we have or might have. The concept can take shape because the mind is able to depict to itself impressions in imagination, and we have here a clear indication of the justice of the view which assigns to imagination a place of the first importance. The second case in which we may think of time-determinations in the object which do not seem to coincide with the sequence of our impressions is that of an object the parts of which are thought of as existing together, though they are not all perceived. But again it may be said that the answer can be given in terms of impressions which we should be bound to have in certain circumstances. The side or back of the object which we do not perceive when we are looking at its front is to be thought of as a different set of impressions which we should necessarily have if we were differently located. But if we reflect on this reference to impressions which would occur 'in certain circumstances' or 'if we

were differently located', we see that the problem looks more complicated. In both cases it appears that the idea of the spatial position of the supposed observer who would have such and such impressions is an important factor in the answer. The time-arrangement of our impressions, actual and imaginary, into which we resolve our notion of changes in an object is clearly connected with a notion of spatial arrangement. The first problem therefore which we noted in connexion with the theory which would resolve our thought of objects into consciousness of a necessary arrangement of our presentations as events in time, seems to involve the second. If we are to have a full explanation of the time-determinations of objects in terms of the order of impressions, we need to be satisfied that spatial arrangement can also be resolved into a system in the temporal order of our presentations.

Can we deal with our notion of spatial arrangement just as we dealt with the notion of an objective time-arrangement? The problem is this. We have succeeding impressions, the content of each of which is a portion of space, endowed with such qualities as colour, hardness, and the like. Now we think of these various spaces as each a part of one space. But if we are to say that we are confined to the succession of our presentations, and that the order and system which we attribute to spatial objects, is an order and system of the occurrence of our presentations, we have eliminated the notion of a single space. It may, however, be possible to describe our experience without introducing the notion of the singleness of space. If we consider what happens when we see certain objects from one angle and then, moving our bodies, see them in a different perspection, we may perhaps say that we have two succeeding presentations, the content of one being a certain spatial appearance a standing in the spatial relation r to the spatial appearance of our bodies, and the content of the other being another spatial appearance a^1 standing in the spatial relation r^1 to the spatial appearance of our bodies; what we mean by saying that we perceive something objective in the same space at different moments from different angles is that the one point of variation in the second impression (the position of our bodies in relation to the object) carries with it necessarily the other variation (the different appearance of the object). The spaces are not united as parts of a single space, but the spatial contents of different impressions stand in fixed relations to each other, and thus (bringing in imagination, as before) I can say that if certain circumstances

arise (or, if I have certain impressions) impressions with a certain spatial content will necessarily arise as a consequence. Or again, to take one of Kant's instances, if I become aware of a line, the parts of which I can only perceive successively, when I say that the line is an object, I mean that the spatial impression of one part of the line when followed by the impression of movement of my body necessarily carries with it a succeeding impression of another part of the line.

The attempt to resolve in this way our notion of objects persisting in a single space and to substitute a necessary connexion of presentations arranged in time does not produce conviction. It seems that we must recognize that our notion of the singleness of space is fundamental in our experience. The kind of necessary connexion which we think of as existing between different spatial impressions is not that of a law which simply dictates certain sequences. We inevitably think of the sequences as being what they are in consequence of the constitution of a single space which has its own necessary laws, and all our ideas regarding the necessary temporal order of our varying impressions are based on our conception of this single space and its laws. This means that the spaces of different impressions are regarded as parts of one space, and that the contents of different impressions are taken to be sometimes the same part of space, sometimes different parts, but parts standing in a fixed relation to each other. Any account of spatial objects as constituted by concepts of necessary relations must be related to such a basis, for the view we take of spatial objects is obviously bound up with the character which we ascribe to space. If therefore we think of space as persisting despite the temporary character of impressions, it is natural for us to think of persistent objects in space, or of persistent grounds in space the existence of which justifies us in thinking of persistent objects to which passing impressions are somehow related.

Now so soon as we reflect on the above considerations it must strike us that they are precisely the considerations which might be expected to present themselves most forcibly in Kant's mind. His teaching in the Aesthetic has been expressly directed to the task of showing that the idea of a single space no less than the idea of a single time is an essential feature of all our experience. We have seen in the last chapter the emphatic way in which he connects this notion of the singleness of space with our conception of real as opposed to merely imaginary spatial objects. It is by his

view of space, as he always insists, that his position is to be distinguished from that of Berkeley. Berkeley presupposes the notion of a single time, within which impressions can be arranged in various patterns, although this part of his teaching is not consistent with the account which he gives of the nature of time. But as regards space, in his doctrine, there is no such singleness possible. He considers no alternatives other than thinking of space as an independent entity and reducing it to disjointed spaces which are the contents of separate impressions, and he is therefore led directly to the view which we have been considering that the unity and order of our experience are constituted solely by the arrangement which we attribute to our actual and imagined impressions in time. Kant, on the other hand, insists that in his account of space as the form of phenomena he avoids the difficulties which spring from regarding it as an independent entity and at the same time is able to do justice to the part which the notion of a single space plays in our experience. It is difficult on these grounds to think that in the passage we have before us he intends to reduce the unity of objects in space to the thought of a temporal arrangement of impressions.

It seems then that we must think of Kant as having in mind, when he speaks of the arrangement of our presentations, the alternative conception that what is arranged is the contents of the presentations. What can at once be said in favour of this second interpretation is that it seems much more than the other to accord with his way of thinking in the first-edition *Refutation of Idealism*. There, as we saw in the last chapter, it is taken as admitted that spatial objects are the contents of *Vorstellungen*. It is on that basis that Kant proceeds to the argument that they are not inferior in status to our inner states, because the latter also are contents of *Vorstellungen*, being themselves objects of inner sense. If it is still thought that the interpretation is difficult to fit with the language of the passage regarding the first synthesis, it seems fair to suggest that in referring to the temporal order of our presentations Kant has something else in mind than the question whether it is the organization of the presentations themselves or of their contents which is connected with the notion of objects. He is perhaps mainly thinking of that which is a condition of any organization, namely the necessity of holding together presentations which occur successively in time. The mind has both to hold together the presentations which have come to it as separate

events and to arrange their contents. Kant runs together the two points in his account and consequently does not make it clear that so far as the arrangement of the presentations is concerned, he is all along thinking of an arrangement of their contents.

That such a view is more compatible than the other with his doctrines regarding time and space and their relation to objects is on the face of it fairly clear. It is at least possible for him to say that the contents of our presentations are organized in a single time and a single space, and that the thought of their reality is connected with the way in which we regard them as related to this single time and space. It is true that there is the difficulty of the connexion between the time-order in which the contents of our presentations are organized and the time-order in which the presentations themselves occur; but the point is one which (at least in this connexion) was not present to Kant's mind until later. There seems then, in general, to be a fair measure of agreement between his view thus interpreted and the thought of the first-edition *Refutation of Idealism*. But at the same time we must notice the important respect in which it departs from the doctrine of the *Refutation*. The conclusion which the early *Refutation* sets out to establish is that our inner states and physical objects are parallel to each other and have a like status. In the first-edition *Deduction* Kant is preoccupied with the consideration that all our states occur as events in time. His train of thought does not lead him to draw the conclusions from this consideration which he draws in the later version of the *Refutation*. The only result which emerges in the first *Deduction* is that physical objects are assigned a position quite different from that of our inner states; inner states are events which occur in time, physical objects are the contents of certain inner states, contents which are characterized by the fact of being organized in accordance with determinate rules. It is perhaps in consequence of his having reached this result that Kant supplements his account with the second line of thought (*viz.* that we relate our presentations to the thought of something independent of them) to the discussion of which we shall shortly turn.

We must, however, first consider a little further the position as it stands without reference to the notion of any objects which exist in independence of our presentations. So far we have only noticed in general that Kant seems to think that objects may be regarded as the organized content of presentations. What we must now do is to consider what he says in regard to the nature of this

organization. From the outset of his account the point on which he apparently wishes to lay great stress is that the organization is made possible or is determined by concepts, but neither his explanations nor his instances make it clear what exactly he has in mind.

In attempting to see the questions which are involved we may begin by noting what seems to be an implication of the introduction of concepts in the Third Synthesis. It suggests that we ought to think that Kant was referring previously, when he dealt with the contents of our presentations, to the manifold of sense. When therefore he comes to speak of the organization or unity of our presentations, we may take him as meaning that the material which is organized or united consists of the factors of our experience which are apprehended by sense. To this, however, we must add the qualification that there is comprised also the content of imagination so far as imagination gives us material of a like character to the sensible manifold; that is, it supplies us with images of sense presentations which we might have in certain circumstances. Further, as the problem relates to physical objects, it must be held that the manifold of sense (as supplemented by imagination) is limited to a spatial manifold or at least to a manifold which is either spatial or deemed to be connected with space.¹ Now if we keep it in mind that the reference to presentations is in the present connexion thus limited, we may ask how, according to Kant's doctrine, concepts organize or unite the manifold of sense comprised in our presentations. But when we put the question, the account seems to suggest different answers at different points. One answer which it suggests is that the concept is just the holding together in consciousness of certain elements of the manifold of sense, and one particular form of it is the holding of past elements along with present elements. The concept only adds to or goes beyond the manifold in supplying the relation of conjunction, which is presumably conjunction in respect both of time and space. If this is all, the concept does not seem to supplement the content of consciousness, and there seems to be nothing in it which resembles consciousness of a rule or principle determining the organization of the sense manifold. But there are other points which Kant makes. In virtue of the concept we think of the conjoined elements

¹ We need to say 'either spatial or deemed to be connected with space' because Kant would clearly include, e.g. sound in the manifold, though it may be difficult to say that sound is extended. This is a subsidiary point which should be considered in relation to his distinction of inner and outer sense.

of the manifold as necessarily conjoined. On this view the concept in one sense does not take us beyond the contents of our sense presentations (enlarged indeed by the imagination of similar sense presentations), but it supplements these contents with the thought of their necessary connexion. That Kant thinks of the concept as the apprehension of the grouped contents of presentations of sense and imagination regarded as necessarily united appears when he says (A 104-5) that if our cognitions (*Erkenntnisse*) are to refer to an object they must have that unity '*which constitutes the concept of objects*'.¹ An instance of what he has in mind is given in the passage (at the end of A 105) where he refers to the concept of a triangle. The triangle he says is conceived as an object inasmuch as we are conscious of the conjunction of three straight lines according to a rule; the unity of rule determines the manifold and 'the concept of this unity is the presentation of the object = x which I think through the thought predicates of a triangle'. Kant apparently thinks that it is the predicates of the object, not anything beyond the predicates, which when thought of as necessarily united constitute the concept. (Whether he is right is what we shall have to consider in a moment.) But there is one more point which we should notice that he seems to have in mind. The notion of necessary conjunction is not quite all that the concept yields. In virtue again of the concept we think of the existence of *kinds* of things, which are to be analysed as particular elements of the sense manifold thought of as necessarily conjoined, and as recurring, so conjoined, in our experience. Kant's thought seems to be moving on these lines when he says: 'We thus think of a triangle as an object, inasmuch as we are conscious of the conjunction of three straight lines according to a rule, and it is possible to have such an intuition at any time according to the rule (A 105).

What Kant is saying suggests various comments and questions. We must ask whether we have yet a clear explanation of the sense in which he thinks that concepts determine the organization of the sense manifold. There are two important points at least in respect of which it seems that there is ambiguity or confusion. In the first place let us notice that when we refer to 'a rule in accordance with' which a conjunction is produced we may have one or other of two different notions in mind. We may be concerned with a certain conjunction of sense presentations and be thinking that they are so related that some of their features necessarily

¹ *Italics mine.*

involve the presence of others; thus if an equilateral triangle is presented the angles will have the look of being equal. We may go further and include in the rule other presentations which we should have under different conditions of sensation, such as the different appearance of the triangle when seen in a different perspective. So far it seems that we can state our concept or rule in terms of the conjunction or succession of actual or imagined sense presentations. It should be noticed, however, that it is not explained how we come to imagine correctly different presentations from those which are actually given, as in fact happens when we imagine objects in a different perspective. This is a consideration which leads us to think that there is involved some notion other than that of the mere conjunction of sense presentations, actual or imagined. It is the notion that what controls our presentations is the spatial character of the object which is not a series of presentations although it gives rise to them. We are in effect coming back to the same point which we had before us earlier (see p. 61), and the question is whether or not in his reference to the concept of the object as a rule determining the system of our presentations Kant is taking up a position incompatible with the view that our notion of objects can be resolved into the organization of our presentations.

The other matter which we should notice is this. We may ask whether the recognition that concepts enable us to think of certain kinds of things which recur in our experience elucidates the part played by the concept in our thought of objects. What Kant has in mind is doubtless the fact that we think, e.g., of gold as a kind of thing, because we think of the characters of yellowness, a certain specific gravity, solubility in *aqua regia*, etc., as necessarily conjoined. But here it seems that he is diverging to another and a later problem than that of the thought of objects. A piece of matter can be thought of as a physical object independently of this determination of it as a particular kind of thing, and it is when we are already thinking of it as an object in space that we raise questions about the combination of these particular qualities and ask whether we are justified in regarding it as an object of a kind. The consideration of this problem hardly seems to answer the question, What is the nature of the concept in virtue of which we think of a physical object? Nevertheless we are tempted to suppose that Kant himself did not altogether distinguish the two problems and that because he noticed that the concept of a necessary con-

junction of qualities in an object amounted to the concept of a kind of object, he was misled into thinking that the concept of a certain conjunction of sensible elements forming the contents of our presentations was exactly equivalent to the concept of a physical object. But it is difficult either to think that the two latter concepts are equivalent or to understand how we can pass from the first to the second.

It appears, therefore, when we examine the line of Kant's thought in the first-edition Deduction which explains our consciousness of objects in terms of the organization of presentations under the control of concepts, that whether we think he refers to presentations as temporal events or to their contents, no satisfactory results are obtained. But we must turn now to the other line of thought which we noticed in our preliminary survey (see p. 57). We saw then that Kant seems also to connect our consciousness of objects with the thought of something which is independent of our presentations, and that there is the question whether the two views can be combined. We must now ask this question and consider whether the references to the transcendental object serve in any way to remove the difficulties which so far seem to belong to his account. What Kant says in regard to the transcendental object is, like the other parts of this section, so obscure that it suggests several different interpretations. One interpretation would at once remove the problem of the connexion between the two lines of thought by contending that there are not two lines of thought, but only one. It takes Kant as meaning by 'the transcendental object = x ' nothing else than the concept of an object in general, or, we might say, the concept of objectivity; and inasmuch as this concept of an object is analysed as the thought of necessary unity in our presentations, the transcendental object itself becomes the unity which we recognize in our presentations. The view is suggested by the statement in A 104 that an object outside our faculty of presentation 'can only be thought of as something in general = x (*etwas überhaupt = x*)', although the context on the whole seems rather to imply the different meaning that in any attempt to pass beyond our presentations we can only have the idea of a mere something, bare of all predicates. More definite support seems to be afforded by the passage A 109-10, which runs as follows:

• 'The pure concept of this transcendental object (which in fact in all our cognitions is always the same = x) is that which in all our empirical

concepts has the general function of producing relation to an object, i.e. objective reality. Now this concept can contain no determinate intuition, and will therefore concern only that unity which must be found in the manifold of cognition, so far as it stands in relation to an object. This relation (sc. to an object) is however nothing but the necessary unity which belongs to consciousness and consequently to the synthesis of the manifold in virtue of the general function which the mind possesses of binding the manifold together in a presentation.'

The passage goes on to state that

'this unity must be *a priori* necessary as otherwise our cognition would have no object, and accordingly the relation of our cognitions to a transcendental object, i.e. their objective reality, must rest on the transcendental law that all phenomena, so far as they are to yield objects, must be governed by *a priori* rules in regard to their synthetical unity'.

The significant point here is that Kant makes the expressions 'the relation of our cognitions or presentations to an object' and 'the objective reality of our presentations' equivalent. It seems plausible to explain the objective reality of our presentations as meaning their necessary unity, and it becomes thereby possible to drop the notion of relation of presentations to objects. The passage certainly at first sight makes it appear that Kant is disposed to resolve entirely the concept of objects into that of unity of our presentations, and if so we have to take the account which we have been hitherto considering as his whole doctrine. The difficulties which then arise have been sufficiently indicated.

It is, however, not at all evident that Kant wishes entirely to eliminate the thought of the object in the sense of something different from the unity of presentations. In the following passage (A 104) he seems distinctly to hold that besides the recognition of unity in our presentations we have the thought of something else when we are thinking of objects.

'But we find', he says, 'that our thought of the relation of all cognition to its object brings something of the nature of necessity in its train; for the object is regarded as that which prevents our consciousness from having an arbitrary content and instead causes it to be determined *a priori* in a particular manner, since, inasmuch as the consciousness relates to an object, its contents must in relation to the object necessarily agree with each other, i.e. they must possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object.'

At the beginning of this passage he seems to recognize two elements in our consciousness, the thought of the object and consciousness

of the organized manifold of sense ; they cannot be the same because the object is regarded as that in virtue of which a particular manifold of sense has a determinate organization. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the concluding words which affirm that the unity of the manifold 'constitutes the concept of an object' seem to abandon the distinction which he has just made. It seems, however, possible to explain the apparent contradiction if we hold that Kant, despite his view that there are two factors in the notion of an object, sometimes when he refers to objects has the one factor in mind, sometimes the other, instead of having both, as properly he should. We may suppose his general contention to be that when we think of an object we think of certain features in our sense presentations (or imagined presentations) which we take to be related to something which is independent of them. Now if we want to describe an object we can only refer to an organized system of presentations, actual or imagined or both together. He seems to hold that the factor to which they are related, the independent object, cannot be described at all. It is *etwas überhaupt* (A 104), and we can only say that with reference to it we think of our cognitions as possessing unity and necessity (A 104-5). It is an object which 'can no longer be intuited by us and therefore may be called the non-empirical, i.e. transcendental object = x ' (A 109). Inasmuch as there is no determinate intuition of the transcendental object, it can only be thought of as something which 'concerns the unity which must be found in a manifold of cognition so far as it relates to an object' ('wird also nichts anders, als diejenige Einheit betreffen, die in einem Mannigfaltigen der Erkenntniss angetroffen werden muss, sofern es in Beziehung auf einen Gegenstand steht'—A 109). Accordingly, since this 'something' to which presentations refer cannot be intuited or described on Kant's view, it comes about that when he wishes to indicate in general terms the features of what is present to consciousness (what he calls the 'concept') when we think of an object, he refers to the unity of our presentations as 'constituting' the concept of an object', although he ought to add that we think also of the presentations in relation to something else. On the other hand, when he refers to 'presentations having an object' he is connecting the word 'object' with the other factor in consciousness, i.e. the thought of something independent of our presentations. But here he is on the whole more careful and generally qualifies his reference to the object by the addition of the word 'transcendental'. There are obscurities and difficulties, as we shall see, in

this way of explaining the two factors, but the point which concerns us here is that Kant does not really hold that the thought of an object can wholly be resolved into consciousness of the unity of the manifold provided by sense and imagination. His ambiguous or misleading language should not make us ascribe that view to him.

If we are satisfied that in the analysis of our consciousness Kant recognizes (however ambiguously) the thought of an independent object and does not confound it with anything else, various questions arise in regard to the nature and status of the transcendental object, the way in which we are conscious of it, and its relation to our apprehension of unity and order in the manifold of sense. As to the first question there is undoubtedly much in Kant's account which lends support to the view that when he refers to the transcendental object he has nothing else in mind than the 'thing-in-itself' which elsewhere finds a place in his doctrines. Many of his remarks regarding the transcendental object are such as to fit the thing-in-itself. It is an object 'separated from our cognition' (*davon unterschiedenen*—A 104); inasmuch as it is 'separated from our presentations' it is 'nothing to us' (*für uns nichts ist*—A 105); again it is an object 'which can no longer be intuited (*angeschaut*) by us and therefore may be called the non-empirical, i.e. transcendental object = x ' (A 109); and in the last passage it seems significant that in referring to it as the object of presentations, and thereby contrasting it with presentations, he points out that presentations are merely appearances and not things-in-themselves, with the possible implication that the contrasted transcendental object is to be regarded as a thing-in-itself. This is probably not a right interpretation of his meaning, but let us suppose for the moment that it holds good, and consider whether the introduction of the thing-in-itself helps his doctrine. Whatever we think his view to be, it is worth while in itself to see whether any satisfactory account can be obtained along this line.

We have seen that Kant's own account, when taken apart from any reference to objects independent of our presentations, is more easily intelligible if the organization of presentations in terms of which objects are explained is regarded as an organization of the contents of our presentations. But it appears also that when the account is thus interpreted it puts physical objects as contents of certain inner states on a different level to inner states themselves.

In doing so it runs strongly counter to the thought not only of the second-edition Refutation of Idealism (in which his doctrine has advanced in a fresh direction) but of the earlier Refutation also. In general we should expect that Kant would wish to recover the measure of objectivity which has been lost for physical objects, or in some way to compensate for what has been lost, and it is plausible to suggest that he turns to the idea of the thing-in-itself with this in view. But we must notice that in that case he departs from the doctrine of the early Refutation which, as we saw in the last chapter, rejects the attempt to save the objectivity of physical objects by recourse to the notion of the thing-in-itself. It is more important, however, to see that the introduction of the thing-in-itself does not appear to provide an answer to the difficulties in Kant's account. One point which needs to be explained is how, if all that we are conscious of is our own impressions or presentations, we come to have the notion of an object which may persist while our apprehension of it comes and goes. The thing-in-itself, as it is conceived by Kant, is not something which at all corresponds to this ordinary notion of an object; for while the object is thought of as having temporal duration in space, the thing-in-itself must not be conceived to be either temporal or spatial; it is therefore difficult to see how it explains the presence in our minds of the ordinary notion of an object. This is a point which seems to apply whether we think that the organization of our presentations to which Kant refers is an organization of the presentations or of their contents. Again we may recur to the difficulty that although in our thought of ordinary objects we conceive arrangements of the sense manifold differing from those given in sense presentations (see p. 66 above), there is no apparent reason why these alternative arrangements should present themselves to the mind as necessary. Here also it seems that the notion of the thing-in-itself does not provide us with a solution. The thought of a thing-in-itself which possesses no predicates and is not even connected with time or space, cannot possibly be a concept which controls the way in which we frame these fresh patterns of time- and space-relations between the parts of the manifold of sense.

These difficulties, of course, do not make it necessary to hold that Kant is not referring to the thing-in-itself; for he may be in error and think that the doctrine helps more than it does in this connexion. But on the whole it seems more likely that it is not the thing-in-itself of which he is thinking. We may notice that what

he has in mind seems in any case different from the notion of the thing-in-itself as he presents it elsewhere. Ordinarily he thinks of it as something which is the ground of the manifold in general as it is given in outer sense, and he points out in the first Refutation of Idealism that perhaps it is the ground of the manifold of inner sense also. It is true that reference to plural things-in-themselves is out of accord with this view, but even when the reference is to things-in-themselves Kant does not seem to be thinking that the thing-in-itself forms an element in our ordinary thought of this or that object. The position is quite different when he is speaking of the transcendental object. Despite the fact that in A 105 he says that the transcendental object 'is nothing to us', his language in other passages implies that it is present to our thought as a particular ground of a particular arrangement of the sense manifold, or as something to which the particular arrangement is related. Thus in A 104 he says of our cognitions (*Erkenntnisse*) that they 'must relate to an object' (*indem sie sich auf einen Gegenstand beziehen sollen*), and again in A 108 he remarks that 'all presentations have as presentations, their object' (*alle Vorstellungen haben, als Vorstellungen, ihren Gegenstand*). This is language which assigns to the transcendental object a part in our thinking which Kant would not ordinarily assign to the thing-in-itself. He would not say that our spatial presentations are 'presentations of' or 'refer to' something which is non-spatial and altogether apart from our forms of intuition. It may be said that his use of the expression 'non-empirical object' (A 109) as equivalent to 'transcendental object' tells in the opposite direction. But 'non-empirical' in Kant by no means necessarily implies 'unrelated to intuition'. Thus the form of space itself as opposed to its sensible contents is non-empirical, and by non-empirical object Kant may refer to the pure concept of an object in a way which is analogous to his reference to the pure form of space.

These considerations present difficulties if we suppose that Kant is thinking of the thing-in-itself. But if he is not thinking of the thing-in-itself, it is not easy to determine what else it is of which he thinks. It may be suggested that his treatment of the transcendental object contains two alternative lines of thought which he does not distinguish. The first seems to rely on the notion of a concept which the mind applies to its sense presentations. The concept of an object is a category or, it may be, a compendium of categories informing the manifold of sense. We should perhaps

not be far from Kant's thought, if we said that it was the focusing of the categories of substance, unity and community or reciprocal connexion on certain elements of the sense manifold. What is given is no more than what is presented to sensibility, but the mind is bound to think of it in certain ways and to use imagination, working under the guidance of the concepts, to supplement what is given. But if we say this are we not returning to the line of interpretation, discussed earlier, which suggested that the thought of the transcendental object was just the concept of the object in general or objectivity?

The difference, however, is important. When we considered before the identification of the transcendental object with the concept of the object in general the view discussed was that the concept of the object could be resolved or explained as the concept of the unity and organization of a group of sense presentations or their contents. We are now supposing that Kant's own assertion in A 105 that this unity 'constitutes the concept of an object' (*den Begriff von einem Gegenstande ausmacht*) is misleading. The concept of an object is now regarded as more than that of the unity of our presentations. It is the thought that the passing presentations are modes of something which is permanent or at any rate has a duration greater than that of our moments of consciousness. It should be noticed that in this view it is implied that what we think of is the content of our presentations and not the presentations as mental events. If we thought of the latter, the permanent underlying our states of consciousness would be something corresponding to the notion of the self, but it is not the self of which we are thinking when we have the concept of objects. Further, following up this line of thought, we should perhaps say that inasmuch as we have the thought that our presentations are features of a permanent object, we also regard these features themselves as having a duration not limited to the duration of the moments in which they are apprehended. Not merely the substance but also its modes are thought of as continuing, and we think that there is an object which has, for instance, shape and colour when we no longer perceive it. To say this recognizes that there is much more in our *thought* of the object than the concept of system in our presentations. At least such a view is in better accord with fundamental factors of our consciousness than the view which supposes that we think only of the unity of transient presentations, and it so describes these factors that, unlike the notion of the thing-in-itself, they can

be seen to stand in some connexion with the ordinary manner in which we regard an object.

But the position is still obscure, and we must try to elucidate it further and to see its implications and its points of difficulty both in relation to Kant's doctrines and in itself. The question which arises is this. It appears that Kant is analysing our thought of objects, and we have to ask whether the analysis really accords with the nature of our thinking and presents an account of it which can satisfy us. If it is his view that the thought of the transcendental object is of the nature of a form or category which the mind imposes on the matter of consciousness or finds in it, and if this matter of consciousness is internal to our presentations, it seems to follow that in thinking of the transcendental object we are not passing beyond the contents of the presentations. The thought of the transcendental object is thus, not indeed simply the thought of the order or arrangement of the manifold of sense which appears in our presentations, but a way in which the mind from the first and inevitably thinks of the manifold; it is a way of thinking, as we have seen, in which certain elements of the sense manifold are taken together and regarded as modes in which something more permanent than the modes is manifested.

The criticism which must immediately present itself of such a position is that it reduces the reality of permanent objects to a fiction of the mind. Is the criticism just? If we try to be fair to Kant it may first be suggested that to criticize him thus is to ignore a main tenet in his doctrines, and that the proper way of stating the position is to say that the object is given a recognizable place in his system, in which it retains its full significance. In effect the transcendental object is now being regarded not indeed as noumenal, but as phenomenal, and that means that the thought of it is not an artificial or fictional way of regarding the manifold of sense. The manifold of sense is not deemed to be a fiction because it has to be regarded as a necessary way in which the mind must feel or be sensibly conscious, and the transcendental object is no more a fiction because it is a necessary way in which the mind must think. On these lines it may be said that the doctrine of the transcendental object must not be separately criticized but should stand or fall with Kant's main doctrine regarding the phenomenal character of all experience.

It seems, however, notwithstanding these considerations, that we cannot be satisfied with what Kant is saying. The difficulty

is not that objects are given reality within consciousness rather than independently of it, but that they bring about a contradiction in the nature of consciousness itself. If we say that objects are our presentations, transformed for thought by a category which the mind reads into them, the presentations are made, so to say, to perform a double function, and the one function appears to be in contradiction to the other. On the one hand we are holding that the mind must think of objects as permanent or enduring, on the other hand it is implied that we are aware, either immediately or on reflection, that these objects are nothing but the contents of our passing moments of apprehension. It may be said that the latter view of objects is that which reflection or philosophical thought gives us, and that we ought simply to recognize that the former is baseless. But Kant himself would not endorse such an attitude towards a category of thinking, nor does it seem proper to regard thus a fundamental element in consciousness. Philosophical analysis should either explain how there came to be these elements of consciousness or else show that with more correct formulation they can be retained. Otherwise the analysis itself must always remain open to suspicion. Hume was right when, thinking of such contradictions in our consciousness, he declared that he was bound to profess himself a sceptic.

If the root of the difficulty is the supposition that consciousness makes its presentations do double duty, it seems that we have here a wrong analysis of our consciousness. The alternative is to hold that from the first the mind makes a much more radical distinction between its presentations and objects than is implied when we say that here are two ways of regarding the same thing. Now this is, in fact, an alternative which Kant seems to have in mind. It is the second line of thought to be found, as was suggested earlier (see p. 72), in his treatment of the transcendental object. It seems plain enough that when he refers to objects to which our presentations are related and insists that presentations, while being objects of consciousness, also 'have their object' he is recognizing that consciousness does not credit its presentations with stability or continuity, but takes objects to be distinct from presentations and to have characteristics which they have not. In this he is much more in accord with the thought both of the first and of the second Refutation of Idealism. As we have seen, it is a main contention of the first Refutation that objects of outer sense should be recognized as having an equal status with those of inner sense,

and it seems to be an implication of all he says that consciousness must take them to be distinct. He came to see later that the way in which he worked out the doctrine was not satisfactory, but the second Refutation is only an attempt to establish the same contention on lines which are more in accord with factors and conditions which he had previously overlooked.

But if this is the alternative line of thought which Kant follows, we must try to see where it is leading. We can perhaps see the direction best, if we think that he is conscious of the difficulties of the view that the thought of objects is just a way of regarding our presentations and wishes to find an account which keeps closer to our ordinary consciousness. It is through reflection on ordinary consciousness that he comes to say that the object is something to which we refer our presentations rather than something which is our presentations. But if we are to look at the matter thus and ask ourselves what we ordinarily think, it seems that there are certain definite ways in which we regard the object to which our presentations are referred. First and foremost, the object is regarded as being spatial and temporal. It is not thought to be something neither spatial nor temporal, the nature of which cannot be known to us. Further we suppose that its spatial and temporal characteristics are in direct connexion with the spatial and temporal aspects of our presentations and that we are aware of the principles of this connexion. It is because there is an object of a certain form existing in a certain place and at a certain time that our presentations occur when they do and have such and such contents. For instance, we see an elliptical shape and say to ourselves that we are seeing an ellipse because we are looking at a circular object from a particular angle. In a similar way certain tactile presentations are understood to be necessarily connected with the same object. It is evident that we are not only distinguishing the object and our presentations but are conscious of the nature of both and of the relation between them. It is on these lines that we make the distinction between the object and its appearances to us. The distinction is based on the supposition that we know something of the nature of the object which is said to have a certain appearance, and we only regard the content of our consciousness as the appearance of an object when we think that the conditions in which an object can appear to us are being fulfilled. If we talk of an imaginary object as an appearance, we are using the word 'appearance' in a different sense from that in

which we ordinarily use it. And again if we speak of the appearance of an unknown or noumenal reality, we are not giving the ordinary meaning to appearance. The concept of the relation between noumena and phenomena is wholly different from the concept of the relation of an object to its appearances.

If this account of the nature of our consciousness is right, it follows that certain ways of regarding the nature of objects are not in accordance with it. Thus, to go back to the previous example, it will not accord with ordinary consciousness to say that the circularity of an object and its elliptical appearance are on the same level, both being appearances, and that the nature of the object is no more than a system of its various appearances. If everything belonging to the object is appearance, the meaning which consciousness gives to appearance is lost. The circularity or what we call the geometrical shape of the object is regarded by consciousness as having a wholly different status to its appearances. It is true that there is a circular appearance of which we are conscious when we look at the object from the front, but it is the circular appearance of a circular object, and the distinction between the appearance and the object is still retained. This is not to say that we are sensibly aware of two shapes (the point against which Hume argued) but that there is a shape for sensibility and a shape for thought, the shape which we are seeing and the shape which we think belongs to the object. These considerations at least allow us to say, so it would seem, that the view that an object is either the most normal of our presentations or the whole system of them is in conflict with our ordinary consciousness. Nor will it be more in accord with our consciousness if we say that the object is the unknown ground of the different appearances or presentations. It is possible to imagine a universe which is comprised wholly by our presentations and an unknown ground which is the reason for their occurrence, but that is not the way in which we think the universe is constructed when we think of objects and our awareness of them.

It is a matter for more detailed consideration whether or not analysis of the elements which enter into our thought of objects leads us along these lines.¹ The foregoing statement can only be regarded as rough and provisional. But there are the further questions whether the method is the right one to adopt, whether it is followed by Kant, and whether it leads him in the direction which

¹ The reader may be referred to my *Treatise on Knowledge*, Chapter III.

has been suggested. Now whether the method is right or wrong (and this question again we shall reserve) there can be little doubt that it is the method which Kant is adopting throughout the *Critique*. The basis of the Aesthetic is the investigation of the elements which are found in our consciousness of space and time. In the Analytic he similarly investigates the nature of our consciousness of physical objects and the relations which hold between them. The Paralogisms and Antinomies again take their stand on ways in which we think. The conclusion to which all his investigation of the elements in consciousness leads is a certain view about the nature of reality, but it is only established, in Kant's way of thinking, in so far as it offers a justification for the ineradicable elements in our sensibility and thought. Two conditions must be fulfilled by any theory regarding the nature of reality; it must satisfy and allow us to retain all the elements which seem essentially to belong to consciousness, and it must be such that the elements of consciousness do not appear to be discordant with each other. The root of his objections to other philosophers, as we have seen in his criticisms of Descartes, Berkeley and Hume, is that they do not satisfy these conditions. When, therefore, he comes to see that the distinction between objects and presentations is one of the primary elements of consciousness, he is bound on his own principles to follow the matter farther, and ask what are the characteristics which consciousness ascribes to objects in distinction from its presentations. It is clear that this line of investigation, whether the conclusions suggested above are right or not, belongs properly to his method.

The question what characteristics Kant thinks are ascribed to objects in our consciousness of them is much more complicated. But we must admit that in the passage of the Transcendental Deduction which we have been considering, he fails to deal with the problem. The fact of the matter is that he only sees fitfully the part which the thought of the independent object plays in our consciousness. He loses sight of the point when he says that the object is only 'something in general' and that it is 'nothing to us', and the reason is that he is hampered by the alternative lines of thought which he cannot help pursuing. Instead of asking himself what we really think about the object as distinct from our presentations, he falls back on the analysis which resolves the notion of the object into that of a complex of presentations or of a category which consciousness ascribes to its presentations. On the

other hand, when he refers to the object as that which determines the system of our presentations he comes back to the proper account of the way in which we think. We can only say that the notion that the object is something more for consciousness than a complex of presentations or a category or group of categories hovers before his mind and is never clearly apprehended in this part of the *Critique*. Nevertheless the notion is present and drives him ultimately to the argument of the second Refutation of Idealism.

When we reflect on the uncertainty and ambiguity of Kant's account it would seem reasonable to suppose that there is something dubious in the basis from which he starts. It is perhaps possible to see that this is so.

In the Preface of the first edition of the *Critique* he draws a distinction between the objective and the subjective sides of his Deduction of the Categories. What he says is as follows:

'This inquiry (sc. the Transcendental Deduction), which goes somewhat deep, has two sides. The one relates to the objects of the pure understanding, and should prove and make comprehensible the objective validity of its *a priori* concepts; for that reason it is essentially related to my purpose. The other considers the pure understanding itself from the point of view of its possibility and the powers of cognition on which it rests, i.e. it considers it subjectively; and although this exposition is of great importance in relation to my principal aim, it yet does not belong essentially to it. For the chief question is always, what and how much can understanding and reason know apart from experience, and not, how is the faculty of thinking itself possible. The latter is, as it were, an inquiry into the causes of a given effect, and so far has something of the character of a hypothesis (although, as I shall show on another occasion, it is not in fact a hypothesis), and thus it seems as if I am here allowing myself to make a conjecture and must allow the reader the liberty of making any other. In view of these considerations I must remind the reader that in case my subjective deduction does not carry the complete conviction which I expect, still the objective deduction with which I am here chiefly concerned retains its full strength' (A XVI, XVII).

It would seem that Kant's description of what he calls the subjective side of his Deduction fits best the account of the three Syntheses which we considered in the last chapter. We may notice that he says in the Preface that the Subjective Deduction 'considers the pure understanding itself from the point of view of its possibility and the powers of cognition on which it rests', and that

the preliminary statement which prefaces the account of the Syntheses begins with the significant remark that the task of deducing the Categories 'makes it necessary to penetrate deeply into the first grounds of the possibility of our cognition' (A 98). If that is so, it appears from the passage in the Preface that Kant has no doubt in regard to the correctness and importance of his account of the Syntheses, but is not equally insistent on its relevance. It is, nevertheless, perhaps nearer the mark to think that the account rests on a dubious basis, and that the purpose of the Deduction, which Kant asserts is 'to render comprehensible the objective validity of the *a priori* concepts of the understanding' is thereby much prejudiced.

If we wish to consider the basis of the account of the Syntheses, we must remind ourselves of the emphatic remarks with which the account begins. In A 98, 99 we are told never to forget that our presentations as modifications of the mind must belong to the internal sense and that they are therefore subject to the formal condition of the internal sense, namely time. Kant is working on the basis of the two points in Hume's doctrine, viz. that we are conscious only of our own impressions and ideas, and that they occur as successive events in the sequence of time; and his task is to show what powers the mind must possess and in what way it must operate in order that consciousness so constituted may have the form of consciousness of a world of objects.

In regard to this account we may notice first that Kant limits the extent to which he pushes back his inquiry into the conditions of consciousness. He imagines a situation, a primary element of which is our consciousness of our presentations as succeeding each other in time. But time itself, according to his doctrine, is the product of consciousness, and we have to remember that he is leaving out of account the consideration that the flow of states of consciousness is not in his view given objectively to consciousness, as it was in Hume's, but is due to the operation of mind itself. Secondly it seems reasonable to think that the difficulties which, as we saw in the last chapter, attend Kant's attempt to explain the nature of our consciousness of objects, arise from his acceptance of the doctrine that the original datum of consciousness is the succession of our presentations and nothing more. If he starts from this position, it seems inevitable for him to suppose either that the thought of objects can be resolved into the thought of a system in our states of consciousness or that the thought of objects

is a fictional construction which is at variance with what we must suppose to be the data of consciousness. In the first-edition Deduction Kant seems to move uncertainly in both these directions and not to be satisfied with either. His dissatisfaction with either is intelligible; for the first view in effect refuses to recognize the concept of the object, the second admits that it is a factor in our consciousness but regards it as fictitious. If either view is accepted, there is a failure to achieve what Kant tells us is the main purpose of the Deduction. He evidently regards the concept of objects as an *a priori* concept of the understanding. But so far from making its objective validity comprehensible, he is hesitant and uncertain in claiming validity for it.

IV

THE DOCTRINE OF THE SECOND-EDITION DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES

If in reflecting on Kant's Deduction of the Categories we try to disregard its complicated detail and concentrate attention on its main outlines, the necessary clue seems to be that Kant thinks first and foremost of the problem presented by those judgements which he calls synthetic and *a priori*. His view is that it is reasonable to suppose that consciousness is governed by certain laws of its own nature and must operate in certain definite ways. Further, if this is so, it does not seem extraordinary that mind should be conscious of its own nature and thereby of the necessity of the principles of its thinking. But when this point is reached, yet another question inevitably arises. We distinguish consciousness from the objects of which it is conscious, and in doing so we must ask what relation exists between the principles of our thinking on the one hand and the nature of objects on the other, and what guarantee we have that consciousness reflects the nature of objects or that the principles of consciousness apply or conform to them. For this question Kant thought that he had a solution. The difficulty, he considered, disappears if we suppose that the objects of consciousness are not separate from consciousness itself or from our thinking. Objects, in his view, are no other than states of our sensibility in regard to which we think and imagine, and are bound to think and imagine, in certain ways because it is the nature of our minds to do so. What is meant by this position is not that the object is a state of sensibility and that when we experience this state we proceed to think about it; but that the object is constituted by a state or states of sensibility, supplemented by imagination and the work of thought. There is no object except in so far as we are imagining and thinking in relation to our states of sensibility. We ought not then to put a question regarding the conformity or application of thought to objects, which implies that there are objects to which thought can be applied. What we mean by saying that the principles of thought are necessary is that unless these principles are operative, there are no objects.

Further, Kant evidently thinks that the validity of his answer

is not affected by the fact that the general principles of thinking manifest themselves in particularized ways of thinking which differ and may be subject to change. The point will be made clearer if we consider his doctrine regarding the principle of causality. He holds that there can be no objects for consciousness unless certain states of sensibility are thought of as standing in necessary connexion with certain other states, actual or possible. We may have different views or change our views on the question what particular states are connected with what other states. But if we decide that the particular connexions are not what others think, or what we ourselves have thought them to be, we still think that there must be connexions and are compelled to formulate new views of what they are. Not to think thus would mean that we were without consciousness of objects. It is in this sense that objects can be said not so much to conform to as to exhibit a principle of our thinking which must hold in regard to every object of thought.

Now it may be doubted whether Kant has really removed the problem of conformity and not merely altered the form in which it needs to be expressed. If it is said that when we think of objects we think of a necessary system of our states of sensibility, actual and possible, it is hard not to make any distinction between what we think the system to be and what it is. Such a distinction is implied when we admit the possibility, referred to above, of differing views regarding the particular form which the system takes. But if we allow the distinction we must still ask what guarantee we have that the system is what we think it to be, or in other words that it conforms to our thinking. It may, however, be said that Kant would not suppose that there could be a guarantee in regard to the particular form of the system; and that all he wishes to establish is that there is a guarantee of *some* system of necessary connexions. But can we even say that there is a guarantee that *some* system exists? It seems open to us to suppose that we think there is a system in our states of sensibility, but actually it is not so. And if Kant answers that this would be to believe that there are no objects, it seems legitimate to allow the possibility that there are no objects although we imagine that there are. We should not need to deny that some objects of consciousness exist, namely, the states of our sensibility of which we are aware, but these are not objects in Kant's sense of the term.

Whether like considerations apply to what Kant says regarding

the mathematical as opposed to the dynamical or regulative principles of our thinking, is a further question.

It is not, however, these problems which we need now consider, though we shall refer to them again later in this chapter. The purpose of these preliminary remarks is to state in its simplest form the way in which Kant seeks to answer the question which he raises in regard to *a priori* judgements, or in other words the way in which he seeks to deduce the categories. What seems to be plain when we look at the Deduction of the Categories from this angle, is that it rests fundamentally on the view that objects are essentially constituted by states of sensibility on which imagination and thought guided by *a priori* principles have operated. Our main task in this chapter will be to understand how Kant works out his doctrine, and to see what difficulties attend it. It will appear that there are certain principal matters connected with his doctrine in regard to which it is necessary to be critical, and it may help to show the direction which our examination will take if they are referred to in advance.

(1) Inasmuch as Kant's argument is based on the position that an object is constituted by states of sensibility which exhibit a certain regular character and that this character is common to all states of sensibility which constitute objects, he tends to find the function and characteristic of the understanding in the fact that it works with concepts, in contrast to sensibility which is concerned with the particular or individual. We must consider what difficulties are connected with this position. (2) The resolution of the object into states of sensibility, actual or imagined, which are bound by the understanding into a system, raises an obvious question regarding the distinction between states of the self and physical objects, or between what Kant calls objects of inner and objects of external sense. This is connected with his doctrines regarding consciousness of self. (3) The whole question is involved whether the object is not more than what Kant on this line of thought contends that it is, namely, a system of our states of sensibility. (4) Further, there is the question whether the doctrine can escape the charge of an extreme subjectivity which rules out the possibility of holding that there is a common reality apprehended by the consciousness of different individuals. (5) The last point is connected with another. We saw that Kant in his later Refutation of Idealism beginning with the recognition of the objectivity of the time order and therefore of the objectivity

also of our states of consciousness, as determined within it, advanced to a new doctrine of the relation between spatial objects and states of consciousness. The question arises whether he made any attempt to incorporate the new doctrine in his revision of the Transcendental Deduction. The suspicion which is raised is whether he could do so without losing the basis of his argument regarding *a priori* propositions, and whether in the Deduction he continued to be so much preoccupied with this problem that he did not see the incompatibility of the argument of the Deduction with that of the later Refutation. (6) Lastly, we must ask whether if we choose to take our stand on the second Refutation it is possible with any modifications of the Deduction to formulate a more satisfactory doctrine regarding our consciousness of objects, and what effect it would have on the account of the categories. It is with these points in mind that we shall consider in order the sections of the Deduction.

At the outset, however, it is desirable to turn to the first section of the Transcendental Logic (A 50 = B 74 et seq.) and notice the distinction which Kant draws between the two pairs of terms, sensibility and intuition on the one hand and the power to form concepts and understanding on the other. As regards the first pair he explains that sensations, which should be regarded as given, are the matter of sensuous cognition, while intuition is the form in which the sensations are received. Pure intuition is the form taken in abstraction from the sensations. As regards the second pair it does not seem that there is a distinction between them; the power to form concepts and the understanding are one and the same. There are pure conceptions (the form of the thought of an object) corresponding to pure intuition. The relation of intuition (taken with sensibility) to the power of forming concepts is indicated by the statement that through the first objects are given, through the second they are thought. It is further stated that without both we could have no knowledge.

The first question we may ask is what the word concept (*Begriff*) means in this account. There seem to be two ideas present in Kant's mind, but it is not clear what he thinks is the relation of the one to the other. In the first place he evidently has before him the contrast between a universal and a particular. This is plain from the fact that he arrives at the list of the categories or the most general concepts of the understanding by considering judgements, and the judgement is regarded by him as the function

of bringing presentations under concepts. Different presentations are brought under a concept in the sense that they are regarded as having the same character or as being instances of the same universal. Secondly, he thinks of the contrast between what is sensible and what is not sensible but only intelligible. For example, when he comes to refer to the concept of causality, he thinks that when we are conscious of causality we are not conscious of something which can be sensibly apprehended. It is the work of the understanding to apprehend causality because sensibility cannot apprehend it.

The employment of those two lines of thought to indicate the nature of a concept (and thereby the nature of the understanding inasmuch as it is taken to be the power of forming concepts) presents difficulties. The suggestion seems to be that the objects of the understanding are both universal and non-sensible. So far as the objects of thought are universals, it may be allowed that they are, *qua* universals, not apprehended by sense. We see a particular red or redness, but we must think of redness in general and cannot see it. The converse proposition, however, that the non-sensible is always universal, does not hold. Causality, as Kant thinks, is not sensibly apprehended, but we must admit that if we can be conscious of causality in general, we must also be able to be conscious of particular instances of causality.¹ Indeed, we can say in general that we could not be conscious of what is universal unless we were conscious in some form or another of the universal as instantiated. It is not necessary to hold that in order to think of a universal we must apprehend an actual instance of it; for we can think of universals of imaginary instances. What is necessary in order to think of a universal is not indeed to experience it as instantiated, but at least to have the thought of it as instantiated. Consciousness therefore of universals which are of such a kind as not to have sensible instances, implies consciousness in some form or other of non-sensible particulars. If Kant does not ascribe this consciousness of non-sensible particulars to the understanding, to what function of mind can he ascribe it?

The fact that Kant ignored these considerations has a bearing on his subsequent treatment of the nature of objects. The bearing is this. He recognizes that to be conscious of an object is to be conscious of more than a certain manifold of sense located in the

¹ Whether we can be certain that what we are conscious of is true or real is another matter.

space and time order. But a manifold of sense so located is all that intuition apprehends. Accordingly anything which constitutes the object over and above the sense-manifold can only be apprehended by the understanding. If then the understanding is a faculty directed towards concepts or universals, it is to the concept or the universal that we must look if we are to find what completes the nature of an object.

Now, of course, we can say that when the mind is aware of a particular object it is also conscious of universals. It is conscious of universals in the sense that it regards the separate characters of the object or the collocation of its characters as something which might be exemplified in other instances. But Kant is not content with this point, and indeed it would not be adequate to say that to be conscious of the manifold of sense as universal in this sense is all that is necessary to complete our consciousness of an object. The way in which he thinks that consciousness of universals enters into our apprehension of objects becomes evident when we consider his account of the judgement. Judgements, he tells us, are 'functions of unity', and he supposes that the unity is brought about because 'in every judgement there is a conception which applies to, and is valid for many other conceptions, and among these comprehends also a given presentation, this last being immediately connected with an object' (A 68 = B 93). The meaning is evidently that judgements produce unity in our experience because in judgements instead of apprehending particulars without relation to each other we apprehend many particulars as having a like nature, or a set of particulars as having a characteristic which belongs also to other and different sets of particulars. But having said this Kant goes on to say explicitly that 'we can bring all activities of the understanding back to judgements, so that the understanding can be represented generally as a capacity of judging'. It seems therefore that the function of the understanding is to produce or to discover the elements of resemblance which give form or system to the contents of experience. From this point of view the categories themselves introduce unity into experience precisely because they are the widest possible concepts, or in other words because they are features exhibited by experience throughout its length and breadth. It is true that such an approach to his subject involves Kant in many difficulties, and that in the second edition he makes some attempt to arrive at a more satisfactory account of the judgement.

Thus in the passage B 128, 129, he no longer insists that the categories are the most general concepts or predicates which judgements implicitly employ, and instead he fastens attention on the different kinds of relations between factors of experience which judgements manifest according as they are working with different categories. It is clear that in the passage in question the relation of subject and predicate which he says is embodied in the categorical judgement is taken to be only one kind of relation. But to think that the categories express different kinds of relational ties is to think of them as concerned with another kind of synthesis than that which consists in the unification of experience by means of common predicates. The significant point, however, for our purpose is that he leaves his earlier account of the work of understanding still unchanged. He has not freed himself from the notion that the understanding works essentially with general concepts. But if this is so we must be prepared to find that his account of our apprehension of objects is affected by the same notion. The tendency is strong for him to think that the part played by the understanding, when we apprehend an object, is just the recognition that the manifold of sense is presenting a collocation of features which in accordance with some regular pattern is constantly repeated in our experience. All this is clearly preparing the way for the doctrine that the object can be resolved into a group of sensible presentations arranged in accordance with a rule.

In considering the sections which contain Kant's revision of the Deduction of the Categories, it will be convenient to arrange our discussion under various heads, although, of course, the topics to which they refer are closely interconnected. . .

1. *Conjunction and the Synthetical Unity of Apperception*

The topic with which Kant begins is that of Conjunction and the Synthetical Unity of Apperception and the relation between these two terms. In § 15 he explains that the conjunction of the manifold must be regarded as the basis of all consciousness. In conjunction we have the presentation to ourselves of the synthetical unity of the manifold, and the latter is the presupposition of conjunction. As he says, synthetical unity precedes all concepts of conjunction and is quite different from the category of unity (B 131). What is evidently meant is this. The forms or concepts

of conjunction are many; thus we may apprehend the manifold presented to consciousness as conjoined in the way of being in the one space or in the one time, with its constituents related to each other in various spatial or temporal relations; or we may think of the constituents as being units which form a totality; or again we may think of them as related to each by way of cause and effect, or simply as being similar. These different forms of relation which conjunction takes are what Kant refers to as concepts of conjunction. The unity which they presuppose is the 'qualitative' unity to which he had referred in a previous section added in the second edition (§ 12—B 113 et seq.). It is unity which does not concern characteristics or properties of objects but is a criterion of thought itself (B 114), and is simply the unity of thought or the 'I think'. Whatever forms of conjunction the contents or objects of consciousness may take, they must at least have that unity which comes from the fact that they are apprehended by a single consciousness.

There are three comments which may be made when we consider Kant's line of thought as developed to this point. In the first place it seems that in what he says regarding the unity of the 'I think' he is departing from his insistent view that when we come to the sphere of thought or the understanding we are concerned with consciousness of the universal in distinction from the particular. The unity of which he is speaking is that of thought, which is single, a unity which is conferred on what thought embraces. The contents of thought so regarded seem to be a single or particular whole or unity. The point, however, need not be pressed. Kant can answer that when he is referring to the function of the understanding, it is not enough simply to regard the unity of the 'I think'; the function of the understanding is shown in the specific forms of unity which it imposes on the manifold, and and it is this which he has in mind when he is describing the nature of the understanding.

The question, however, regarding the relation of the passage to Kant's general account of the understanding recurs when we pass to a second point. As we have seen, he holds that conjunction, which presupposes unity of consciousness, takes various forms which he refers to as concepts of conjunction. No doubt in thinking of concepts of conjunction he has here in mind the categories. To fit what he says with his view of the function of the understanding as it is displayed in judgements, he must suppose that conjunction

by means of the categories operates through the imposition of the categories on all the contents of experience so that every part reveals identity of structure. In this way experience is unified or conjoined by having all its parts brought under concepts of the highest generality. More particular conjunctions are effected because certain parts of experience are brought under the same particular determination of a general category.

We shall consider this view of the conjunction effected by the categories later. In the meantime, if we turn to another passage, we see that conjunction by means of the categories is not taken by Kant to be the only form of conjunction. In the footnote to B 160 he says:

'space presented as an object (in the way that geometry requires) contains more than the mere form of intuition, namely conjunction of the manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility into an intuited presentation, so that the form of intuition gives a bare manifold, while formal intuition gives unity of what is presented. In the Aesthetic I have ascribed this unity simply to sensibility, in order to mark the fact that it precedes all concepts, although it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses, through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. For through this synthesis (in which the understanding determines the sensibility) space and time are first given as intuitions, and accordingly the unity of this intuition belongs *a priori* to space and time, and not to the concepts of the understanding.'

What Kant is affirming is that in order to apprehend space there must be synthesis, and that this synthesis is not merely conceptual. That there must be synthesis is clear from the fact that simple consciousness of a piece of extension or an extended somewhat would not be apprehension of the full character of the extended as a part of the totality of space. What would be apprehended in such a case would only be something complying with the form of intuition, and there would be no proper employment of the mind's power of formal intuition. It is part of the same doctrine that the synthesis is not simply conceptual. The mind does not synthesize spaces in the sense that it recognizes a like character in all spaces and thus endows all spaces with the unity of members of a class or kind. Spaces are not held together in the mere unity of being alike spaces. The unity which we attribute to space lies in the fact that we immediately apprehend a particular whole which is composed of necessarily differentiated parts,

It is quite true that if we recognize that all spaces are differentiated parts of the single space, we thereby must recognize the common character which they must at least possess of being alike parts of space. But the important point is that here the concept is derived from the synthesis, not the synthesis from the concept. The synthesis is that of a particular whole of parts, and the common character which we attribute to the parts depends on their being recognized as belonging to the synthesis of this whole and its parts. Hence Kant says that a synthesis is presupposed 'through which all concepts of space and time first become possible'.

All this is, of course, entirely in line with the doctrine of the Aesthetic. But the point to be noticed is Kant's insistence that the synthesis or conjunction must be regarded as belonging to the understanding and not to sensibility. In the first place this means that the function of the understanding is not wholly conceptual, and secondly it has a bearing on the deduction of the categories. In so far as Kant's argument in regard to the categories is that because there can be no consciousness without synthesis and because the categories are the forms of synthesis, therefore the categories are indispensable to consciousness, the argument is plainly weakened by the admission that there is a form of synthesis other than that of the categories. But we shall return to this point later.

The next comment which may be made at this stage refers to an altogether different issue. When Kant contends that the 'I think' must be able to accompany all my presentations (*Vorstellungen*) we may admit that what he says is indisputable. It may indeed be said (as he himself seems to hold elsewhere) that such a proposition is merely identical, since the meaning of my presentations is that they are presentations of which I am conscious. Nevertheless, it seems useful to point out, as he is doing, that there is a kind of unity belonging to objects or contents of consciousness which is connected with the fact that this consciousness of which they are objects or contents is one. Further, it seems admissible for him to hold that this kind of unity is not a unity which can be thought of as belonging to the presentations themselves, but is conferred on them by the unitary character of the consciousness which comprehends them. This is no doubt what he has in mind when he says: 'For the empirical consciousness which accompanies different presentations is in itself disjointed and without relation to the identity of the subject. This

relation then does not come about because I accompany every presentation with consciousness, but because I join one to the other and am conscious of the synthesis of them' (B 133). But to admit that this form of unity belongs to the objects or contents of an individual consciousness does not involve the admission either that it is the only form of unity which they possess or that all particularized kinds of unity are derived from it. We habitually think that there are not only existents of which we are conscious, but also existents of which we are not conscious. The former doubtless possess the unity of which Kant is speaking. But what are we to say of the latter? Kant would presumably answer (1) that after all I think of them and that they belong to the unity of consciousness in this sense; (2) that I think of them in terms of presentations which may be given in intuition, and thus they fall within the unity of possible intuition.

Let us consider (2) first. We may notice that Kant's account of what is comprehended in the unity of the 'I think' is ambiguous. He begins by using the term 'presentations' (*Vorstellungen*) and it is not made clear what is the connexion of the term with actual intuition. In B 133 he refers to 'the identity of the apperception of a manifold given in intuition', and a few sentences later to 'presentations given in intuition'. But it is obvious that what is comprehended in the 'I think' is not limited to the actually intuited, and we must therefore suppose that the unity of the 'I think' is extended, as suggested above, to what is thought of as capable of being presented in intuition. We can therefore ask whether the unity which we attribute to existents of which we are not conscious is derived from the thought of them as possible contents of our intuition. There are difficulties in such a view even when we think only of physical existents. As Kant himself reflects in the Second and Third Analogies, the conditions of our perception are such that many features of objects cannot be *perceived* simultaneously; yet we think of these features as *existing* simultaneously. This simultaneous existence of an object's features is not then in such cases a form in which we unite our perceptions actual or possible; for we do not think the perceptions can be united in this way. We think instead of some kind of unity or system belonging to objects whether or not they are perceived, which controls our perceptions and the order in which they can occur. In fact we think of two unities, first the unity which comprehends not only what is present to an individual conscious-

ness but what lies beyond it, and secondly a subordinate unity of what enters into the ambit of a unitary individual consciousness or may so enter. Kant is ignoring the first, and concentrating attention entirely on the second.

It is not justifiable to fall back on the answer ((1) above), that when I think of what lies outside the content of individual consciousness, I am *ipso facto* bringing it within the sphere of the 'I think', and thereby conferring on the whole the unity of my own consciousness. For to think of that of which I am not conscious as comprehended within a unity means that I am obliged to think of this unity as different from the particular form of unity which belongs to the objects of my consciousness in virtue of my being conscious of them. It may be right to say that forms of unity are not otherwise thinkable than in relation to a unitary consciousness, and this perhaps is the truth which Kant is feeling after in his account of the unity of apperception. But if so, what is enforced is the necessity of distinguishing universal and individual consciousness, and of saying that the unity of the whole belongs to the former and not to the latter.

It may, however, be said that this line of criticism does not really touch Kant's position because it starts from a presupposition which he would not allow. It presupposes that there are objects of which we are not conscious, whereas his contention is that there is nothing (of which we can form any conception) outside the contents of individual consciousness. Of course, if we begin by supposing that there are such existents it is necessary to find for them some other unity than that which the individual consciousness confers. But so long as Kant abides by his main position he has guarded himself against criticism. So the argument would run, but it can be answered. In the first place the basis of Kant's account seems to be that we are conscious of the unity of objects as depending on the unity of the 'I think'. But if this is so, the point which is still valid against him is that it seems to be an original and ineradicable part of our consciousness to think that what I am conscious of is not the whole and that the unity of the whole does not depend on my consciousness of it. Whether or not his account of reality is right, it can still be urged that his account of the working of the understanding is incorrect. The second part of the reply may begin with a consideration of what Kant means by 'the phenomenal world'. It is open to say that the phenomenal world for each individual is the totality of what has been or may

be the content of his consciousness. But it is impossible to be content with the qualification 'for each individual' in referring to 'the phenomenal world', and it seems therefore necessary to regard the phenomenal world as the totality of the contents of individual consciousness. So soon, however, as this is allowed, we are admitting the existence of a totality which is not comprehended within any individual 'I think'. Further, we must add that it is impossible not to think of this totality as possessing some kind of unity of its own. If we think of the contents of different consciousnesses we can hardly suppose that they do not stand in some relation to each other, and if we disregard the contents and think only of the activities of the several consciousnesses, even so we must hold that they at least belong to the one time order and within it have determinate temporal relations. All this brings out the point that it seems impossible to dispense with the notion of a unity which is other than the unity conferred by the 'I think' of the individual consciousness. It will be noticed that the last line of thought is in effect that of the second Refutation of Idealism. It does not seem unfair to contend that the working out of the Deduction of the Categories, even in its second version, shows Kant's failure to recognize the implications of his own argument in the Refutation.

The result of the modifications which need to be made in Kant's account of the unity of apperception is important. As we have noticed, his doctrine is that all 'concepts of conjunction', which, of course, include the categories, presuppose the unity of the 'I think'. Now if he means that consciousness cannot be aware of the unity imparted to its own experience by the categories, unless it is also aware that the experience is its own, the proposition may seem to be tautological and at any rate need not be disputed. But if he means further that the unity of the concepts of conjunction is derived from the unity of the 'I think', he is stating something different. He is stating that the forms of conjunction belong only to what I experience, and belong to it in virtue of my activity of experiencing. The statement can be supported if no unity is thinkable unless it be in terms of the 'I think' of the individual consciousness. But if, on the other hand, it is impossible to dispense with the thought of a unity other than the unity of the individual consciousness, the case fails—at any rate so far as this line of argument is concerned—for the assertion that the categories depend on the activity of the individual consciousness. There is no reason why they should

not be forms of the unity which embraces more than the individual consciousness does or can embrace. If there is a case for Kant's view that they can only be forms of consciousness, it may still be held that it is to an order of consciousness different from that of the individual consciousness that they should be ascribed.

2. *The Concept of an Intuitive Understanding*

Kant seeks to make clearer his view of the nature of the understanding by contrasting it with the notion of a different kind of understanding, which he refers to as an intuitive understanding. The passages in which he draws this contrast are B 135, B 138-9, and B 145-6. All these passages are difficult to follow and perhaps are hastily conceived.

The first (B 135) seems to be concerned with the condition of self-consciousness, and depends on the reflection that in our consciousness the manifold is given in intuition and not produced by consciousness itself. The forms of my thinking can be said to be the work of my mind's activity and therefore to be mine, but the manifold can not. Accordingly it is only in my consciousness of my thinking, that is, of the ways in which I conjoin the manifold that I can be aware of what is mine or myself. (I cannot be aware of a simple ego as the source of the activity of thinking; for the ego is not an object of intuition.) If we suppose another kind of consciousness, which produces for itself the manifold of intuition, so that what it intuits can be said to be itself, it can know itself in intuition and does not need the thinking, which is displayed in conjoining the manifold. But for a human intelligence conjunction is the necessary condition of self-consciousness. In B 138-9 Kant is more closely concerned with the relation of the synthetical unity of apperception to the cognition of objects. He desires to show that it is in the conjunction of presentations that we are conscious of objects, and here again he draws a contrast with an intuitive understanding. His contrast is generally on the same basis as before, but he expands and alters the reference to the production of the manifold of intuition by an intuitive understanding. Here he says that through the presentation (*Vorstellung*) of such an understanding the objects of the presentation would at the same time exist. Again he contends that an intuitive understanding would not require any act of synthesis of the manifold. In B 145-6 he states explicitly that the categories would have no meaning in relation to an intuitive understanding,

seeing that they are merely rules for an understanding whose function it is to submit the synthesis of the manifold, which is given to it from elsewhere in intuition, to the unity of apperception.

Kant's account, if it has been rightly represented, seems difficult and dubious. Of the two problems with which it is concerned, self-consciousness and consciousness of objects, we may take the former first. His contention is apparently that the manifold of our intuition produces no self-consciousness because it is given or passively received. Now in order to decide what importance should be allowed to this point, we must ask what exactly Kant is conceiving the manifold of intuition to be. Plainly he does not think of it as something not belonging to consciousness of which consciousness is aware. If he were so thinking, he might perhaps say that there could be no self-consciousness attached to the manifold of intuition, because it is itself not conscious but only the object of consciousness. Even so, when the manifold of intuition is spoken of, it is not legitimate to ignore the side represented by the word intuition; the reference must be to a manifold which is intuited or of which there is consciousness. But in that case consciousness is involved and the existence of awareness of consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness, does not seem to be ruled out. The question whether the manifold of which there is consciousness is given or not has no obvious bearing on the matter. Kant's own position (according to the general tenor of the Deduction) is that the manifold of intuition is the content of states of sensibility. This content is spatial or temporal, that is to say, it is endowed with the form of intuition, but intuition in the proper sense is not involved, because there is no consciousness of the unity of the content. The last point is explicitly made by Kant in the footnote to B 161 where he says that '*the form of the intuition* gives the bare manifold, but *formal intuition* gives unity of the presentation'. But although the content is not to be thought of as unified and there is therefore no true intuition, still inasmuch as the manifold is the content provided in intuition, it belongs to consciousness. Accordingly, when the expression 'manifold of intuition' is used it can have no meaning on Kant's own view apart from a reference to consciousness. It is necessary then to insist (on the same lines as before) that there seems no clear reason why the consciousness which is inseparable from the manifold of intuition should not carry with it awareness of itself, whether its contents are spontaneous or not.

Kant's reply, however, might be that he is not concerned with the question whether and, if so, under what conditions awareness of itself belongs to any activity of consciousness; his problem is the different problem of consciousness of an identical self. With reference to this problem his contention is that our understanding can only be conscious of an identical self in synthesizing different moments of consciousness and being aware of the synthesis, and that in order to effect such a synthesis it must employ principles which unify its experience. The difficulty, however, in regard to this answer, is the difficulty of seeing how even an intuitive understanding can be supposed to be conscious of itself without some form of unity of consciousness. What Kant says about our consciousness seems to apply to any consciousness which is conscious of itself. In B 133 he says: 'Relation to the identity of the subject does not exist because I accompany every presentation with consciousness, but because I join one to another and am conscious of the synthesis of them.' The supposition that an intuitive understanding spontaneously produces the contents of its own consciousness does not seem to dispense it from the necessity that its experience should be unified. Without some such unity of synthesis it is not plain why it should not be, in Kant's words, as 'many-coloured and diverse a self' as our own unsynthesized consciousness would be.

We shall consider later whether possibly there lies behind Kant's statements a more tenable idea to which he has failed to give adequate expression. But in the meantime we may turn to the bearing of his statements on the problem of consciousness of objects. As we have seen Kant thinks that an understanding which produces its own manifold of intuition needs principles of synthesis neither for consciousness of itself nor for consciousness of objects. The argument regarding consciousness of objects is perhaps rather clearer than the argument regarding consciousness of self, but it is by no means free from ambiguity. On the whole his meaning seems to be this. So far as our understanding is concerned, the manifold of intuition is no more than the content of our sensibility endowed with a spatial and temporal character. It carries with it no consciousness of an object. The way in which we come to think of the contents of our states of sensibility in terms of objects is by the employment of principles in accordance with which they are synthesized, and this is the work not of sensibility or intuition but of understanding. On the other hand,

because an intuitive understanding is conceived as having the power of producing its own manifold of intuition, we should regard it as supplying itself with a manifold of intuition for all its thought, and so being conscious of objects immediately in the act of thinking. It is not subject to the necessity of receiving a given manifold and arriving at the thought of objects by a synthesis of the given. If this is Kant's argument, it can hardly be said to show that an intuitive understanding would need no principles of unity in order to be conscious of objects. It apparently makes no attempt to show that the *thinking* of an intuitive understanding would be of a different order to our own. All that it seems to say is that thought can have no meaning except in relation to an intuited manifold, and that accordingly our thought is dependent on the manifold being given, whereas the thinking of an intuitive understanding is not so restricted because it can provide its own manifold of intuition. If our thinking is unintelligible except as a unity, there is nothing to show that the thinking of an intuitive understanding without unity would be any less unintelligible.

The foregoing interpretation supposes that Kant is keeping to what seems to be the main view of the Deduction regarding our consciousness of objects, i.e. the view that we are conscious only of the content of our states of sensibility, and that the thought of objects is the thought of this content as unified in accordance with certain necessary principles. But his statement in B 139 that 'through the presentation of an intuitive understanding the objects of the presentation would at the same time exist' is susceptible of another interpretation which would suggest that here there is the same uncertainty in Kant's thought which we found in the first edition Deduction. The implication is possibly that in our understanding as contrasted with an intuitive understanding, presentations have objects, but the objects do not exist in virtue of the presentations; indeed the passivity of our presentations may be stated in the form that objects do not exist in virtue of them, but they exist in virtue of objects. But the difference of interpretation does not affect the point taken above that Kant has done nothing to show that the necessity of unity and principles of synthesis is a necessity bearing on our understanding alone.

If we ask why Kant is anxious to prove that an intuitive understanding has no need of synthesis or unity of apperception or principles of unity such as the categories of our understanding,

the answer is not far to seek. He thinks that if he can show that it is only for our understanding that the principles in accordance with which our experience is unified are necessary, he obtains some support for his view that they are principles derived from the nature of our understanding, and not principles belonging to a reality other than ourselves. The importance of the latter contention is, of course, that it provides the basis for his explanation of the validity of our *a priori* judgements. The point at issue is therefore by no means a minor or subsidiary question in relation to his doctrine as a whole. It is intimately related to his deduction of the categories.

So far we have been considering whether Kant's arguments succeed or not in proving what he wishes to prove. But doubt in regard to his arguments does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that he is altogether on the wrong lines. We should ask ourselves whether there are any points of value in the contrast which he draws, and when, if at all, he seems to be mistaken. In the first place we may allow that there is much which seems to be right in the account which he gives of the self-consciousness of the individual mind. There is evidently, as he contends, a close connexion between consciousness of self and the recognition of unity in the contents of experience. A mind can only be considered to exist as an individual mind in so far as it consists of moments of consciousness which are in some ordered relation to each other. It should be added that since a moment of consciousness implies both a temporal occurrence of consciousness and some content or object of consciousness, this ordered relation must extend both to the occurrences of consciousness and to its contents or objects. Self-consciousness then in the full sense of the term would involve awareness of the ordered unity of experience which constitutes the self. Further it seems to be a right corollary of this view that, as Kant in effect contends, experience is not immediately recognizable as a unified whole, and that it is in processes of thought (characterized, we may add, by trial and error) that consciousness of the unity of the self is attained or partially attained. Self-consciousness is a product only gradually elaborated in our thinking, and it is here that we have the significance of Kant's remarks regarding our process of synthesis.

At the same time it seems that there are important points which are overlooked in Kant's account. If we ask why synthesis is required in individual experience and why self-consciousness needs

to be elaborated by thought, we must pay regard to two features which mark individual consciousness. As we saw in connexion with Kant's account of unity of apperception, we cannot but think that there is an ordered reality which extends beyond the individual's sum of experience. We must therefore say of the consciousness of the individual that it amounts to less than consciousness of the whole. Secondly, if we try to draw, as Kant did not, some distinction between the activity of consciousness and its contents or objects, we must notice that in our thought of the self we do not identify it with the totality of the contents or objects of consciousness, or even with their totality taken along with the activity of being conscious of them. It is true that the self would not, we think, be what it is except in being conscious of that of which it is conscious. Nevertheless in self-consciousness the mind distinguishes itself from the objects of consciousness and indeed thinks that the being of the objects is in some respect independent of the mind's consciousness of them. Now it seems that these are features of consciousness which have a bearing on the mind's need of synthesis. We can see this if we recur to Kant's contrast with an intuitive understanding which we may notice he links significantly (in B 145-6) with the notion of a divine understanding. It is legitimate to frame the notion of a mind which may be supposed to possess neither of the characteristics which we have just ascribed to the individual mind. We can think of a consciousness which would not be limited to awareness of a part only of the totality of what exists, but would be conscious of the whole in a single uninterrupted activity. It would therefore apprehend the unity of the whole without any processes of synthesizing, and in this respect it would be unlike the individual understanding which is interrupted in its consciousness and is under the necessity of piecing together the unity of its experiences, both because its consciousness is subject to conditions of time and because it is at any moment bound to apprehend less than the whole. Kant himself marks wrongly the difference between the two kinds of consciousness. The proper contrast, it would seem, is not the contrast between an understanding which can dispense with principles of unity and one which cannot, but between an understanding for which such unity is immediate and an understanding which is obliged to elaborate gradually and imperfectly the unity of experiences which come to it piecemeal, and with factors missing which are necessary for the understanding of their unity.

If we take the other point in regard to individual consciousness it seems once more that Kant gives a wrong turn to the contrast with an intuitive understanding. Here again we need not question the legitimacy of the notion of an understanding (such as a divine understanding may be supposed to be) the objects or contents of whose consciousness are not given, but produced by the activity of consciousness itself. Of such an understanding it may be said that all objects of consciousness are itself in a sense which does not hold of all objects of an individual or finite consciousness. And in that case it can be supposed that it is conscious of itself in the same manner in which it is conscious of the unity of the whole, since the unity of the whole is indeed the unity of itself. But this line of thought by no means leads us to suppose that the self-consciousness of an intuitive understanding lacks the employment of principles of unity or synthesis. We can only say, as we said of its consciousness of objects, that there are no processes of synthesis in its apprehension of itself, but, instead, an immediate consciousness of its own unity. The non-intuitive understanding, on the other hand, of a finite or individual mind, as we saw above, should be regarded as not possessing this immediate recognition of its own unity, and only attaining it through processes in which it pieces together the diversity of its experience.

To this contrast we should join one addendum and one qualification. The addendum is that the gradual consciousness by the individual self of its own unity seems to be closely connected with the apprehension of conditions external to itself to which its experience is subject. To take one point alone, my consciousness of myself is connected with awareness of the way in which the nature of my experience is controlled by the location of my body in space and the conditions to which it is subject as a spatial object. Thus if my visual or tactile experiences appeared irreconcilable with the continuity of changes of location of my body in space, it is difficult to suppose that my notion of my own identity would not be disturbed. We shall follow this line of reflection further when we consider later what Kant has to say regarding the organization of inner sense. In the meantime it may be noticed that we come back once more to the point that consciousness of the self is not the same as consciousness of the unity of everything which is the object of my thought, but is consciousness of a limited unity subject to conditions of a whole which is not myself. The difficulty for Kant is to show how this aspect of

our consciousness is compatible with the position that all principles of synthesis or categories which make unity possible are simply the product of the self's own consciousness. It may be said that he allows of a reality to which the self is subject when he thinks of noumenal reality. But whatever value is attached to the notion of noumenal reality, it does not seem that it can take the place of the notion of a temporal and spatial reality which is not comprised within the self, but is external to it and in part controls its nature. It is the latter notion which seems to be ignored in what Kant says regarding apperception and the contrast of intuitive and non-intuitive understanding.

It seems desirable to refer to a possible qualification which should be made when we assent, in part at any rate, to Kant's doctrine regarding the connexion of self-consciousness with the apprehension of principles of unity which govern our experience. However true it may be that in self-consciousness we are aware of a unity which is ordered in accordance with principles, it is difficult to maintain that without the recognition of principles controlling our experience awareness of unity of consciousness would be entirely absent. There seems to be a simpler or more direct unity in consciousness which cannot be ignored. The point can be put in this way. Kant says that there could be no unity of consciousness (and therefore nothing of the nature of self-consciousness) if we were not aware of the unity of the world of objects. But a moment of consciousness can contain, through memory, the awareness of another moment of consciousness, and when it does, it seems impossible that the two moments should not be regarded as belonging to the one consciousness. However little connexion, in terms of principles, is seen between the objects of the moments of consciousness, or even if no connexion is seen, the remembered moment of consciousness must inevitably be bound in a unity with the present consciousness. It seems fair to say that it is impossible to think of remembering the consciousness of anyone else. If so, the unity of consciousness cannot be held to be dependent on the apprehension of unity in that of which we are conscious. But to recognize this seems to raise questions regarding the validity of the precise way in which Kant seeks to deduce the necessity of the categories of our experience. It may well be that we cannot but think of the objects of consciousness as systematically ordered, and that unless we so thought of them our own unity of consciousness would not present itself as intelligible. But this is altogether

different from Kant's thesis that without the systematizing of objects unity of consciousness is impossible.

3. *Objective and Subjective Unity*

In considering Kant's account of the Unity of Apperception and of the contrast between our understanding and an intuitive understanding we found it difficult to assert, as he asserts, that the unity of all which we regard as existent can be referred to the determinate ways in which the individual mind systematizes its own experience. The difficulty of his doctrine is further apparent when we turn to the sections (§§ 18 and 19 of the Deduction) in which he speaks of the Objective Unity of Self-Consciousness or Apperception and contrasts it with what he calls the Subjective Unity of Consciousness.

The point from which Kant starts is unambiguous. To be conscious of an object, he supposes, is to be conscious of the manifold given in an intuition and to think of it as united or systematized. The unity or system is imposed by the transcendental unity of apperception. He adds that for this reason the designation 'objective' is given to the transcendental unity of apperception, and apparently he means that the transcendental unity of apperception is always employed in constructing the thought of an object. Subjective unity of consciousness, on the other hand, is not concerned with the thought of an object, but is merely consciousness of the manifold of intuition which is given empirically to be united. It is referred to as a state or determination (*Bestimmung*) of the inner sense.

We must notice that the account becomes more difficult as it proceeds and that in particular it is not at all clear what Kant means by his reference to 'a determination of the inner sense' in the present connexion. Two interpretations may be suggested. In the first place he may have in mind one element, taken by itself, in the totality of our consciousness of objects, namely consciousness of the manifold of intuition. So taken it would not be a distinguishable kind of consciousness, or indeed, by itself, consciousness in the proper sense of the word. It would therefore be possible to regard it as distinct from the transcendental unity of apperception, without denying that the latter was necessary to anything which could properly be called consciousness. It is difficult, however, to attribute this meaning to what Kant says. It seems

clear that he is referring to a state of consciousness which is indeed properly consciousness but is different from consciousness of objects. It is called a determination of the inner sense because it is consciousness of those states of sensibility which are, according to Kant, the manifold of an intuition. His doctrine is that if we do not unite this manifold into a conception of an object, what we are conscious of is a series of subjective states. He seeks to bring out the point at the end of the next paragraph (§ 19) where he contrasts the statement 'When I carry a body I feel an impression of weight' with the different statement 'It, the body, is heavy'.

So soon, however, as we decide that this is Kant's meaning and try to follow his account, we find many difficulties. In the first place the implication in § 18 seems to be that the transcendental unity of apperception is not involved in the kind of consciousness which is called a determination of the inner sense and is alternatively referred to as the subjective and empirical unity of consciousness. But it is contrary to Kant's fundamental doctrines to hold that there can be any consciousness without that unity which he calls the synthetic unity of apperception. Perhaps he might think of the isolated moments of inner sense as capable of occurring without the unity of apperception, but it is not isolated moments to which he is here referring but a unity of consciousness. What leads him to his position is that under the head of the transcendental unity of apperception he is here thinking not simply of unity of consciousness but of the necessary principles in accordance with which a unitary consciousness systematizes its contents. His contention in fact is that when we think of objects the contents of consciousness are so systematized, when we are merely aware of states of sensibility they are not. In this sense the transcendental unity of apperception is not really operative in subjective or empirical unity of consciousness.

But this only leads to other difficulties and contradictions in his doctrine. We notice that empirical or subjective consciousness is still regarded as a unity. Indeed no other view of it could be taken. The contents of this consciousness have arrangement or system in the sense that they occur in time and are disposed within it in a certain determinate order. But Kant clearly thinks that this order is not imposed by the transcendental unity of apperception. Thus in B 139 he says: 'Whether I can be empirically conscious of the manifold as simultaneous or successive depends

on circumstances or empirical conditions.' This indeed is the point of saying that the manifold is given and the consciousness is empirical. But all this is to allow that the mind is conscious of a unity or something systematic, the system of which is not imposed by the principles with which the synthetic unity of apperception operates. Here then we find Kant in another context making the admission which we saw was disregarded and yet ought to have been made in his account of the unity of apperception. We may notice farther how far Kant is from applying the implications of his second Refutation of Idealism to the doctrines of the Deduction. In the second Refutation his starting-point is that we are aware of the occurrence of our states of consciousness in time, and that they, and the time order must be regarded as objective and in some sense external. Hence time and its contents are regarded as the objects of the external sense, and all this is the foundation of the contention that space and the physical order are also objective. In the present passage of the Deduction our states of consciousness are merely determinations of the internal sense, the apprehension of the system in which they occur is merely a subjective or empirical unity of consciousness, and it is dismissed as something which is comparatively of no importance in the development of Kant's doctrine.

We may now turn to other difficulties in the account of the two kinds of unity. There is first a point needing consideration to which Kant evidently attaches great importance in drawing his distinction. Even if it be allowed that there is some form of order or system in the subjective no less than in the objective unity, still he contends that there is an important difference in the kind of system in the two cases. Our moments of sensibility have an order in their occurrence, but, as he says in B 140, this empirical unity or order is entirely accidental (*ganz zufällig*). On the other hand, when we are conscious of an object, 'the manifold given in intuition is united into the concept of the object'. It is plain from the whole passage that in Kant's view the concept of the object involves the thought of necessary relations holding together the elements which are its components. The contrast he has in mind is that of a unity of parts which are in accidental collocation and a unity of parts necessarily related. But if this is his view, we must ask whether the contrast holds. Its validity seems to be extremely dubious. Kant is supposing that if we are conscious of an object, we must think of it as a kind of thing, i.e. as an instance

exemplifying a universal and necessary arrangement of elements. Here once more we encounter the results of his misleading view that the work of the understanding only takes place in the region of concepts. It cannot legitimately be said that to be conscious of an object is the same thing as to be conscious of a necessary conjunction of a manifold of sensibility. Let us consider the following point. We may be aware of an object having certain qualities which include, e.g. a particular shape, but we can think that the shape could in different conditions be other than it is in combination with the same qualities. Now if what constitutes consciousness of an object is the thought that a certain manifold of sensibility is characterized by necessary relations, and if without this thought the manifold must appear as merely subjective, it is hard to see how on this doctrine a particular element of the manifold (in the present instance shape) which is accepted as contingent comes to be included in the system which we think of as the object. We must admit that we think, at any rate, of *some* features of objects as being contingent, and this admission in itself should make us doubt the identification of objectivity and necessity. But if this argument is held to be insufficient and it is contended that somehow or other the fact that other qualities are seen to be in necessary relation, and therefore constitute an object, explains how a quality which is not in this relation is thought to be objective, there is another and perhaps more obvious point to be considered. It seems necessary to allow not only that there are cases where we do not see a necessary relation of some feature of the manifold to the rest, but that sometimes also we see no necessary relation between any of the features of the manifold and yet have the consciousness of apprehending an object. We are aware of something of a certain shape, size, colour, hardness, and weight which is indubitably located in a particular area in space, but we make no pretension to know why, having this shape, it should be of this size, or having this colour, it should also be thus hard, and heavy, and so forth. Nevertheless we do not, because of this, begin to doubt whether we are conscious of an object.

There is, however, an answer to this criticism of Kant's doctrine which should be considered. It may be said that although we can be conscious of an object without apprehending the necessity of the particular forms which its qualities take, yet we think that there must be a necessary nexus of certain qualities in some form or another. Thus we conceive it to be necessary that a visible

object should be of some shape and of some colour, although we do not know why it should be of this shape or this colour. Further, we are aware of certain general necessities controlling any shape and any colour, the necessities, for example, which Kant refers to in his discussion of extensive and intensive quantity; or again we hold that there is something involved which we call cause and effect, although we do not know what particular thing it may be which is the cause of a given effect. It should be noticed that this line of argument may be claimed as an answer to both the objections taken above. For it does not matter whether some only of the qualities of the object appear to be contingent or all of them; there remains something which is not contingent, namely the presence of certain qualities in some form or another. But reflection seems to show that the answer fails because the doctrine has taken a form which now does not support the distinction between objective and subjective unity. It is allowed that the nexus of elements constituting the object may, so far as our consciousness is concerned, be in one sense contingent, and in another sense subject to necessity. But must not this also be said of the factors which constitute what Kant calls the subjective unity of consciousness? We do not think that our sensations occur simply at haphazard. In our ordinary thought we explain them by reference to general conditions controlling the perception of objects, and where we are unable to work out the explanation in detail we still think that an explanation on these lines would be available for fuller knowledge. Kant himself recognizes the position when he says that 'the empirical unity of consciousness is deduced from the objective unity under given conditions *in concreto*' (B 140); for there could be no deduction if the empirical unity were not thought to be subject to universal conditions. But when we have recognized that the subjective and the objective unity are alike in that the elements of each can present themselves as both contingent and necessary, Kant's distinction fails and with it the contention, which is vital to his Deduction, that the thought of necessity constitutes the idea of an object.

Kant is partly aware of the difficulty, as can be seen from the confusion which marks the conclusion of § 18. He has begun the paragraph by referring to the data of perception which, as he says, sometimes occur in one arrangement, sometimes in another; the example he gives is intended to show that the data may be coexistent or successive according to circumstances. But at the

conclusion of the paragraph he speaks of an altogether different matter, namely, the variations in our association of ideas. 'One person,' he says, 'connects the presentation of a certain word with one thing, someone else connects it with another.' Here perhaps Kant could work out the contrast which he wants, but it is useless for his present purpose. His purpose is to take the distinction between the manifold of sensibility and our consciousness of an object, and to show that consciousness of an object is effected because the mind imposes the thought of a certain system on the manifold of sensibility. The unity to be contrasted with the objective unity is that of the order in which our sensations occur. When he wants to explain the nature of this subjective unity it is a plain *ignoratio elenchi* to refer to the different ways in which we may associate our ideas.

We may therefore set aside the conclusion of § 18 and keep to the contrast which properly belongs to Kant's argument. The point to which we shall now turn is his statement, already noticed, that the empirical unity is deduced or derived (*abgeleitet*) from the objective unity. If we translate *abgeleitet* by the word 'deduced', what is suggested is that Kant is looking at the subjective side of the matter and is thinking of the mind's ability to see how the facts of sense-consciousness are explicable by the objective unity. The translation 'derived' suggests that Kant is thinking not primarily of the mind's power of deduction, but, more objectively, of the dependence of the facts of consciousness on the objective unity. The difference, however, is not important since the mind cannot be regarded as having the power of deduction unless the reason for the facts of sense-consciousness being what they are resides in the objective unity. It is fair to notice that the statement regarding this matter of derivation immediately precedes the reference to the association of ideas, and it may be considered that it is only connected with the mistaken line of thought which Kant follows at this point. But whatever exactly is in Kant's mind a problem exists regarding the connexion between objects (however conceived) and our states of sensibility, and it has important bearings on Kant's doctrine. On the ordinary view of objects there does not seem to be much difficulty. If it is held that there are objects in space and that a percipient is conscious of them at different moments and in ways which are related to his situation in time and space, it seems intelligible to speak of the states of the percipient subject being derived from objects and

the laws which govern them. We can say that the mind of the percipient is conscious in a particular way because there is an object and the conditions are fulfilled which enable him to perceive it thus and thus. But according to Kant there is no separate object from which the states of consciousness can be derived; there are only the states of consciousness and a system constructed by thought with which they are held to comply. How then does the notion of a deduction or derivation work?

The first difficulty is that of applying the notion of derivation when the two factors are the manifold of sense, on the one hand, which is empirical or given, and on the other a construction made by thought. It is difficult to see how a construction made by thought can be offered as the reason why the data exist. If it is said that it is the reason for the existence of the data in the sense that it embodies the principles on which the data occur, that is to make the system not something which is a construction by the mind but rather something which belongs to the nature of the data. It must be a system which the mind either discovers in the particular data or discovers in data generally and applies to the particular data on the score of its universality. It seems that here we have one special aspect of the difficulty which appears elsewhere of reconciling the origin which Kant attributes to the principles of the understanding with the independence of the data to which they apply.

Other doubts are provoked, if we inquire more closely into the nature of the order or system imposed by the understanding on the manifold, which together with the manifold is said to constitute the notion of an object. Kant often seems to suggest that what he has in mind is the necessary relations in time which exist between certain states of consciousness. If a certain state of consciousness which we can call α , or perhaps better speak of as having a content α , exists, it must be preceded or accompanied or followed by a state of consciousness having a content β . But it seems difficult to stop at this point if we are to recognize the nature of our consciousness for what it is. We do not simply think that states of consciousness stand in certain necessary temporal relations to each other, these relations being primitive or undervived factors in the scheme of necessity. The temporal relations are conceived to be in part dependent on the spatial character belonging to the contents of the states of consciousness and to be explicable by reference to it. Thus if I have the consciousness of looking at

the front of an object from a particular location in space, it is because of my consciousness of these spatial relations that I conclude it to be necessary that consciousness of the back of the object should be prior or subsequent to my present state, but not simultaneous with it.

Now let us suppose that we say with Kant that the spatial relations are part of the scheme imposed by the mind on the manifold of sense, and that the manifold itself is given. We must ask whether in thinking of the manifold of sense as given we think that the time-relations of the states of consciousness in which the manifold is comprised are given or not. In order to make the question clear we may state the alternatives in a different way. When we reflect on the occurrence of our moments of sensibility we may suppose that the order of their occurrence is something which the mind does not in any way control or alter. This order of occurrence then has a different origin from that of the scheme which is formulated by the objective unity of consciousness. Alternatively we may suppose that inasmuch as time is a form of the mind, the time-relations which we are conscious of as existing in our states of sensibility proceed from the mind which is conscious of them, and in that sense belong to a mind-imposed scheme or system.

Whichever of the two views is adopted, serious difficulties are raised for anyone who recognizes, as Kant seems to do, the dependence of the time relations of states of consciousness on what we call objects, and attempts to account for it on Kantian lines. If the first alternative is taken, we encounter again the difficulty which was referred to above (p. 109). A construction made by the understanding on the basis of data which exist uncontrolled by the understanding is offered as the reason why those data exist, and it is hard to see how such a position can successfully be defended. A defence might perhaps be attempted by saying that the construction made by the understanding is itself dictated by the nature of an unknown reality which is the cause also of the existence of the sense manifold. But in the first place this looks like a surrender of the Kantian maxim that necessity is the work of the mind. In the second place there is something unsatisfactory in the way in which the relations of space and time are envisaged. It seems that space and its relations are taken as a mental construction which does not present the real nature of the ultimate reality or the thing-in-itself, although it is dictated

by the thing in itself. On the other hand the time relations of our moments of consciousness seem to be taken as being more properly real. Space and time are not then regarded as being genuinely co-ordinate or on the same level. But what is wanted is a defence and explanation of our conviction that the time-relations of our moments of perception are in part dependent on the space-relations of the objects perceived. It is hard to see how the defence or the explanation is forthcoming if time and space are not accepted as properly co-ordinate.

This leads us to the second alternative. Here it is allowed that time and space must be co-ordinate, each being accepted as phenomenal. But with this admission the whole distinction between subjective and objective unity seems to be endangered. The dependence of the time-relations of our states of consciousness on the space-relations of things is made more comprehensible because both time and space can be brought within the same system or mind-construction. But then there are not two contrasted unities, with different natures, a subjective and an objective unity, but only one. The explanation is plainly dependent on the denial of the distinction which Kant sets out to make.

We may ask finally which of the two alternatives it is that Kant adopts in the present passage. There is a sentence which at first sight suggests that he is insisting on the phenomenal character of our states of consciousness and so seems to incline to the second. At the beginning of B 140 he says: 'Accordingly the empirical unity of consciousness, through association of presentations, itself concerns an appearance (*Erscheinung*) and is quite contingent.' Does the reference to 'appearance' mean that our states and their time-relations constitute a phenomenal system? First let us notice that even if Kant is asserting that our states of consciousness are a phenomenal system he would still have to say, in view of his insistence on the fact that the manifold and its time relations are given, that the time relations are not controlled by the mind, and in that case the problem remains. But in fact it does not seem, if we study the context, that he has here the idea of a phenomenal system in mind. He goes on in the next sentence to contrast the empirical unity with the objective unity of consciousness, and it is clear that both the 'concern with appearance' and the contingency are referred to as points which mark the difference of the former from the latter. If he were insisting on the phenomenal character of the empirical unity, he would be giving a point of likeness

not of difference. We must conclude therefore that he is referring to something else when he says that the empirical unity concerns an appearance. Nor is it difficult to see what he has in mind. He is thinking of the same point as that which he makes in the next paragraph when he discusses the objective validity of a judgement (B 142). I at one time and another, or different persons at the same time, have different sensations in respect of the weight of a body, but nevertheless I judge that the body has one particular weight. The different sensations of weight are examples of what Kant refers to in B 140 when he says that the subjective unity concerns an appearance. There is no reference to the phenomenal nature of the sequence of our sensations.

The passage in B 140 which we have been discussing is the only passage in the sections on the objective and subjective unities which seems at all to suggest that Kant may obscurely be trying to bring them into connexion by insisting on the phenomenal character of both. If this passage is interpreted in the way suggested above, we may say that all his statements seem to belong to the line of thought which supposes that the occurrence of our states of sensibility and their particular time determinations are facts which the mind's consciousness of them does not make or alter. (This is the first of the two alternatives referred to above (p. 110). To say, however, that Kant's statements belong to this line of thought is not to say that he has clearly conceived or formulated it. The truth seems to be that he is here touching on two points which have an important connexion with the argument of the second Refutation of Idealism but does not in the least realize their implications. The two points are that our states of consciousness are facts occurring in time and that the order of these facts has to be connected with our consciousness of objects. We may remind ourselves of the contrast which we noticed earlier (p. 105 above). In the Refutation of Idealism he argues that the recognition of the objective status which belongs to time and to our states of consciousness compels us to attribute some similar status to the physical world. He thus makes it possible to think intelligibly of connexions between the two. In the sections of the Deduction which we have been considering he seems to ignore entirely the points which he regards as cardinal in the Refutation. Despite his reference to connexions between consciousness of our states and consciousness of objects, his whole endeavour is to explain that the two kinds of consciousness are as different as

possible, and instead of making consciousness of our states a basis of his doctrine regarding the nature of objects of consciousness, he gives it an inferior status and rules it out as having no importance for his main doctrines. All this shows clearly his failure to relate the doctrine of the Transcendental Deduction, even in its revised form, to that of the second Refutation of Idealism.

We may perhaps gain further insight into the difficulties of Kant's position if we follow one other line of reflection regarding his distinction between objective and subjective unity. It was observed earlier (p. 107 above) that it is difficult to allow a contrast which attributes necessity to the objective and contingency to the subjective unity, because we must suppose that there are general and necessary conditions which control the occurrence of our perceptions. It is on this point that we may reflect a little further. If we accept the position that we must attribute some necessity to the occurrence of our states of perception, let us ask how we can distinguish the objective and the subjective necessity. In any answer which is made, the basis of Kant's position must be remembered, viz. that whether we think of objective or of subjective unity there is nothing else in question than different ways in which the mind regards its own manifold of intuition. The objective unity is one unity of this manifold, the subjective is another. If we cannot deny some necessity to the arrangement of our states of sensibility which is termed subjective, how does it differ from the other arrangement which is said to be objective because it is necessary? Kant's account seems to suggest the answer that though the subjective arrangement may be dictated by necessary conditions it is not a constant arrangement for different percipients or for the same percipient at different times. On the other hand, the objective arrangement has the constancy which cannot be attributed to the other. This is the distinction we draw when we say that a body may seem to be of varying degrees of heaviness but so long as it continues unchanged it always has the same weight. The remarks on the judgement in § 19 (B 141, 142) point to such an answer. But can the distinction stand if for 'body' we have to substitute the expression 'arrangement of perceptions', even though it be allowed that this expression covers possible as well as actual arrangements? No actual or possible arrangement of perceptual data seems capable of being taken as constant for all percipients at all times. But if so there is nothing which can be called an objective unity or an object, and we seem to be driven to

the conclusion that something more than a reference to a system of perceptions is required if we are to explain what is contained in this notion.

4. *The Derivation of the Categories from the Unity of Apperception and their Application to Experience*

The derivation of the categories from the unity of apperception and their application to experience are the subjects of §§ 20-3 of the Deduction (B 143-9) and the earlier part of § 24 (B 150-2). We shall therefore consider these passages together, leaving the subject of the later part of § 24 for consideration in the next section.

The beginning of Kant's view of the relation between the categories and experience is the contention that any whole of parts can only be apprehended by consciousness if the consciousness is unitary, and that therefore it may be said that the unity of the whole is conferred on it by the unitary consciousness. The dubiousness of this contention we have already discussed in examining his account of the unity of apperception. The next step brings us to the categories. If the manifold is united in a single consciousness, the unity must take some particular form. To think of components as forming a whole we must think of them as having relations to each other and through these relations composing the whole in a particular way. The categories, according to Kant, express the relation of the manifold elements of consciousness to each other and the way in which they form a unity. If this statement of the matter is combined with the view that it is consciousness which confers unity on the objects or contents of consciousness, we can say that the categories are the form in which consciousness operates and for this reason we can be conscious of nothing, or at any rate can be conscious of no whole or unity, without thinking in the manner which is expressed in the categories.

The foregoing seems to be a part, or one aspect, of Kant's argument, and if so, it clearly rests on his account of the unity of apperception, and is undermined by the failures in that account which we have already noticed. But there are other considerations by which he seems to be influenced. How far they are either convincing in themselves or compatible with the rest of his argument is a question which will need to be raised. Kant is probably influenced in his view that the categories are the product of the understanding by the contrast which he supposes to exist between

the way in which the manifold is given and the way in which we think about it. We have seen how he works with this contrast in the distinction between the subjective and the objective unity. The manifold content of sensuous intuition is given in a certain order of states of consciousness; it is connected and arranged in fresh forms by the understanding. There is no new or different material apprehended by the understanding, and it is its particular function to produce a new form of arrangement without new material. This view that the understanding in its own capacity apprehends no new material is plainly stated in § 21 (B 145).

'The categories are only rules for an understanding, whose whole capacity consists in thought, i.e. in the activity of bringing to the unity of apperception the synthesis of the manifold which is given to it from another source in intuition. In itself therefore it knows nothing, but only connects and arranges the material for knowledge, i.e. the intuition, which must be given to it objectively.'

The inability of the understanding to be conscious by itself of an existent is reiterated at the beginning of § 22 (B 146). Its function is only the function of thinking of that which is given in intuition in certain ways. Kant's doctrine on this point should be connected with his view that the understanding is the function of conceptual thinking. An existent must be particular and for this reason he seems to think that conceptual thinking as such apprehends no existent. All this, as already suggested (see p. 86 above) is dubious, and it is one of the sources of error in his doctrine that he thus debars himself from saying that the mind can know anything beyond the manifold of its own sensibility. But however that may be we can see how, starting from the point that there is only one material for consciousness and that this material is given in one form and connected or systematized in another, Kant comes to hold that the second form does not belong to the data but is a construction which the mind makes.

We may consider whether this doctrine that the categories are a fresh form which the understanding gives to the manifold of sense can be maintained. On reflection it seems that the nature of at least one important group of the categories is such as to be incompatible with this doctrine. The group which raises the

¹ Kant uses the expression *durchs Objekt*. It must be a variant of the expression *anderweitig* which he has just used. No sense can be made of the passage if it is supposed that there is a reference either to an independent physical object or to a *Gegenstand* constructed by the understanding.

difficulty is that which contains the categories of substance and causality and we shall see the point involved if we keep in mind what Kant says in the Principles of the Understanding where the categories are explained not in their abstract but in their more concrete form. The whole matter turns on the ideas of permanence and continuity which form the basis of the categories of substance, causality, and reciprocity. In view of the account which was given of these ideas when we discussed the second Refutation of Idealism, it is unnecessary to repeat what was then said in regard to their meaning and importance. The reader is referred to Chapter II. What we have now to notice is the difficulty of regarding the notion of permanence or continuity as a form imposed on our states of sensibility or a method of systematizing them. We can think of our states as arranged in a different order to that in which they occur in experience, but it is a contradiction of the nature we attribute to them to think that they are permanent or continuous. They come and go, and when we think of one succeeding another we do not think that there is any law internal to their nature which prescribes continuity of transition from the one to the other. We must say advisedly that we do not think of any law 'internal to their nature'. It is true that if we think of the series of perceptions we get when, in changing our position, we regard an object from different points in space, we think that the perceptions are continuously changing. But we think that they change thus not in virtue of their nature as states of consciousness but in virtue of the conditions governing that of which we are conscious, namely the object and the continuously changing location of our body. It should be noticed that a change in these conditions may make us think of the states of consciousness as necessarily discontinuous, as for instance if we shut and open our eyes while we change our position in relation to the object. But we still think of the object and the movement of our bodies in space as subject to the principle of continuity. It may be said, however, that we are laying too much emphasis on the order in the factual occurrence of states of consciousness, and that Kant would wish us to think of an order imposed on their contents. But such an answer does not seem really to meet the case. It is only if the mind goes so far as to think of the contents as disjoined from the moments of consciousness and independent, that it can attribute permanence or continuity to them, and to do this is to think of them no longer as contents but as objects of perception. It seems to follow from these considera-

tions that the category is not a form imposed on our states or their contents, but a nature attributed to an object which stands in distinction from them. We may remind ourselves that if the interpretation given to Kant's argument in the second Refutation of Idealism was right, it was a line of thought not dissimilar to this which led him there to argue for a greater independence of physical objects than the rest of the *Critique* seems to imply.

We can follow somewhat similar reflections in another direction. Just as we may have doubts regarding the application of the categories of substance, causality, and reciprocity to our own states of sensibility, so too we find ourselves in doubt regarding the application of the intuitional form of space to these states. If, as Kant insists, the essence of the form of space is its unity as a single whole, how can we consistently think of it as the form of a temporal series of states, each one of which has perished when another occurs? Here again it seems useless to say that it is a form which is applied only to the contents of the states. It is only if that to which the form is applied is dissociated from the states and thought of as independent of them, that the inconsistency can be removed. The problem is one which again brings us back to the categories. For if the form of space must be thought of as belonging not to our states but to something else, it seems to follow that the same view must be taken of the categories which are connected with extension. Kant himself in the second edition of the Deduction has come to see that the connexion between the forms of intuition and the understanding is closer than he first indicated. This is explicitly stated in the footnote to B 160, and in § 22 we can see in his reference to mathematical concepts the way in which he connects the two. In § 22 he refers first to 'pure intuition (space and time)' and its 'determination' and then passes on to speak of 'mathematical concepts', evidently regarding the determination of pure intuition and the mathematical concepts as equivalent expressions. What therefore he says regarding the objects of mathematics in § 22 touches closely the problems connected with the understanding and objects and the relations between the two, and we may obtain some further light on these problems if we consider some of the points which he makes.

What Kant seeks to maintain in § 22 is that thinking (*Denken*) and knowing (*Erkennen*) are different, that thinking by itself knows nothing, that knowledge is dependent on the conjunction of thinking with intuition, and that for this reason the categories

have no other application than to sensuous intuition. The meaning which he gives to sensuous intuition is indicated by the alternative expressions 'perceptions' and 'presentations accompanied by sensation' (*Wahrnehmungen (mit Empfindung begleitete Vorstellungen)* —B 147). What the determination of pure intuition (or mathematical concepts) enables us to know is stated as follows. 'Through determination of the former (sc. pure intuition) we are able to attain *a priori* cognitions of objects (in mathematics) but only in respect of their form as appearances; whether there can be things which must be intuited in this form, is not so far established.' How the existence of things is given is explained in the statement, 'Things in space and time are only given in-so-far as they are perceptions (presentations accompanied with sensation), consequently through empirical presentation.' The doctrine is plainly that the understanding working with pure intuition knows no existents; the only existents are our own sensations which present themselves as 'things' in virtue of their subjection to the form of intuition and the concepts of the understanding. But the difficulty is that if we think of the relation between geometrical concepts and our sensations or perceptions we are compelled to doubt whether the geometrical concept is correctly described either as a form or as a system of our perceptions. The geometrical concept of parallel lines which recede from us is not the form of what we see, nor is the geometrical concept of a cube the form of anything which we are capable of seeing. The thing or object which has the geometrical form seems indeed to be apprehended not by sense but by the understanding, though it is apprehended as something which stands in necessary relations to our sensations or perceptions.

If we follow this line of thought we are led to two departures from Kant's doctrine. In the first place we must give up the view that the understanding apprehends no existents or particulars, and instead we must say that it is the understanding which apprehends those existents which we call objects, though it apprehends them in connexion with its own sensations. Secondly we seem to be led to a different view in regard to our apprehension of space which affects in its turn the way in which we formulate the relation between space and objects in space. Instead of saying that space is a form of our sensations we shall be more inclined to say that space is an existent in its own right, which is known by the understanding, though the understanding would not know it, if the mind possessed no sensations. In this sense space itself or

any portion of it is an object, having those characters which are expressed in the system of our geometrical conceptions. What we call a physical object is a volume of space having other characters besides those contained in the geometrical conception of a spatial volume, characters which are connected by our understanding with the occurrence and nature of our sensations or perceptions. If we wish to make our terminology more precise we can use the terms object, extended object, and physical object, making the following distinctions between them. We shall think of an object as anything which can be distinguished from the consciousness of it. (It is unnecessary at this point to work out the description further since our concern here is with the relation of space and objects in it.) The term extended object will cover both space or volumes of space and physical objects. An extended object as such will have geometrical characteristics, and it will also stand in relation to the occurrence of our sensations. Thus even a void space must be thought of as having geometrical form and as being in a determinate relation to our sensibility. Our sensations of sight or touch will not be the same if we are presented with a spatial void, as they would be if it were occupied. In this sense it is an extended object, but its effect on our sense consciousness is not thought to arise from its having any other than a geometrical character. A physical body is, as we have said above, a volume of space possessing other characters in addition to geometrical characters, which are in relation to the occurrence of our states of sensibility. If now we ask ourselves whether or not the understanding has any *a priori* knowledge of objects, we may perhaps make the following answer. We must first say what kind of knowledge we think of when we refer to *a priori* knowledge. If we mean by it knowledge of existents and certain necessary characteristics belonging to them, which is not dependent on our having sensations related to the particular existents which we know to exist nor dependent on (in the sense of being an inference from) sensations related to other particular existents, then we say that the understanding has *a priori* knowledge of objects in two directions. In the first place it has knowledge of extended objects in knowing the existence of space and its parts and in knowing geometrical characteristics which they possess. Secondly as regards physical objects it seems that we should at least say that the understanding knows *a priori* that all parts of space are such as to have the capacity of possessing other characteristics besides those exhibited in their

geometrical nature, and that these are characteristics which stand in a necessary relation to our states of sensibility. In other words it knows that any portion of space has the capacity of being a physical object. To this we should add, on the lines of Kant's doctrine in regard to the categories (though now we think of the categories as applying not to our states of sensibility but to objects), that the understanding has *a priori* knowledge of certain general conditions (e.g. such as are embodied in the concepts of substance and causality) to which the non-geometrical characteristics of physical objects must be subject.

These points are important and demand further consideration if an attempt is made to see generally in what directions Kant's doctrine requires to be recast,¹ but in the meantime it would seem that some such modification of the Deduction is necessary if space and objects in space are, as Kant argues in the second Refutation of Idealism, to be distinguished from our presentations.

We must conclude this section with a brief reference to the opening passages of § 24 (B 150-2). Here Kant, rightly enough and in conformity with his line of thought in the discussion of mathematical concepts in § 22, brings the categories into close relation with the forms of intuition, and insists that without this relation there could be no cognition of any determinate object. The synthesis belonging to the categories is *synthesis intellectualis*, the synthesis of the manifold of sensuous intuition, *synthesis speciosa*. Both are applied to the determination of the internal sense, i.e. of our states of sensibility. Kant realizes when he thinks of the matter thus that the manifold of actual sensibility is insufficient for the synthesis which yields the notion of objects, and on the lines of the first-edition Deduction, though much more briefly, explains the importance of the productive imagination; the arrangements or systems which the two kinds of synthesis effect can only be effected by the inclusion of imagined states of sensibility as well as actual. Two comments may be made. The first is that he still works with the notion, which we have seen reason to criticize, that the forms of intuition and the categories are appropriate not to something other than our states of sensibility but to these states themselves. Secondly, his topic (the relation of the categories to the forms of intuition) is bringing him to the problems of the schematism of the categories, and we notice that there is nothing here to suggest the solution or even the

¹ See my *Treatise on Knowledge*, Chapter III.

realization of the difficulties attendant on the notion of the mind's ability to impose forms and categories on a manifold which is given. The difficulties would not arise if he were allowing a more objective status to space and time and to the categories themselves. But to this topic we shall return later in this chapter.¹

5. *The Status of Internal as compared with External Objects of Consciousness*

We shall now consider the latter part of § 24 (B 152 (*ad fin.*)–156). Our task here will be twofold. It will first be to disentangle the complexities of this difficult passage, and to see what is the doctrine which Kant is stating. Secondly we must ask whether the doctrine is either consistent with other passages of the Deduction, or consistent and intelligible in itself. This inquiry is the basis of the attempt made elsewhere² to set out the conditions which, it would seem, require to be satisfied in any solution of the problems which Kant is considering and thereby to give some indication of what would appear to be the elements of a right doctrine if this can be done.

Kant begins by saying that he has arrived at the proper place for explaining the paradoxical statement in his exposition of the form of the inner sense (§ 6),³ that this sense presents us to our own consciousness only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves, since we intuit ourselves only in the way in which we are inwardly affected; this seems to be a contradiction inasmuch as we must then stand in a passive relation (*als leidend*) to ourselves. It is because there is this apparent contradiction, Kant remarks, that psychologists are accustomed to identify internal sense and the faculty of apperception, whereas he carefully distinguishes the two. The meaning of the passage, taken by itself, seems up to a point plain. The ordinary view is that there occur in us states of consciousness and that we are aware of them. This awareness of our states of consciousness may be called indifferently apperception or internal sense. Kant's position on the other hand is that there is something else to be reckoned with; viz. the fact that when the mind is conscious of anything which presents itself as an object (whether the object is spatial or not) it performs a task of

¹ Cf. also my *Treatise on Knowledge*, Chapter II, § 2.

² See my *Treatise on Knowledge*, Chapter III.

³ This is a reference to the paragraph in the Aesthetic where he explains that time is nothing but the form of the inner sense (B 49 et seq.).

unification and arrangement, and so affects, or imposes a certain character on, that of which it is conscious. This task or function is what he has in mind when he refers to apperception, and he finds it ignored in the ordinary view. So far his statement is intelligible. But when we examine it further there are a number of points in respect to which we see difficulties arising.

The first difficulty concerns the apparent contradiction which leads the psychologists to identify apperception and internal sense. The apparent contradiction, says Kant, is that 'we must [sc. it necessarily follows from his doctrine] stand in a passive relation to ourselves' ('welches widersprechend zu sein scheint, indem wir uns gegen uns selbst als leidend verhalten mussten'—B 153). Now this statement might have a more or less paradoxical aspect according to the implications attached to the word *leidend*. On the one hand what is implied may be that when there is consciousness of our states of consciousness the former consciousness, in part at any rate, makes the objects of which it is conscious; or, if the matter is stated from the other side, the objects take their form or character from the former consciousness and so are affected by it (*leidend*). This would be the more paradoxical aspect of the statement that we stand in a passive relation to ourselves. On the other hand, it may be that the implication is only that there is a passive relation to ourselves in the sense that we, the subjects who know, are also objects to ourselves in being known. If this is what the statement means the paradox is certainly less. Which is Kant's meaning?

There would seem to be no doubt that Kant is maintaining the more paradoxical view, were it not for what he says in a later passage. In B 155 there is the following statement:

'But how the I, who think, is distinct from the I which intuits itself (though I can imagine as at least possible other forms of intuition) and yet is one with the latter as the same subject; how I can thus say, "I as intelligence and thinking subject know myself as an object thought, so far as I am, besides being thought, given to myself in intuition, only like other phenomena, not as I am for the understanding, but as I appear to myself"—all this is neither more nor less difficult than the question, how in general I can be an object to myself, or an object for intuition and internal perceptions.'

Here Kant seems to be thinking of two other propositions besides the proposition that consciousness of our states affects them in the more paradoxical sense. The first is that thought and intuition,

though distinct, are combined in consciousness; and with it there is the corollary that, because there is always this combination, in self-consciousness I cannot be aware of myself as an object of the understanding but only as an object of intuition, i.e. as a phenomenal object. Kant would regard this proposition as one which explains or gives the reason for the more paradoxical interpretation of the statement that we are in a passive relation to ourselves. The second proposition to which he refers is that I, the subject, am also an object to myself, i.e. the lesser paradox. When he says that the one paradox is no more or less difficult than the other, does he mean that in the end his doctrine amounts to the statement that the subject is also an object to himself? It is plain not only from the passage itself but also from what precedes and follows it that he cannot mean this. In the sentence which precedes he says: 'The understanding finds in the inner sense no such synthesis of the manifold [sc. a synthesis in accordance with the concept of succession] but produces it by affecting this sense' (B 155). In a later sentence he says uncompromisingly: 'Consequently we must arrange the determinations of the inner sense as phenomena in time in exactly the same way as we arrange those of the external senses in space.' But if from all this it is plain that Kant is holding to the more paradoxical view, it is also plain that he has done nothing whatever to show that his view is no more or less difficult than the view that we are objects to ourselves or to appreciate the difficulties it presents both generally and for his own position. What the difficulties are we shall consider later. We must first continue with the attempt to see clearly what Kant is maintaining.

The points which we shall next consider raise other and serious difficulties. The questions we have to ask are what Kant means in this context by internal sense, and what by its objects, and, indeed, whether he distinguishes between the sense and its objects. If we turn back to § 6 of the Aesthetic, to which Kant has referred us at the beginning, we find him saying of time that it is 'the form of the internal sense, i.e. the form of the intuition of ourselves and our internal states' (A 33=B 49). Here internal sense is plainly taken to be an activity of consciousness (intuition), which has our internal states as its objects. In A 34=B 50 he expressly includes presentations (*Vorstellungen*) amongst these internal states: 'all presentations', he says 'whether they have external things as their objects or not, still in themselves as determinations of the mind

belong to our internal states.' The distinction of the presentation and its object shows that when he refers to the presentation as an internal state he thinks of it as a fact or event belonging to the history of a particular consciousness. As such it takes its place amongst the objects of the internal sense.

If this is Kant's point of view in the present context we must ask how exactly, when he refers to his own distinction of internal sense and apperception, he conceives the relation between the two. We can dismiss any suggestion that, in his view, internal sense is one form of consciousness, apperception another. For internal sense has its objects, and he thinks that there can be no form of consciousness of objects without apperception. Apperception can only be thought of as something which co-operates with or controls internal sense in its consciousness of its objects. This indeed Kant indicates by the statement in B 153 that the understanding 'determines the internal sense'. (We may notice that the same expression is used earlier in B 150 where he says that the understanding is able 'to determine the internal sense through the manifold of given presentations in accordance with the unity of apperception'.) The nature of this determination of the internal sense he purports to explain in the next few sentences, which we will quote.

'The human understanding is not in itself a faculty of intuition, and, even if intuitions were given in sensibility, still it could not take them into itself, in order, so to speak, to unite the manifold in its own intuition. It follows that the synthesis of the understanding, if it is considered alone by itself, is nothing else than a unity of activity, of which as such the understanding is itself conscious even without sensibility, by means of which it is able itself to determine the sensibility internally in respect of the manifold, which may be given to the sensibility in accordance with its form of intuition. Thus the understanding, under the name of a transcendental synthesis of imagination, directs that activity on the passive subject, whose faculty it is, and on that account we can say with justice that the internal sense is affected through it.'

The main points in the account seem to be these. The understanding provides neither the matter of sensibility nor its temporal and spatial form. The matter is given in sensibility and the mind's faculty of intuition supplies the temporal or spatial form. But when there is a temporal or spatial manifold of sense the understanding unifies it in consciousness and thinks of it as being an arrangement or system of a certain kind. In order to conceive this arrange-

ment or system which needs the thought of more than the actually given manifold, it must employ imagination, and when imagination is thus employed, we have what is called the transcendental synthesis of imagination. The conclusion is that the internal sense has thus been determined by the understanding's power of synthesis.

The difficulty which belongs to this alleged explanation of the way in which the understanding determines the internal sense is that it seems to lose sight of the point at issue. Kant has given what is in effect a summary of his doctrine regarding our consciousness of physical objects, and if it is to be taken as a doctrine regarding the determination of the internal sense it would seem that the meaning of internal sense is altogether different to that which we have supposed. What Kant is here referring to is the way in which understanding in co-operation with the forms of intuition determines the manifold of sensibility, and it seems that the expressions 'determining the sensibility' and 'determining the internal sense' are used interchangeably. But if 'internal sense' is simply equivalent to 'sensibility', Kant has told us nothing about consciousness of our states as events occurring in time, much less has he shown that this consciousness is determined by the understanding, operating in the form of a synthesis of imagination. It may, however, be said that in this explanation of the determination of internal sense, internal sense is not precisely equivalent to sensibility. Sensibility is what Kant would call 'blind'; it is not itself consciousness of an object. Internal sense, on the other hand, is not blind, but is consciousness of an object, because it is consciousness of sensibility systematized or determined into the form of an object by the understanding. There is doubtless something to be said for this answer,¹ but it raises a fresh difficulty. For if we now ask ourselves of what object the determined internal sense is conscious, the only answer to this question seems to be that it is conscious of a physical object. But if that is so, we are still without any reference to consciousness of our internal states or any explanation of their nature.

¹ It should be noticed that Kant himself in this passage seems to regard the internal sense as blind. This at any rate is the natural meaning to give to the following sentence in B 154: 'On the other hand the internal sense contains the bare form of the intuition, without any conjunction of the manifold in it [so, the intuition], and consequently contains no determined intuition, which is only possible through consciousness of the determination of the manifold by the transcendental activity of imagination (synthetical influence of the understanding on the internal sense) which I have called the figurative synthesis.'

The remarks which immediately succeed the passage from which we have quoted, so far from removing the difficulty only make it clear that it exists. In the latter part of B 154 he contends that to think of a line or a circle we must draw or describe it in thought. He seems not to be thinking simply of the fact that we must intuit it in imagination, but to wish to make the point that spatial entities are somehow constituted for thought by a synthesis of states of sensibility actual or imagined. He goes on to apply the same idea to motion, and in the footnote to B 154, contends that the only spatial motion which we apprehend *a priori* is that which issues from 'a pure act of the successive synthesis of the manifold in external intuition'.¹ The whole passage raises the difficulties which attach to the doctrine that physical objects are constituted by the mind through a synthesis of its own states of sensibility. But the point which we here need to notice is that Kant still seems to be occupying himself with the question of our consciousness of spatial objects, and not at all with the question of our consciousness of our internal states. Nevertheless we find him suddenly in B 155 reverting to the latter question, and reverting to it in a way which seems to imply that he has been dealing with nothing else. The passage is the one already quoted (see p. 122 above) in which Kant contends that the statement that I as thinking subject know myself as an object, not as I am for the understanding but as a phenomenon for intuition is neither more nor less difficult than the statement that I can be an object for myself, or an object for intuition or internal perceptions. It seems that he here remembers the specific problem of consciousness of our own states, as events in time, in regard to which he has maintained that they are determined by the understanding, and he now goes on to produce an argument for his view. The argument is that space and its contents must be admitted to be phenomenal, that the inter-relation between consciousness of temporal determinations and consciousness of spatial determinations is so close that we cannot have the

¹ The whole passage is dubious doctrine. 'That anything is movable', he says, 'cannot be known *a priori* but only through experience.' It might be retorted that if motion of objects is only a succession of our states, so far from it being known from experience that an object is movable, the fact is that there is nothing which is movable. But ignoring this difficulty, we may remember that Kant certainly thinks elsewhere that we have an *a priori* idea of the necessity of continuity in the movement of physical objects. He seems to be right in thinking that this necessity cannot be known from experience, but if the thought of continuity of motion is *a priori*, why should he maintain that there can be nothing *a priori* in the thought that objects are movable?

former without the latter, and that consequently the temporal determinations of our internal perceptions or internal sense must be phenomenal also.

The two comments which we shall at present make on this argument are these. First we notice how close the argument is to that of the second Refutation of Idealism and how different in its conclusion. Whereas here Kant uses the argument to support the subjectivity of the temporal determinations of our internal states, in the Refutation he starts with the position that these determinations are exactly the factors in our consciousness which have undeniable objectivity, and consequently the argument is taken to prove an equal objectivity in spatial determinations. Here the subjectivity of time is deduced from the subjectivity of space; in the Refutation, the objectivity of space is deduced from the objectivity of time. Secondly, we should notice that it is not evident that Kant has proved what he wishes to prove even if he is justified in claiming that our internal states are phenomenal because our intuition subjects them to the form of time. He is concerned to establish the point that the understanding or the synthesis of imagination spontaneously arranges data which are endowed with spatial or temporal form by intuition. Now it may well be thought that though all the data of sensibility are equally subject to the forms of sensibility they are not equally or in the same way subject to the synthesis of imagination, and indeed we shall see in a moment that Kant's own doctrine implies a distinction between what is so arranged and what is not. Nevertheless he goes on at once to say that 'it follows that we must arrange the determinations of the internal sense as phenomena in time in exactly the same way as we arrange the determinations of the external senses in space' (B 156).

We shall later follow up this last line of reflection, but first it will be convenient to consider a final point which Kant makes. In a footnote to B 157 he says:

'I do not see why so many difficulties are found in the notion that the internal sense is affected by ourselves. Every act of attention gives us an example. In such an act the understanding determines the internal sense in conformity with the conjunction which the understanding conceives, by bringing about an internal intuition which corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding. How much the mind is commonly affected in this way everyone can perceive in himself.'

Kant is saying that we can spontaneously imagine and so spontaneously bring about a state of consciousness, and that further our imagination may be controlled by what we think to be the nature of the object, in connexion with which the activity of imagination is employed. All this raises no difficulty. Further we can say, if we like, that we choose the date at which to exercise the capacity of imagination and in that sense determine the date of the act of imagining. But there we must stop in our agreement with Kant. The date, whatever it is that we choose, belongs, we may think, to an actual time order and no amount of thinking about the date of the act will change the date. In other words it is one thing to state that our power to act produces events with a certain time-determination and another thing to state that our consciousness of an event produces its time-determination. What Kant says about attention concerns the first statement, but what he is arguing for concerns the second.

It seems then that Kant purports to show that when the mind is conscious of its own states it is conscious of something, the unity and arrangement of which are determined by the understanding operating in the synthesis of imagination. We expect him to offer some account of the system which the mind thus imposes, but instead we find him recurring once more to the system which in his view constitutes physical objects, and affirming dogmatically that just as we impose a system on data of sensibility and produce the consciousness of spatial objects, so too we impose a system on our sensibility and produce consciousness of our internal states. His particular argument that we must hold there is a system imposed by the understanding alike as regards our consciousness of physical objects and our consciousness of our internal states, because both these kinds of objects of consciousness are phenomenal, is inadequate because it is possible to conceive that something given to the mind might be subject to the form of intuition but not arranged by the understanding. It is this last point on which we need now to reflect further.

In the first place we must ask what kind of data of sensibility we may conjecture that Kant has in mind when he is referring to the determination of the internal sense. If he follows consistently the doctrines of the Aesthetic and the Deduction, he should hold that they are of two kinds. There are, first, data of sensibility, such as pleasures or pains and desires, which are not thought of as providing the matter from which the mind consti-

tutes objects. Secondly, there are those data on which the mind draws, in Kant's view, when it is conscious of objects. They are presentations inasmuch as they are states of consciousness occurring in a certain temporal order, but they also provide the matter of objects because when the mind with the help of imagination thinks of a system governing the occurrence of such presentations, actual or possible, it thinks that it is conscious of a physical object. In their former aspect these data of sensibility are to be regarded as objects of internal sense, in their latter aspect as objects of external sense.

Let us consider first this second class of data of sensibility (the data which thus possess a dual aspect) and ask how far in respect of them Kant's view of the determination of the internal sense fits the rest of his doctrine. The difficulty is very clear if we recall in particular his account of the objective and the subjective unity of consciousness in §§ 20 and 21. He there describes the subjective unity as 'a determination of the internal sense through which the manifold of intuition is given empirically to be united [sc. in the concept of an object or in the objective unity]' (B 139). In his explanation of the objective unity his whole point is that the mind takes the order of its states of sensibility, which is given empirically, and constructs its concept of the object, starting from this basis. Thus he says emphatically: 'Whether I can be empirically conscious of the manifold as co-existent or successive depends on circumstances or empirical conditions' (id.). It is not too much to say that his whole doctrine of the way in which the understanding constructs our consciousness of an object is based on the view that our states of sensibility are given in a certain temporal order and that the understanding through the synthesis of imagination constructs a different order or system to that which is empirically given. He holds to this doctrine despite the fact that everything temporal is considered by him to be phenomenal, and it is an implication of his position 'that the fact of our states of consciousness being phenomenal does not mean that they are controlled by the understanding's power of synthesis. They and the order in which they occur remain none the less empirical and given. We can only conclude that when he insists that we arrange the determinations of the internal sense as phenomena in time in exactly the same way as we arrange the determinations of the external senses in space, he is saying something which is irreconcilable not only with his distinction of the subjective and the

objective unity of consciousness but more generally with the doctrine of the Deduction regarding the manner in which our consciousness of spatial objects is produced.

We need only add in this connexion that it would obviously be difficult for Kant to maintain a distinction between states of perception and states such as pleasure or desire as regards the empirical nature of their occurrence in the time-order. If so, what has been said in regard to the doctrine that the understanding determines the arrangement of our internal states may be held to apply to both these kinds of states, though directly to the one and only indirectly to the other.

Setting aside, however, the inconsistency of Kant's contention regarding the determination of our internal states with the rest of his doctrine, we may notice the difficulties he would have encountered if he had tried (as he did not) to work out the notion that our internal states are subject to a synthesis exactly the same as that which constitutes spatial objects. Consciousness of a spatial object arises, according to Kant, when in addition to our having actual states of sensibility we imagine others, and connect the whole in some kind of system. The object includes states of sensibility but is more than they are, both because imagination has added to them and because the understanding has imposed the thought of a system which governs them. Let us now turn to a state of sensibility or a state of consciousness, thinking of it as an object of the internal sense. If it has become an object by exactly the same kind of synthesis as that which constitutes a spatial object, we must ask where we find the work of imagination. If, as an object, it is parallel to a spatial object, imagination should have added the thought of states of sensibility or consciousness not experienced to that which is experienced before we could have a state of sensibility or a state of consciousness present to the mind as an object. But there seems nothing to support the view that this takes place. A state of sensibility or consciousness does not present itself to us as something incompletely apprehended in a particular experience, and having other sides of its nature which we need to apprehend by imagining a system of experiences of which the particular experience is only a part. Something of this kind may be said of the spatial object, but not of an internal state regarded as an object of consciousness. It is difficult then to find the same function for the imagination. But if the imagination has not the same function in regard to the internal state, it is clear that

the synthesis cannot be the same, since the synthesis which bears on the spatial object relates essentially to the conjunction of what is actually experienced with what is imagined. The problem indeed is to see what there is which has been synthesized when we are conscious of one of our states.

It may be said in answer to these arguments that we do not think of a state of sensibility or consciousness as isolated. To be recognized as a state of sensibility or consciousness it must be thought of as standing in relation to the rest of our consciousness and, indeed, involves the notion of the self. This may well be true, but as an answer to the objections which have been brought against Kant's account it calls for two comments. In the first place Kant seems plainly to have indicated in § 24 that he is thinking of the time determinations of particular states of consciousness, and not of the notion of the self, when he is discussing the determination of the internal sense. Secondly, even if we allow him to change his ground and refer now to the arrangement of our internal states which constitute the self as an object, he has still not shown that it is an arrangement produced in exactly the same way as that arrangement which constitutes a spatial object. On reflection we may be inclined to hold that it is very different. But since Kant turns to the problem of consciousness of the self in his next paragraph (§ 25) we must consider the matter in connexion with what he there says.

6. *Consciousness of Self*

Kant discusses consciousness of self in § 25 (B 157-9). He distinguishes two elements in this consciousness. On the one hand we must allow what has been taken as allowed in the previous paragraph (§ 24), viz. that the mind is conscious of its internal states. But on the other hand consciousness of anything implies the activity 'I think' which is the activity of transcendental synthesis, and of this activity too the mind is conscious when it is conscious of its own states. It is thus conscious of the determining of the self and of the self as determined (cf. footnote to B 158). Now the activity of determination works with the faculty of intuition and accordingly the self as determined is an object of intuition, but it is also thereby phenomenal. The activity of determination is not determined or intuited because 'I do not possess a further intuition of myself which gives the determining factor in me (of the spontaneity of which I am conscious) before the act of

determination' (id.). The activity of determination is therefore only an object of the understanding. As such it is not phenomenal, but we cannot know what it is since it is only of an intuited object that we can know this. The most therefore that we can say is that we are conscious that it exists; its nature we cannot know.

We may notice that when Kant says that the understanding is conscious of the determining or spontaneous side of the self, even though he adds the qualification that it does not know *what* it is, he seems to be losing sight of his view that the understanding works only with concepts and can apprehend no particular existents. We shall consider later whether it would not have been better if he had gone farther in this direction and allowed explicitly that what we can know is more than what we can intuit. But we shall first concern ourselves with the other side of the matter and examine what he says regarding the phenomenal self which is known in self-consciousness. Continuing the line of thought with which we were occupied in the last section we need to see what, in Kant's view, is the kind of synthesis or arrangement to which the self, regarded in this aspect, is subject. In B 158-9 he says:

'I exist as an intelligence which is simply conscious of its power of conjunction, but in relation to the manifold, which it has to conjoin, is subjected to a limiting condition which is called the internal sense; in accordance with this condition it is required to make the conjunction intuitable in terms of time-relations which lie entirely outside the sphere of the concepts of the understanding; and therefore it can only know itself as it appears to itself in respect of an intuition, which is not intellectual and cannot be given by the understanding itself; it does not know itself in the way that it would, if its intuition were intellectual.'

It is plain that, according to Kant, the answer to the question what kind of synthesis or arrangement constitutes the self as a phenomenal object of consciousness, is that it is a synthesis exhibited in a pattern of time-relations.

Now it may be suspected that the time pattern of which he is thinking is that of the actual order in which our states of sensibility and consciousness occur. He satisfies himself that the order can be held to be imposed by the mind, because the form of time belongs to our intuition, and the understanding exercises the function of synthesis. But, as we saw in the last section, the supposition that the actual time order of our states is not given but imposed by the understanding in conjunction with our intuition is in conflict with the rest of Kant's doctrine. If he

is making the supposition here he is no more successful in showing that the phenomenal self regarded as a series of states is the product of the mind which is conscious of it, than he was in establishing the same thesis in regard to our states of consciousness regarded separately. We should, however, ask whether he might not have adopted a more defensible position. It would be easy, and indeed right, to maintain that the self of which we are conscious is more than a mere series of states occurring in time. If we consider what unity it has which is more than that of a temporal series, several answers can be found, and we must allow the possibility that any superior unity which we discover can be claimed as the work of the understanding.

Let us consider three ways in which internal states can be regarded as unified in a self, and inquire whether any of them represents a unity at all similar to the arrangement of the manifold of sensibility which according to Kant brings about the thought of a physical object. First we may think of the unity of our perceptions. We do not suppose that they occur merely at random, but that there are laws or principles in accordance with which they occur. The consciousness of the system produced in our perceptions by the laws or principles which govern them is closely connected with our consciousness of ourselves, since it is hard to imagine how we should retain the notion of the self if all our experiences were disconnected. All this is familiar doctrine in Kant and might be applied at this point, when he is referring to the arrangement of states which constitutes the phenomenal self. But when we reflect on his views regarding the nature of our experience there are difficulties in seeing what are the laws with reference to which we are enabled to frame the notion of the unity of the self. On the ordinary view which distinguishes objects and our perceptual states it is possible to say that there is one set of laws governing the nature of objects, and another set governing our perceptions of them although the two are closely connected. Thus objects are subject to geometrical necessities, principles of continuity of change and the like. Perceptual states are subject to necessity inasmuch as an object must e.g. have a certain apparent shape under some conditions and a different shape under other conditions. The necessities on the one side and the other are connected because the apparent shape is dependent on the object's geometrical shape. On such a view it can be said that when we think of the principles which control our perceptual states or, in other

words, which control the appearances of objects to us, we are thinking of something which helps to constitute the unity of the self and thereby enables us to apprehend the self as an object. But Kant's doctrine regarding the nature of objects debars him from adopting such a position. If the object is resolved into the thought of perceptual states, actual and imagined, which are united by certain laws, it is hard to see how the laws and the unity of the self are distinguishable from the laws and the unity of the object. If the self is regarded as held together in a unity, its unity seems to be that of the object which it apprehends. At the best we can only say that there is the unity of the object, and there is also consciousness of its unity. It certainly does not seem possible to think consistently of two separate arrangements of internal states, though this is what Kant seems to have in mind.

It may be thought that Kant has somewhat mis-stated his position in referring to the two arrangements, and that he should have contended that the self is simply consciousness of the unitary system of perceptual states. When we are conscious, so he might say, of the system of perceptual states we apprehend a physical object; when we are conscious of our consciousness of the system, we apprehend the self. But such a modification takes us far from his doctrine. The self so regarded seems to resemble more nearly the notion of consciousness as 'determining' (of which Kant speaks) and to be altogether different from the phenomenal self which consists of a series of states in time, although it is the latter which he purports to describe. If we wish to introduce the temporal character which is an essential part of the notion of the phenomenal self, we must say that to be conscious of the self is to be conscious of a series of moments of consciousness. But in this way we return to the question of the kind of unity in which the moments are held together, and we then find that the only answers which seem to be available for Kant are either to say that the series is empirical and given, or to refer to the system of perceptual states, which in his account of objects of perception is taken to constitute not the self but physical objects.

We may notice further that apart from the general need which there seems to be for showing how we should distinguish perceptions and objects perceived, there are particular difficulties in Kant's way of regarding the matter. What constitutes the object for our consciousness is the thought of a system of actual and possible perceptions. What constitutes the self for our conscious-

ness is by no means the thought of all the possible perceptions which enter into the thought of an object. We think of the individual self as having essentially a limited capacity for perceptions. (Only a universal consciousness could be conceived as the counterpart to the totality of an object.) In our ordinary view we think of the limitation as connected with the relation of the individual mind to a body, and if we attempt to read the situation in idealist terms we must provide some idealist counterpart to this source of limitation. Even if we think of the self partly in terms of capacity for other perceptions than those which it actually has, again we must think of the capacity as circumscribed by the conditions belonging to its attachment to a physical body. All this suggests that the nature and unity of the self are connected with a system of conditions which are by no means ascribable to the operations of the understanding in its consciousness of the mind's internal states. The conditions seem clearly to belong to the 'given' elements which we saw that Kant recognized explicitly enough when he was contrasting the unity of the object with the unity of our internal states of sensibility.

It appears then that if we think that the unity of the self is connected in part at any rate with some kind of system in our perceptions, it is very difficult to fit Kant's account of the nature of the self to the requirements of any such view. We may now go on to consider a second way in which we may conceive the self to be a unity (not necessarily an alternative to the first but capable of combination with it) and again compare it with the doctrine regarding the self's unity which we find in Kant. Besides the kind of unity belonging to the self's perceptual states, which seems to be derived from the nature of objects and the conditions of perception, we think naturally of another kind of order or coherence when we reflect on states which are other than perceptual. We not only perceive, but also desire and will, and we have emotions and imaginings. These are states which, like perceptions, occur in temporal sequence, and we ask ourselves whether they too have not some controlled order or system. Here the way seems easier for the doctrine that the understanding and the imagination arrange internal states so as to produce the notion of the phenomenal self just as they arrange states of sensibility so as to produce the parallel notion of a spatial object. Kant can say that the states are phenomenal because they are temporal, and he can plausibly add that the system which they exhibit is that of the categories,

or of some of them, and in particular of the category of causality. According to this position, the elements which enter into the notion of the self are in the main comparable with those which enter into the notion of physical objects. There are data of sensibility, a form of intuition, and categories imposed by the understanding. Further, imagination is necessary because the mind cannot present the system to itself unless it imagines data which are not actually given; thus, in tracing the causal connexion of our states, we imagine states which preceded or states which follow those which we in fact experience. We must allow then that, in so far as Kant follows this train of thought in regard to our consciousness of the self, he can consistently think that the notion of the self depends on an arrangement by the mind of its internal states which is parallel to the way in which it constitutes the notion of physical objects.

The difficulty of the doctrine is twofold. The first is the general difficulty of regarding causality as a character not belonging to the data but imposed on them by the understanding. We have already touched on this question (see p. 83 above). Since it is a difficulty which concerns both the notion of objects and the notion of the self it does not as such tell against the consistency of the parallel which Kant draws, although it may make us doubt what he says both in regard to objects and in regard to the self. The other difficulty affects directly the claim that both notions are of the same order. It is arguable that the kind of system which belongs to what we regard as our internal states is of a different order to that which we attribute to objects, and indeed it may be asserted that Kant himself shows a recognition of the difference! It is this second difficulty which we should now consider, and we shall begin by asking what light in regard to it there is in Kant's own teaching.

It is in the Third Antinomy that Kant is particularly concerned with the matter of the application of the category of causality to the self. His treatment of the problem shows that he wavers between two doctrines which he does not clearly distinguish. We may notice now their main points and amplify them later. According to the one doctrine everything which properly belongs to our experience, that is to say, everything which is temporal and spatial and can be intuited, is strictly subject to the law of causality. States of the self, as they appear to consciousness, are in this respect no different from what we regard as physical objects. It follows that freedom is not attributable to the phenomenal self but

only to a self which is no part of the phenomenal order and cannot be intuited. The self which is contrasted with our phenomenal states is referred to sometimes as 'a transcendental object', sometimes as 'the intelligible character of a sensible object', sometimes as 'the character of an object as a thing-in-itself' (cf. A 538-9 = B 566-7). (We shall recur to these expressions later.) According to the other doctrine a rational being is different from a physical object, because its states are in part determined by its reason, and reason is not itself subject to causal determination (cf. A 551 = B 579). This determining reason is not itself a state. The point is made clearly by Kant when he says: 'Pure reason, as a faculty which is purely intelligible, is not subject to the form of time nor consequently to the conditions of temporal succession. The causality of reason in its intelligible character has no beginning nor does it operate at a certain time to produce an effect' (A 551 = B 579). Nevertheless though the conditions of pure reason (not being temporal) cannot be said to precede an action, the effects of pure reason can be said to occur in time in the form of phenomena of the internal sense (*id.*). The conclusion seems to follow from the second doctrine that internal states may occur which are not the necessary consequences of precedent internal states (or any other phenomenal conditions), but must be ascribed to the timeless activity of reason. Hence Kant can say in a passage which discusses the problem of blameworthiness: 'Blame of a wrong-doer is based on a law of reason which compels us to regard reason as a cause which could and should have determined otherwise the behaviour of the man, despite all empirical conditions' (A 555 = B 583). This last statement may be set in contrast with another belonging to the first doctrine, which Kant has made earlier. In A 549-50 = B 577-8 he says:

'All the actions of a man in the phenomenal world are determined by his empirical character and the other causes which co-operate with it in accordance with the order of nature, and if we could completely explore all the phenomena of man's volition, there would be no single action of a man which we could not with certainty predict and recognize as following necessarily from its precedent conditions.'

The two statements are irreconcilable and seem plainly to indicate that the two doctrines to which they respectively belong are irreconcilable also.

It was said above that Kant wavers between these two doctrines and does not clearly distinguish them. We must recognize, however,

that his thought is more complicated than this statement suggests, and we should ask why he inclines to both doctrines and further what reasons apparently prevent him from recognizing their incompatibility. Let us begin by considering what attracts him to either doctrine. There are obvious reasons why he should be attracted to the view that our internal states are phenomenal, that they are subject to categories imposed by the understanding, and that only that which is independent of the phenomenal order can be exempt from the conditions which govern phenomena. We have noticed already (see the beginning of this chapter) his fundamental contention that the mind cannot know the necessity of principles to which existences altogether independent of itself are subject. In virtue of this contention he makes it a cardinal point that when the mind apprehends a necessary system or principles controlling an object of which it is conscious the system or principles issue from the apprehending mind. A corollary is that no spontaneity or freedom can be attributed to the object of consciousness in respect of the system imposed on it by the conscious mind. On the other hand, he finds himself bound to recognize that there are data of consciousness in respect of which the mind is passive. But unless the data are to be regarded as an entirely irrational factor in the universe they must be connected with some reality, albeit unknown and unknowable, which accounts for their existence. This is one, at least, of the lines of thought by which Kant is led to the concept of noumenal reality. Now when he considers the problem of the unity or system of our internal states regarded as objects of consciousness it is natural that he should apply the same line of thought, more particularly since the temporal nature of these states already in his view stamps them as phenomenal. He then thinks that he can solve the problem of freedom by saying that freedom is an attribute of the self which is a thing in itself or a transcendental object, while the self which is a phenomenal object must always appear to be subject to the law of causality.

But Kant has overlooked an important point which is related to his initial postulate. It seems to be neither necessary nor possible to apply to the mind itself his doctrine regarding our consciousness of other objects. It is not necessary because the ground of the doctrine is that the mind cannot apprehend the necessary nature of an object which is independent of itself. But when the mind is conscious of itself it does not apprehend an object which is thus independent. Further, it is not possible to apply the

doctrine to the mind, because the attempt to do so involves an internal contradiction. We can see that this is so if we realize that the doctrine implies that the mind knows the principles or necessities of its own nature. For it is only on the supposition that the mind knows its own nature that anything is gained by saying that the principles which are ordinarily held to belong to objects do not belong to them but are ways in which it is the nature of mind to think. There is also a further point which we should notice. The necessity of the mind to think thus and thus must, it seems, be regarded as a necessity belonging to the mind and not a necessity imposed by consciousness of the mind as an object. For if we think that it is imposed by our consciousness of the mind, we must hold that we are conscious of the necessary nature of this consciousness. Does then the necessity at last belong to consciousness of mind or must we go yet farther and say that it is imposed by our consciousness of consciousness of mind? If we wish not to be involved in an infinite regress we must say at some point that the principles of consciousness of which we are conscious belong to the consciousness of which we are conscious and are not conferred on it by our consciousness of it as an object.

Now Kant certainly does not have these particular considerations in mind when he is writing the Third Antinomy. Nevertheless he sees that the mind apprehends some features of its own nature which he cannot call phenomenal. In this respect the standpoint of the Third Antinomy resembles that of the passage in the Second-edition Deduction which we have been considering. We have seen that he recognizes in the Deduction that there are two elements in self-consciousness, viz. consciousness of a determining self and consciousness of the self as determined. Of the existence of the determining self he says explicitly that 'it is not a phenomenon, much less mere illusion' (B 157). It is just this recognition of the double nature of the self apprehended in self-consciousness which leads him to his second doctrine in the Antinomy. In his discussion of what he calls 'the possibility of free causality in conjunction with the universal law of natural necessity' his opening sentences refer at once to the two elements in the self, and he states explicitly that the one element is not phenomenal.

'That element in a sensuous object which is not itself phenomenal I call "intelligible". If accordingly that which in the sensible world must be regarded as a phenomenon has also a faculty which is not an object of sensuous intuition but yet is something which enables it to be the

cause of phenomena, the causality of such an entity may be regarded in two aspects; it may be regarded as intelligible when we think of it as activity (the activity of a thing in itself), and as sensible when we think of its effects (the effects of a phenomenon in the world of sense)' (A 538 = B 566).

When Kant is here referring to the sensible and the intelligible elements in the self it is plain that he has more in mind than the contrast between something which is given in sensibility and the way in which the mind thinks about it. The reference is to a determinate element or factor belonging to the object of consciousness in its own right over and above the features which are presented in sensibility. We may notice that Kant is saying something which can hardly be applied to a physical object—at least according to the doctrines of the Deduction. He can say in general that a physical object has a sensible and an intelligible aspect, in so far as it is something sensible about which we think, but there seems to be no case for saying that it has an intelligible 'faculty'. (The difference should put us on our guard at the outset when we read his comparisons between the self or its states and other objects of consciousness.) The faculty to which he is referring is the reason, but he does not say so explicitly until later. In A 546 = B 574 we first find the reference made, and we may notice that at the same time he clearly defines the contrast between the self and other objects. The passage is as follows:

'If we look to inanimate nature or to nature which is animal and nothing more we find no reason for ascribing to ourselves any faculty which is not simply sensibly conditioned. But man who knows the whole of the rest of nature only through sense, knows himself through pure apperception also, and this in activities and inner determinations, which he cannot refer to the impression of the senses. He is to himself on the one hand a phenomenon, on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties, a pure intelligible object, since the action of this object cannot be referred to sensuous receptivity. We call these faculties understanding and reason. The latter is altogether and peculiarly distinct from all empirically conditioned powers, for it considers its objects simply in accordance with ideas and determines thereby the understanding which then makes an empirical use of its own concepts, these concepts too being pure.'

We need not consider in detail various constructions which might be put on the last sentence. It is clear from what follows later that when he refers to the understanding he has in mind the laws

of our thinking in virtue of which experience is intelligible: when he refers to reason he is thinking more particularly of practical reason and the concept of duty by which we can regulate our actions.

Two points seem clear in connexion with these statements and Kant's subsequent development of them. First, if the non-phenomenal element which we apprehend in self-consciousness is the understanding or reason, it cannot be said to be noumenal in the sense that it is unknown and unknowable. We not only know the laws of the understanding and reason, but as Kant goes on to say we are conscious of them as operative in regard to our inner states and actions. Thus in A 547 = B 575 he says: 'That this reason possesses causality—or at least that we attribute to it something akin to causality—is clear from the imperatives which we impose as rules on our powers of action'; and again in A 550 = B 578: 'Sometimes we discover, or at least believe we discover, that the ideas of reason have been actually causative in relation to particular actions of men; and that these actions have taken place because they were determined not by empirical causes but by grounds of reason.'¹ Secondly, the statements we have been considering, and particularly the last quotation, confirm the point which we noticed earlier (see p. 137). It seems clear that if reason is held to operate in the manner stated there cannot always be those necessary and invariable sequences of the states and actions of the self which the application of the category of causality postulates. Both points seem sharply to contradict the alternative doctrine.

How is it that Kant conceals from himself the contradiction? At the outset it seems that he is confused in regard to his own notion of a purely intelligible object. His confusion seems to be in part connected with different implications of the term 'intelligible', as applied to an object of consciousness. As we noticed earlier (see p. 140), when reference is made to the intelligible side of an object, the implication may be that it has a nature, of which we have knowledge, different from but conjoined with its sensible nature. Clearly this is what is meant when man's reason

¹ The qualification in the first passage seems to indicate Kant's recognition that the causality of reason is not in all respects the same as the causality which we attribute to the physical world. The qualification in the second perhaps suggests that he remembers his other doctrine which he is plainly contradicting, or it may simply mean that he is thinking of the occasions when we erroneously attribute an action to reason.

is referred to as the intelligible side of his nature. On the other hand, the meaning of intelligible may be simply 'what we think about the sensible'. In regard to the latter meaning a little more needs to be said. What we think about the sensible may be the categories to which, according to Kant, we subject it. But we may also think in respect of the manifold of sense that there is some ground for it being what it is, or (regarding the manifold as appearance) we may think that there is a reality of which the manifold is the appearance. This ground or reality of which we think is not intuited and therefore it cannot be known. On such lines the intelligible becomes the noumenon which is unknown and unknowable. The doctrine is reinforced by the view that the understanding itself, unaided by intuition of the sensible, can apprehend no object. The last point is, of course, really incompatible with saying, as Kant does, that it is possible to apprehend the reason, which is not sensible nor phenomenal nor intuitable. Perhaps we may take it a sign of uneasiness on Kant's part that he does not refer to a noumenon or a noumenal self but instead (as we saw above, p. 137) speaks of the self as 'a transcendental object' or 'the character of a thing-in-itself'. The use of the expression 'transcendental object' is particularly interesting when it is compared with what he says about the transcendental object in the first-edition Deduction. Doubtless when Kant speaks of a transcendental object in the context of our consciousness of physical objects and when he speaks of the self as a transcendental object, there are many differences in the two concepts. But there is at least this in common, that in both cases he seems driven to recognize that we can be conscious of the existence and, in part at least, of the nature of an object which is not intuited.

In any case Kant somehow contrives to regard the contrast between the causality of reason and the causality which we attribute to the physical world in terms of the contrast between noumena and phenomena; with the result that he still maintains that all our inner states and actions conform to the same category which controls all other phenomena. It becomes very difficult for him to maintain this doctrine when he insists (rightly, it would seem) on the necessity of recognizing the peculiar operation and influence of reason. We may notice one way in which he attempts with ill success to evade the difficulty in which he is involved. After the passage already referred to (see p. 137) in which he states that the causality of reason has no beginning and does not operate

at a certain time to produce an effect, he goes on to say: 'We can therefore affirm that if reason is causal in relation to phenomena, it must be a faculty by means of which the sensuous condition of an empirical series of effects is first originated'; and later: 'Thus we find—what we do not find in any empirical series—that the condition of a successive series of empirical events may itself not be empirically determined' (A 552 = B 580). He evidently has it in mind that when the causality of reason emerges, so to say, in the phenomenal sphere, a series is started alike of inner states and physical events which exhibits causation in the sense applicable to phenomena. But he does not ask himself what should be said regarding the relation of the whole phenomenal series, or the first member of it, to other phenomena. It is not sufficient to maintain that the members of the series are in causal relation to each other, if the first member has no antecedent which can be regarded as its phenomenal cause. If it is said that the first member has a phenomenal cause, it does not seem possible to reconcile this with the causality of reason, and in particular with the view that the causality of reason is such that the action which follows from it might have been determined otherwise despite the empirical conditions.

What conclusions may we draw from this examination of the Third Antinomy? It seems clear that the two doctrines which we have traced are inconsistent and that what we have referred to as the second doctrine is in every way preferable to the other. But if the points of the second doctrine are accepted they compel much revision of the views of the Deduction. To hold that reason has a nature and methods of operation altogether different from those which we attribute to the physical world and that mind can be conscious of its own reason, is to allow first that the kind of unity or system belonging to human action and the states of mind concerned with action is not that of the physical world, and secondly that this unity indeed belongs to the nature of mind and is not imposed by our consciousness of it. Both points are irreconcilable with the view of the Deduction that all unity of an object of consciousness is imposed by the consciousness of it, and that the mind arranges the determinations of the internal sense as phenomena in time exactly as it arranges the determinations of the external sense. A still more far-reaching departure from the doctrine of the Deduction and much else in the *Critique* is involved, if we begin to press the implications of the admission that the mind

can apprehend the nature of reason which is not a phenomenal nor an intuitable object.

We have now examined two different aspects in which the self seems to present itself as a unity. The first was the aspect in which we think of it as being subject to certain conditions or principles which regulate and order its perceptual experience. The second was the aspect which it presents when we reflect on other states of consciousness than perceptual experiences, states of consciousness such as desires, will, emotions, or imagination, which seem also not to be haphazard but to occur in some kind of system. In either case the attempt to investigate the unity involved has only made us more critical of the doctrine which we find in the Deduction. There is, however, one other side or aspect of the self to which we should refer. In effect what we considered under the head of the second aspect of the self was mainly its rationality in relation to action or matters connected with action. It is this rationality which Kant is concerned to discuss in the Third Antinomy. But he recognizes that the understanding too is a part of the element of rationality in the self. What we have to ask ourselves is whether the rationality which appears in cognition and the principles of our thinking is not also an aspect of the unity of the self, and, if so, of what kind this unity is and to what source it should be attributed. Now we may think of the understanding in various ways, but in whatever way we think of it, it is doubtful whether we find any support for Kant's doctrine regarding the arrangement and unity of our internal states. If we regard the operation of the understanding as manifesting itself in a series of states, it seems to be difficult to regard the unity of those states as being parallel to the unity of states of sensibility which in Kant's view constitutes an object. States of sensibility, actual and imagined, present themselves as a unity, because there are thought to be conditions which dictate the occurrence of the states in a certain order in time. But when, for example, we have the thought of a triangle the sides of which are equal and have the further thought that its angles must be equal, the situation is different. We can say if we like that we have here two elements of consciousness, the thought of equal sides and the thought of equal angles. But the unity holding together these elements has nothing to do with a fixed temporal order in which the thoughts occur. The unity present is the logical unity of thought, which is not temporal. We may allow that the logical unity has a relation to the temporal

sequence of our thoughts. If we begin to think about the equality of the sides, the thought that the angles are equal follows, or may follow, later in time. But the temporal sequence is then dependent on the logical unity and is explicable by it. The same thing cannot be said of the sequence of our states of sensibility. But if that is so, we cannot, when we think of our states of consciousness in their logical aspect or in their connexion with the understanding, suppose that their arrangement and unity are similar in kind to the arrangement which we attribute to our states of sensibility. Nor can we ignore in this connexion the considerations already referred to (sec p. 139) which bear on Kant's contention that the mind itself imposes the unity which it attributes to its own states. As we saw, even if we allow that there is some plausibility in the notion that the mind arranges its states of sensibility, there is no plausibility in saying that the form of the understanding is imposed by our consciousness of the understanding. It seems then necessary to conclude that alike as regards its nature and its source the unity of states of consciousness, considered as states belonging to a rational intelligence, must be differentiated from the unity of what Kant calls the determinations of the external senses. It must be remembered too that, if Kant's doctrine that the two are parallel is rejected for the reasons given, his further doctrine that the self which we know is phenomenal must also be gravely doubted. If the unity of rational thought is not to be found in a temporal order of states of consciousness and if the unity is not imposed by our consciousness of it, what case remains for saying that the rational self is a phenomenal object?

There is, however, another way of considering the understanding in regard to which we must ask whether it does not enable Kant to evade these arguments. We may speak of principles of thinking which constitute the nature of the understanding, but these principles, it may be said, are better regarded as part of the nature which we attribute to the objects about which we think. From such a point of view the understanding is what Kant calls the 'I think', and the 'I think' is strictly not resolvable into elements nor therefore is it a unity in the ordinary sense. It can only be regarded as a unity of elements when we think of it in close relation to its objects, and in this aspect its unity is indeed that of the objects which it contemplates. May we not here find some justification for Kant's contention, that the unity of our internal states

is the same as that of objects? The question, it may be remarked, resembles that which arose in our discussion of the unity of perceptual experience, and the answer is perhaps to be found in considerations somewhat similar to those which were then noted. In the first place we must observe that if the principles of the understanding are thought of as principles of the objects contemplated by the understanding rather than as elements in the nature of the understanding which contemplates them, it cannot at the same time be maintained that states of consciousness, so far as they are rational, possess a unity or system parallel to the unity or system of objects. The doctrine of parallelism supposes that there are two systems, and on this view there is only one; for the rational mind is being regarded not as a system but as a power or faculty of imposing a system. But the view must clearly be modified if we are to speak of a phenomenal self at all. From the Kantian standpoint it must be said that there is a phenomenal aspect of the rational self because the 'I think' is not a single undivided and non-temporal moment. The rational self appears as a series of moments of consciousness, each of which is an 'I think'. These moments are the elements of rational consciousness, the unity or arrangement of which is the problem to be considered. Now it may perhaps reasonably be said that what unifies the diverse moments of consciousness or 'I think's is the fact that the contents or objects of the diverse moments are organized in accordance with the principles which the understanding imposes. Kant's own remarks regarding self-consciousness in the first-edition Deduction are very much on these lines. But all this is clearly a departure from the view that the mind imposes an arrangement of the determinations of the internal sense which is comparable to the arrangement which it imposes on the determinations of the external senses. It cannot be said on the view we have been considering that unity is imposed on the moments of consciousness by the mind's reflective consciousness of them; the unity is not imposed by reflection, but is possessed by the moments of consciousness, in virtue of the systematic nature which mind imposes, according to this doctrine, not on consciousness but on its objects.

It seems then that in whatever aspect we consider the nature of the understanding or the mind's rationality we do not attain a result which confirms Kant's doctrine. Undoubtedly the principles of the understanding have something to do with the unity of our moments of consciousness, but their relation to this unity

must be held to be altogether different from that which is implied by the statements of the Deduction. One further point may be noticed. It is hard to see how a reference to the general principles of the understanding can explain the unity or identity of the individual self. The individual self must be constituted by some differentiation or limitation of consciousness which is conjoined with its subjection to the principles of rational thinking. Kant makes no reference to this problem, but it concerns closely the working out of his doctrine, and it should have received his consideration.

7. *The Adjustment of the Principles of the Understanding to the Given in our Experience*

The concluding paragraphs of the Deduction (§§ 26 and 27) suggest that Kant is more uneasy than he admits regarding the problem of the adjustment of the principles of the understanding to the given in our experience. The problem appears in many parts of the *Critique*, and some aspects of it have already been discussed in this chapter (see p. 83). There are, however, one or two remarks which may be made on the present passage of the Deduction.

The first question to be asked is how exactly Kant formulates the problem in his own mind. But to this it does not seem that there is a clear answer. He approaches his subject in a manner which suggests that he is thinking of a general problem of the adjustment of any category or principle of the understanding to what is given in our experience. We notice that early in § 26 he takes pains to indicate that he includes in the principles of the understanding the *a priori* principles which are connected with our intuition of space and time, and he expressly corrects the view (which might be attributed to the Aesthetic) that the intuition of space and time has nothing to do with the synthesis of apperception, nor with the understanding and its principles or categories (cf. B 160-1 with footnote). He goes on (B 161-2) to take two cases of perceptual experience (or 'empirical intuition' as he calls it), and argues that they involve respectively the categories of quantity and causality. It is this reference both to geometrical and arithmetical concepts or principles and to the category of causality which implies that he thinks of a general problem. Now a general problem regarding the adjustment of thinking to the given might be stated in the following way. We may ask why it is that a particular instance of the given is endowed with a particular aspect of the form of intuition

and so comes under the principles which govern that particular aspect. Thus we may ask why a particular instance of redness is intuited as circular and not as triangular and so is subject to the way in which we think about a circle rather than to the way in which we think about a triangle. Similarly if we suppose it is a principle attributed by the understanding to objects that every element of the given has a necessary and invariable antecedent, we may ask why it is that this principle exhibits itself in a particular form of sequence $a \rightarrow x$ rather than in another particular form $b \rightarrow x$. If the matter is thus stated, it seems that there is some ground for holding that there is a problem common to the two cases. We can ask in either case what there is in the matter of sense which explains its intuited aspect; in the one, its spatial aspect, in the other, its temporal aspect (which, of course, does not exclude it from having a spatial aspect also). To this question it does not seem that we can give the answer that the selection of the particular spatial form or the particular temporal relation is a spontaneous act on the part of the mind. Kant himself insists on the receptivity of the mind in intuition in contrast to the spontaneity which he attributes to the understanding (cf. e.g. A 51 = B 75). But if we cannot assign the selection of the particular form or the particular relation to the intuiting mind, it would seem that the selection must be controlled by the nature of the given manifold or else by something which lies beyond it. The difficulty which then arises is this. It seems hard to think that what is responsible for the particular spatial form, or the particular temporal relation has no connexion whatever with the intelligible principles which govern the particular form or relation. If there is something which requires that we should intuit a phenomenal triangle, it is more natural to suppose than not that this something is also connected with the requirement that the understanding should think the interior angles of the triangle to be equal to two right angles. But to admit so much would seem to impair Kant's doctrine of the spontaneity of the understanding.

Whether the problem thus formulated is serious or not we need not here consider. For it does not seem that it is the problem which Kant has in mind. But if it is not, it is not easy to see what other problem can be stated which will be common to all the categories and principles. In fact what Kant has in mind is apparently connected with the special features of one category, viz. the category of causality. To see this, let us notice for a

moment the difference between the two cases referred to above. So long as we keep to their purely intuitional aspect they can be regarded as parallel. In the one case colour is intuited in a particular shape, in the other two events are intuited with a particular time interval between them. No question is raised regarding the correctness of the intuition. The question is not, how do we know that the colour has this shape or the two events this time interval, but, if there is a question, it is why there is this shape or this interval. But when we consider the operation of the understanding in the two cases, we notice important differences. There is no question, if the shape is triangular, whether or not it is subject to the principles governing the nature of a triangle. Further, the particular nature of a triangle is necessarily related to other principles belonging to the nature of space and may be said to be deducible from them. But because we intuit a particular time-interval between two events, we do not think that the one event is necessarily the cause of the other. Again, the connexion of a particular case of the causal principle (that A causes B) with the principle of causality in general presents a special difficulty of its own. We cannot see that A causes B in virtue of knowing that everything has a cause. Nor is there a body of causal principles comparable to the laws of spatial extension from which a particular causal connexion can be certainly deduced. Now it is in effect these points to which Kant refers in stating his problem, thereby showing that, despite his approach to the subject, he is not concerned with a general problem applicable to all the categories and principles of the understanding, but with a problem which is related to the special category of causality.

'All possible perceptions,' he writes, 'and consequently everything which can belong to empirical consciousness, i.e. all phenomena of nature, must in respect of their conjunction fall under the categories, on which nature (considered simply as nature in general) depends as the primitive ground of her necessary conformity to law (as *natura formaliter spectata*). But the pure capacity of the understanding to prescribe *a priori* laws to phenomena by means of bare categories does not extend to the prescription of other laws than those on which nature generally, as the conformity to law of phenomena in space and time, rests. Particular laws, since they concern empirically determined phenomena, cannot be completely deduced from the general laws prescribed by the understanding, although they stand under them. Experience must be added in order that we may learn to know the particular laws; but experience in general and everything which can'

be known to be an object thereof can only be a subject of knowledge through the general *a priori* laws' (B 164-5).

Kant is content to leave the matter when he has made this distinction between pure or general laws and particular laws and assigned the latter to the sphere of the empirical. In the next paragraph (§ 27) he discusses what he calls 'a preformation system of pure reason' contrasting it unfavourably with his own, although his account raises the suspicion that the two systems are not so much different as he supposes. We shall see later whether this is so if we begin by noticing the difficulty of the doctrine which he himself maintains. The difficulty is not that the empirical character which he assigns to particular laws impairs their certainty or throws doubt on their status as laws. Kant recognizes (it seems rightly) that certainty cannot be claimed for these laws. His regular doctrine is that the mind is bound to hold that there is some constant and necessary antecedent of every phenomenon and is bound also to search for such antecedents of phenomena in interpreting its experience. If that which it takes to be the constant and necessary antecedent of a phenomenon is shown by experience not to be so the mind must revise its view and find some other which is consistent with what experience reveals. This is what Kant means when he refers to 'analogies of experience' and explains that they concern the relation of the facts of experience to a fourth member in the relation, a member which is not given *a priori*, 'although I have a rule for searching for it in experience and a mark for discovering it in experience' (A 180 = B 222). He continues the same line of thought when he goes on to say in the same passage: 'An Analogy of experience is therefore only a rule which imports unity of experience into perceptions (it is not an empirical intuition like perception) and regarded in relation to objects (phenomena) it has the validity of a regulative not a constitutive principle' (id.). But all this does not avoid the difficulty which is apparent when we ask the question, what guarantee is there that the search is not fruitless? The principle with which the mind works is one which has reference to the details of its experience, and when once it is allowed that the details are beyond the mind's control, the case for the necessary conformity of experience to the principle is thereby destroyed.

In discussing the 'preformation-system of pure reason' Kant describes it as a system which holds that

'the categories are neither autonomous (*selbstgedachte*) *a priori* prin-

ciples of our cognition nor derived from experience but are subjective dispositions of thought implanted in us at birth and so arranged by our Creator that their employment exactly agrees with the laws of nature which govern experience' (B 167).

He goes on to say:

'The concept for example of cause, which proclaims the necessity of an effect under certain conditions would be false if it only rested on an arbitrary and predetermined subjective necessity of conjoining particular empirical presentations in accordance with such a rule of relation. I should not then be able to say that the effect is related to the cause in the object, i.e. necessarily, but only that I am so constituted that I think of a particular presentation as standing in such a relation and can think of it in no other way. But this is all that the sceptic wants. For in that case all our insight and the supposed objective validity of our judgements would be mere illusion, and there would not be wanting people who would say that they did not recognize in themselves this subjective necessity (which must be felt). At any rate we could not dispute with anyone in regard to something which simply depends on the way in which he, as subject, is organized' (B 168).

There is an ambiguity in these passages of which it seems that Kant takes some advantage in his argument. He begins by supposing that it is the categories which the preformation theory regards as subjective dispositions of thought, but his later remarks suggest that it is the particular laws of nature rather than the categories which are so regarded. The difference has a bearing on what he says regarding the arbitrary (*beliebig*) character of a purely subjective necessity and the possibility of denying its existence. The comment may seem applicable to beliefs about particular laws, but it is hardly in accordance with Kant's general position to suppose that there can be such disputes about the essential principles of our thinking. It seems, however, that this line of thought as a whole does not affect the real issue. The gravamen of the charge against a preformation theory is that the necessity which we apprehend in our thinking and the necessity which belongs to objects are separate and disconnected, and that therefore our apprehension of the first necessity is no guarantee of the existence of the second. Now Kant can say if he likes that he does not recognize the existence of objects apart from our consciousness, but to say this does not save his position from the difficulty which the preformation theory attempts to meet. Within consciousness he recognizes on the one hand autonomous principles

of thinking and on the other an element which thought does not control, and he recognizes too that the principles of thinking are applied to the latter element. If the element which mind does not control has no principles or necessity of its own, there is no guarantee that it will conform to the principles of the mind. If it has its own principles, there is again no guarantee of the conformity of its principles to those of the mind. It seems only possible at this stage to fall back only on a preformation theory such as that to which Kant refers. Nevertheless he is right in his objection to the preformation theory; for the guarantee which it offers is one of which we can have no knowledge. He does not see, however, that the preformation theory is an attempt to find a way of escape from a difficulty which is inherent also in his own position, and because he ignores the difficulty he himself suggests no other way.

THE ANTITHESIS OF PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA

IN discussing Kant's contention that the world of spatial and temporal objects of which we are conscious—a world which includes not only physical objects but also our own internal states—is phenomenal, there are some outstanding features of his doctrine which we must keep steadily in mind. When he puts forward this particular contention he does so in the firm belief that he is thereby enlarging our claims in regard to what we may be said to know. He begins by supposing that all objects of which we are conscious are internal to our own consciousness. The confinement of consciousness within this limit does not disturb him; for he would be ready to ask, What more can we desire to know than what has or might have constituted or does or will or can constitute the content of our consciousness? But though the view that objects of consciousness fall within consciousness may not, in Kant's opinion, unduly confine our knowledge, he does not think that taken by itself it does anything to enlarge our claims to knowledge. An idealist doctrine such as that of Berkeley at best leaves us in the same position in which a realist doctrine would leave us as regards our claim to knowledge of objects and of our own states. If then the doctrine that these objects are phenomenal improves the position, as Kant thinks it does, it must mean something more than that such objects are ideal. What it means essentially is that the system with which all objects are connected is constituted by the forms of space and time, that these forms proceed from the nature of consciousness, and that consciousness knows its own nature.

The doctrine, we must further observe, is closely connected with the view that the contents of consciousness may be conceived to be of two kinds. All contents of consciousness belong to consciousness but not all proceed from the nature of consciousness. This is what is meant by saying that some of the elements of consciousness are given. If all contents of consciousness alike were given, the mind could doubtless be said to know these contents in a certain sense. But such apprehension of each element of the content of consciousness as it occurred would fall far short of what we would wish to know. We can only be said to have true knowledge when we understand the principles in accordance with which

the contents of consciousness occur or the laws to which they are subject so that we can know what might have been or may or will be our experience. Now it is possible to think, as Berkeley thought, that there are principles which govern the contents of our consciousness, dictating what contents shall be present and in what form and order and conjunction, but that these principles come from a source which is not the mind itself. In that case Kant held that we could not know them. It is only the supposition that the principles issue from our minds which can enlarge our claim to have knowledge of the contents of consciousness, and it is this supposition which is the essential feature of the doctrine that objects of consciousness are phenomenal.

When we look at Kant's doctrine from this point of view, we can see that there is a problem of the limits of knowledge with which he is bound to be concerned. It is the problem set by the division of the internal contents of consciousness into those elements which can be held to proceed from the nature of the mind and those which cannot. We can state the matter in another way if we say that, taking the contents of consciousness as internal, he seeks to determine what elements in these contents are fully intelligible and therefore fully known and what are not. It is important to observe that if this statement of the position is correct, Kant's problem regarding the limits of knowledge is not (at the outset at any rate) the problem whether we may suppose that apart from the contents internal to our consciousness there is some other reality and whether it can be said to be in any sense knowable or not. The way in which he formulates the doctrine that objects of consciousness are phenomenal does not, it seems, directly involve the antithesis of phenomena and noumena. The point should be kept in mind as we proceed with the analysis of his doctrine.

As has been said, Kant seeks to answer his question by contending that the forms of space and time proceed from the nature of the mind, and are therefore intelligible to the mind. But this is only the beginning of the answer, and even why he begins thus is not plain unless we refer to what has to be said regarding the other contents of consciousness. Kant recognizes in connexion with our faculty of knowledge the forms of intuition, the sense manifold, the products of imagination, and the categories or principles of thought. At the outset of his account of knowledge he selects space and time, and the sensuous manifold as that of which we can

be said in the first instance to have knowledge. He has no hesitation in disregarding the imaginary, as such, although he supposes that all objects of knowledge are internal to consciousness and it might seem that on this basis it would be hard to distinguish the imaginary and the real. His doctrine regarding the distinction was discussed in Chapter I, and it is only necessary to recall here that he regards the distinction, so it seems, as one which is immediately apprehended, but holds too that the sensible cannot be apprehended as a reality unless it is also apprehended as having a determinate position in the order of time or of space and time. We can take it then that time and space, and the sense manifold which belongs to them, are realities to be known in a sense in which the products of imagination are not. For this reason he evidently thinks that the reality of time and space and their application to the sense manifold do not require the kind of deduction which is necessary when we raise questions in regard to the validity of that part of our thinking which is not confined to the intelligible nature of the temporal and the extended.¹

But does Kant hold and would it be right to hold that no deduction of validity is required in regard to time and space? Here it seems necessary to draw a distinction. { It is perhaps right to say that we cannot but be immediately aware that any sensuous content of consciousness does and must present itself as belonging to the order of time or space. But there is another question to be considered which concerns the intelligible principles of time and space. We may be allowed to say that the sense manifold must be known to belong to time and space, but are we equally entitled to claim the knowledge that what we think about one part of time or space applies equally to all parts of time or space? It seems that some kind of deduction is required here, and it also seems that this is Kant's view. The deduction is his general argument that neither time nor space is like its sensuous contents in regard to which we can only attend on the occurrence of the given and know what it is when it occurs. [We must allow that mind can enlarge its consciousness of time or space at will. This does not mean simply that mind can *think* more about them. Such a restriction would suggest that the thinking might turn out to be wrong when we came actually to apprehend more time or more space. In the intuition of the form of time or space there is no divorce between conceptual thinking and consciousness of what

¹ Cf. A 89 = B 122.

is individual and actual. To think of the characteristics of any further extent or part of time or space is to be also conscious of an actual extent or part. The time itself or the space itself of which we think cannot be imaginary, and therefore there is no question whether what we think may not apply to actual time or space. This is at once the deduction of the necessary application of the intelligible principles of time and space to any part of them (and thereby to the sense manifold) and the explanation of the statement that time and space proceed from the nature of mind and are in the fullest sense known.'

For our present purpose it is not necessary to consider how Kant deals with imagination and how he seeks to establish the validity of the concepts or principles of the understanding, except in so far as his treatment of these questions shows what is the problem of knowledge with which he is really concerned. It will be enough therefore if we notice the particular aspect which the problem presents when it concerns imagination and the concepts of the understanding. As regards both in their different ways it is possible to raise a question which is not raised by the principles of time and space. [When we imagine some sensuous experience we can ask whether it has occurred or can or will occur. Similarly when we think of a character of experience which is intelligible rather than sensuous we can ask whether experience actually has that character. It is our experience, not something outside it, which we imagine or think about, but there is none the less room for a divorce between what is imagined or thought and the actual. Sensuous imagination is not the same as sensuous experience, and a general concept is not bound to have an actual instance. There is no such difference between imagination and experience of time and space, or between the thought of a pure temporal or spatial concept and consciousness of it as actualized. Hence if we believe that what we imagine or think in reference to sensuous experience is true a kind of deduction is necessary which was not necessary in reference to our consciousness of time and space.] As has been said, it is not necessary for us to consider now the nature of the deduction, but we may observe that when we reflect how firmly based in Kant's view is our knowledge of time and space, we are not surprised if we find him constantly recurring to the attempt to connect the principles of the understanding (which are also the principles on which imagination works) with the nature of the forms of intuition.

The main point which emerges from these considerations is that Kant is above all concerned with the problem of showing how much of the content of our consciousness is knowable in the sense that the principles exhibited in it are intelligible to consciousness itself; and that he thinks that the intelligibility of experience can only be explained by connecting it with the nature of consciousness. Now if this is his doctrine, the notion that experience is rendered more intelligible by supposing the existence of something outside our experience or inaccessible to consciousness seems at the outset to accord with it very imperfectly. The ideas connected with the doctrine that our experience is phenomenal are not those which suggest the idea of the noumenon or noumena as their natural complement. Nevertheless it may be true that Kant often turned his thoughts in this direction, and even that there may be good reasons for his doing so. It is this question which we shall now consider.

In the first place we must notice an argument which Kant seems from time to time prepared to endorse. In the first-edition version of the chapter on Phenomena and Noumena he writes: 'It follows naturally from the concept of appearance in general (*aus dem Begriffe einer Erscheinung überhaupt*) that there must correspond to it something which itself is not appearance' (A 251). In the second edition of the same chapter he states what seems to be the same argument thus: '... if the understanding calls an object in a certain relation merely phenomenal, it conceives at the same time an object in itself apart from this relation' (B 306). Again, in the *Prolegomena* he has a passage which makes the same point:

'In fact if we regard objects of sense (legitimately enough) as mere appearances, we thereby allow that they are based on a thing in itself although we do not know what qualities this thing has in itself, but only know its appearance, i.e. the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. The understanding therefore in accepting appearances, concedes also the existence of things in themselves, and so far we can say that the thought of such existences which are at the base of appearances (existences which are therefore merely thought) is not only allowable but also unavoidable' (§ 32).

It is possible to lay too much stress on these passages. It should be remembered that Kant writes them in a context where his main purpose is to insist that if we think of something which we call noumenal in contrast to phenomena it is not intelligible to us nor properly knowable. The argument from the antithesis of

appearance and reality is treated as natural but is not carefully considered nor deliberately endorsed. In fact the antithesis does not at all suit the opposition of phenomena and noumena, as it has to be conceived if we allow the existence of the latter. We shall see this if we examine for a moment the connotation of the term 'appearance'.

In considering the meaning and implications of 'appearance' we need not regard the usage which signifies no more than the presentation of something to consciousness. We can speak for example of the sun 'appearing' above the horizon, but the word has not here its specific connotation. The specific use of 'appearance' carries the implication of a contrast between the form in which an object is apprehended and its real nature. It is this contrast and the implications attached to it which we must examine. If we take the example of the stick in water, we notice that we say the stick appears bent or has the appearance of bentness when we know or believe that the stick itself is straight. From this contrast there arises the further implication that the appearance is in some way due to consciousness. Because the stick is really straight and the bentness therefore cannot be its bentness, it must be related to the mind's apprehension. But to think that appearance resides in the mind or is the work of the mind is not to think that everything which is the work of the mind is appearance. Appearance is not appearance in the specific sense of the word unless it is related to a contrast with what the object of consciousness really is. But besides containing this contrast the judgement that something appears in such-and-such a form implies both that the reality is in some degree akin to the appearance and that we are not wholly ignorant of the nature of the reality. When the statement is made that the stick appears bent it is natural to ask what it really is, and to anticipate some such answer as that it is a straight stick partly immersed in water and that the appearance is due to the way in which our sight is affected by the refraction of light by the water. Of course a detailed answer cannot always be given, but the point to be noticed is that when we think of the reality with which the appearance is contrasted we think that its properties are, at any rate in part, of the same order as the properties which the appearance presents. The supposition that we have some knowledge of the reality to which the appearance is correlated is an obvious implication of this analysis. All these points seem to be confirmed if we think of some of the cases to

which we do not apply the concept of appearance. A dream is thought to be the work of the mind, but we do not think it is an appearance in the proper sense of the word, because the question 'Of what is it the appearance?' is not applicable. Again we do not think that a certain sound is the appearance of one physical object infringing on another (e.g. a clapper and a bell) or even the appearance of a set of sound waves, because here there is not sufficient congruity between extended objects and sound to justify the thought that they stand in the relation of reality and appearance. If we think of sound as an appearance it is only when we think that as a result of some contrast which we perceive or imagine the sound seems louder or more shrill than it is.¹

If the implications of the notion of appearance have been rightly stated, it is easy to see that they are very different from the implications of Kant's term *phenomenon*. The two terms seem to approach most nearly if phenomena are explained to be objects of consciousness which receive their form from the mind, that on which the form is imposed being the manifold of sensation. The phenomenal object might then be said to be the appearance which sensation presents when it is apprehended by consciousness. But in the first place it is doubtful whether Kant thinks of the forms of time and space as a character imposed by the mind on sensations and not rather as a schema with which sensations are connected.² Secondly this line of thought would only lead to the result that the reality contrasted with appearance (i.e. 'the object in itself apart from a certain relation' contrasted with 'the object in this relation', as Kant says in B 306) was nothing other than the manifold of sense conceived apart from temporal and spatial form. But this is far from any meaning which Kant could possibly attach to the term *noumenon*. If, however, we abandon the attempt to trace a resemblance between the meaning of appearance and the meaning of *phenomenon* on these lines, there seems to be nothing in common in the two terms, or at least nothing relevant to the argument that if there are phenomena there must also be noumena. It is true that both appearances (in the specific sense of the word) and phenomena may be said to be

¹ Of course, it may well be that it is more difficult to conceive what a sound is in contrast to its appearance than to conceive what a shape is in contrast to its appearance. But the point we are noticing is that we only apply the notion of appearance when we suppose that we can conceive a reality which has some kinship with its appearance.

² Compare my *Treatise on Knowledge*, Chapter II, § 2, pp. 76-8.

what they are through the work of the mind. But, as we have seen, not everything which is the work of the mind is appearance in the sense which implies the existence of a correlative reality. It cannot be argued that simply because phenomena exist in consciousness and must be in whole or part the products of consciousness, there must therefore be some reality correlative to them. To say that phenomena are appearances and therefore, like all appearances, must have a correlative reality is to beg the question; for the question is whether phenomena must have a correlative reality and therefore can be called appearances in the ordinary sense of the term. In any case when Kant insists that the reality with which they are correlated (if there be any such reality) cannot be known, he makes a point which at once denies to them an important part of the connotation of the term appearance.

The line of thought which we have been pursuing suggests that if we hold that what we are conscious of is the content of our consciousness which indeed is due to the nature of our minds, it does not directly follow from such a view that there exists something other than our consciousness and its contents. But we must consider whether the notion that there is this other reality does not render our consciousness more intelligible. We may notice here that the question whether our consciousness is rendered more intelligible is capable of having two meanings. The intelligibility referred to may be the intelligibility of the contents of our consciousness or the intelligibility of the existence of our consciousness at all. The first interpretation means that the question is whether the supposition of another reality supplies a clue to the nature or system of the varying contents of our consciousness so that we thereby understand better the system of these contents. The second in effect means that the question is whether consciousness does not appear more intelligible if we suppose that there is something which causes it to exist and to be what it is. Neither question, it seems, need detain us very long. The first at once suggests the idea that the contents of our consciousness are more intelligible if we suppose that they are sensations which are caused by objects, the objects not being internal to consciousness. There is much to be said for this view, but it does not seem to coincide with nor to support the doctrine of a noumenal reality or realities. It is only in so far as we attribute to objects a determinate position in time and space that they seem to render intelligible the occurrence of our sensations. But to attribute to them this relation to time and space

is to deny that they are noumena. If there is any doctrine in the *Critique* which suggests that objects independent of consciousness are required to render the contents of our consciousness intelligible it is the doctrine of the transcendental object, not the doctrine of noumena.¹ But because when Kant thinks of the transcendental object he still regards time and space as being internal to our consciousness, the notion of the transcendental object tends immediately to become the notion, not of something independent of consciousness, but, of a concept, i.e. of a way in which consciousness inevitably thinks about its own contents; and when it is so transformed it is doubtful whether it any longer serves the purpose for which it was introduced. But however the matter stands as regards the function and value of the notion of the transcendental object, it is clear that it is only the notion of objects determined in time and space which can be thought to contribute to the intelligibility (in the sense under discussion) of our experience. The doctrine of noumena has no place in this line of argument.

The second way in which the notion of noumenal reality may be supposed to render our consciousness more intelligible is that it gives a reason why our consciousness and its contents should exist. From this point of view it must be regarded as the last step in a regressive demand for causes. Now it is dubious whether a simple regress of this sort can be said to add anything to the intelligibility of the facts for which a cause is sought. It is different from the demand for a cause, the existence of which would explain the like experiences of separate minds; and again it is different from an inference which argues from the orderliness of our experience to the existence of a mind which plans the order. We shall consider presently whether Kant has anything to say about the presuppositions of the similar experiences of separate minds. The argument from the orderliness of our experience to a reality outside it certainly does not play a large part in his thought. The reason is easy to see if we remember that his chief concern is to show that the order in our experience is derived from the activity of our own understanding, and is intelligible to us for that reason and no other.

It seems, then, that in neither of the directions which we have been considering can the notion of the noumenon be said to contribute to the intelligibility of our experience. But so far we have

¹ Reference may be made to the discussion of the doctrine of the transcendental object in Chapter III.

attended only to the question of what is needed to explain the experiences of a single consciousness. We believe, however, that there are other consciousnesses besides our own, that we can be sure of some measure of agreement between different individual consciousnesses, and that they can communicate with each other. The notion of the noumenon would have a part of great importance if it could explain these relations between one consciousness and another. We must ask whether the view that it has this part influences Kant, and whether the view can be defended.

We find Kant noticing the question of the community of experience of different minds more explicitly in the *Prolegomena* than in the *Critique*, and there are some *prima facie* grounds for thinking that he connects the doctrine of the existence of noumena with this question. In § 18 of the *Prolegomena* he contrasts judgements valid only for the subject who is judging with judgements valid for everyone alike. At the end of the paragraph he says: 'There would be no reason for the necessary agreement of other judgements with mine, were it not for the unity of the object to which they all refer and with which they accord, with the result that they are all in accordance with each other.' If we wish to know what he thinks about these objects to which the judgements of different minds refer, it seems that we should turn back to an earlier passage which occurs in § 13 (Remark II). Here he says, distinguishing his position from that of the idealist: 'On the contrary I say that there are things which exist as objects of our senses outside us; but of what they may be in themselves we know nothing. We only know their appearances, i.e. the presentations which they produce in us in so far as they affect our senses.' Since he describes the effects of the objects as phenomena it seems natural to conclude that he regards the objects themselves as noumena. The conclusion is strengthened when we come to the passage in § 32 (already quoted on p. 157 above) where he remarks that to regard objects of sense as appearances is to allow that they are based on a thing in itself. We notice that in the latter passage he describes the appearance of the unknown thing in itself as 'the way in which our senses are affected by it', thus reproducing the description of phenomena given in § 13. At the beginning of § 33 the term 'noumena' is given as a synonym for 'things-in-themselves'. Taking all these passages together we seem entitled to attribute to Kant the view that the part played by noumena in affecting different minds accounts for the accordance which the

judgements of different minds reveal. If his view is correct, we have here a reason for postulating the existence of noumena.

We shall see that this position is by no means consistently or unambiguously argued by Kant, but for the moment let us note one point in regard to it. It is important to observe how much it can purport to explain. If it is held that our experiences are internal to each of us, but that in some way we can become aware that we and others have similar experiences, we can say, starting from this basis, that it is reasonable to explain the similarity of our experiences by the supposition that they are due to a common cause. The supposition is philosophical and is made as a result of reflection on our consciousness and on the relation in which it stands to that of others. But this line of thought does not itself indicate the answer to the question how we are aware that the experience of others is similar to our own. Kant seems to realize that there is this question, although he does not refer to it very explicitly, and he suggests a way in which it may be answered. In § 20 of the *Prolegomena* where he is speaking of the judgement of experience (*Erfahrungsurteil*) he says that 'such judgements can be of two kinds; in the first I simply compare my perceptions and conjoin them in a consciousness of my state, in the second I conjoin them in consciousness generally.' Later in the same paragraph he says: 'The given intuition must be subsumed under a concept, which determines the form of the judging generally in relation to the intuition, unites the empirical consciousness of the intuition in consciousness generally, and so provides universal validity for the empirical judgements.' Again in § 22 he puts the matter thus: 'The sum of the matter is this: the task of the senses is to intuit, that of the understanding to think. But to think is to unite presentations in a consciousness. This uniting is either simply relative to the subject and so is accidental and subjective or it is absolute and is necessary or objective.'

It seems clear from these passages that what is thought to be universal and objective or to belong to consciousness generally is not the occurrence of the intuitions but the general form in which they are united by the understanding. The doctrine is thus in line with that of the *Critique* where there are frequent references to the conditions of 'possible experience in general' (e.g. A 111) or to 'the nature of our mind' which is evidently conceived to be a general or universal nature (e.g. A 125). Now the conviction that the laws of our thinking are also the laws of other minds which think, in whatever way we may be inclined to explain or

justify it, is not unreasonable. We may hold that when any consciousness contains what Kant would call a certain matter of intuition or manifold of sense, it is necessary that it should think about it in ways dictated by the nature of consciousness in general. Even so there are questions to be asked and reservations to be made. Are the laws of thought to which we are referring pure or abstract laws, or are they concrete and conjoined with the matter of experience? We may be convinced that the laws of logical thinking are the same for us as for others, and yet see no reason for believing that the particular necessary connexions which we attribute to our experience must be attributed by others to theirs. Yet the judgements of experience to which Kant refers seem to be pre-eminently concerned with these particular connexions. But setting aside this point we must notice that the doctrine which Kant is formulating fails to give all the explanation which is required of our knowledge regarding the experiences of other minds. Manifestly the conviction that the general laws of my thinking are the same as those which are embodied in the thinking of others is not the same thing as the conviction that a certain matter of intuition or manifold of sense is present in the consciousness of others. Yet we have the latter conviction no less than the former. Kant only tells us how we know that if another mind than our own contains in its consciousness certain given elements, sensuous in character, it must think about them as we do about the sensuous elements in our own consciousness. What he says in regard to the universal laws of the understanding offers no explanation of our conviction that others see what we see, touch what we touch, hear what we hear, and so forth.

The point which we are considering is very important in itself. It is also important if we are to try to follow the working of Kant's mind. There is an answer which might be given to our question and it seems to be an answer which Kant himself wishes to give although his mind is far from being clear in regard to the whole matter. The answer in its simplest form is that there are objects which are not internal to the consciousness of an individual mind, that the individual mind can know these objects, and further that in knowing them it can know that they are known to other minds also. What is involved in saying this is the doctrine that the individual mind not only knows, as Kant says, that the principles of its thinking are the principles of the thinking of other minds, but also knows another general fact in regard to consciousness.

The further general fact which it knows is that the objects which are not internal to the individual mind must be objects of consciousness for any individual mind in so far as the conditions of individual consciousness are the same. The position can be stated without much difficulty in realist terms. When I see an object, I not only know that there is something in a certain quarter of space which presents itself to me at a certain time as having such and such qualities, the qualities which it presents being dependent on my position in space and the conditions of my bodily organism, but I also know that if all the conditions were the same for another mind than my own, it would present itself also to that mind in the same way. Unless we have some such belief as this it is difficult to understand how it is that we are convinced that others see what we see.

Is it correct to say that Kant himself is disposed to take this view? Let us turn again to the passages already cited (see p. 162 above). It is not easy to read the passage in § 13, Remark II, in which Kant contends that 'there are things which exist as objects of our senses outside us' without at first thinking that he has some such view as that of Locke regarding bodies in space which affect our senses. That this interpretation is not legitimate is shown by the subsequent passage in which he explains that not only secondary qualities but all the qualities which are called primary, such as extension, place, and in general space with all that is dependent on it, are mere appearances. (He does not here include time determinations in appearances.) The doctrine is that the nature of the object is wholly unknown, but that we must not doubt its actuality. We know it, Kant says, by the presentations which its influence on our sensibility produces. In the subsequent development of his thought he is led by his own statement that the nature of the object is unknown to identify its real nature (the thing in itself) with what he calls a noumenon. But we must ask whether he is not identifying two concepts which ought by no means to be identified. Let us notice some of the points of difference between them and consider whether the one concept can have the same function as the other in a theory of knowledge. The function to which we must particularly attend is the capacity to explain our knowledge that the experiences of others resemble our own.

In the first place if we recall Kant's chapter on Phenomena and Noumena in the *Critique* it is at once noticeable how great a difference there is between his negative attitude in that context and the assurance with which he speaks of our knowledge of the existence of

things-in-themselves in the *Prolegomena*. The description of the concept of a noumenon in the *Critique* is that it is a limiting, problematic, or negative concept (cf. A 254 = B 310, A 259 = B 315, and B 309). If the noumenon is conceived in these terms, it plainly cannot also be thought of as something our knowledge of which enables us to know when others have experiences similar to our own and when not. Secondly, when Kant begins to describe the thing in itself in terms which certainly suggest at the outset that he thinks of it as something which exists independently of us at a certain time somewhere in space it is plausible that he should use the antithesis of appearance and reality and say that what we know is an object which appears to us to be such-and-such. But, as we have already seen, the antithesis of appearance and reality is not applicable when the concept of the noumenon is defined as it is in the *Critique*. Thirdly, the notion of referring our perceptions to an object, which plays a large part in the *Prolegomena* account, is inappropriate if the object is a noumenon strictly conceived. We do not refer our perceptions to something which is neither temporal nor spatial, nor do we refer them to a limit of our experience. The object to which we refer our perceptions is thought to be at a particular point in space, and to exist at a certain time, although we may not think that we know the real nature of that which is thus located in space and time. Further, the reference is to a particular object distinguishable in thought from other objects, but it is hard to see how one noumenon could be distinguished from another. Now if we reflect that the concept which Kant is using for the purpose of his argument carries (and needs to carry) these various implications which are subversive of the concept of the noumenon, we must conclude that he is using two different concepts and passing from one to the other without noticing the difference between them. The first concept in effect represents the group of ideas which Kant had in mind in the first-edition Deduction of the Categories when he explained his notion of the transcendental object. We saw in Chapter III that this notion was by no means interchangeable with that of the noumenon. It seems to be still less interchangeable when we consider it in the context of the present argument.

It may be said, however, that despite these considerations, the concept of the noumenon can be strictly used and yet have a part in explaining our knowledge of the experiences of other minds. Let us consider the following line of argument, which is indeed

suggested by some of Kant's remarks in the first-edition Deduction. The objection to employing the notions of appearance and reality or of reference to an object is that they suggest a direct knowledge of the object which is incompatible with the concept of the noumenon. But a different account of our knowledge of the object may be suggested. What we know directly is the order and system exhibited in a certain group of perceptions, and from this we know that there is something by reason of which our perceptions thus cohere. It is true that if we say no more than this we are not entitled to claim that we know the existence of noumenal objects. The reason for the coherence of our perceptions may equally well be supposed to be, as Berkeley thought, a plan formulated in the mind of God. Nor can we properly make use of the notion of appearance and reality. But for the purpose of explaining our knowledge of the experiences of other minds it may seem that these reservations do not matter. For if we are justified in holding that there exists something outside ourselves which explains the occurrence of our perceptions in a certain system, are we not justified in holding that it must also produce a like system of perceptions in other minds?

It is impossible, however, to be content with this suggestion. As we have already noticed (p. 164 above), it is one thing to say that there is a system governing the perceptions of all individual minds which is such that if certain perceptions occur in a mind other perceptions must occur also, and a different thing to say that when a perception occurs in the consciousness of one mind it must also occur in other minds. The conviction that there is something which is the reason for my perceptions does not imply a conviction that it must be causing like perceptions in others. Indeed we must observe that if the implication held we should be bound to believe that the perceptions of others were at all times the same as our own. But so far from believing this we have the opposite conviction that the perceptions of others must be for the most part in some degree different from our own, because, as we say, the conditions or circumstances are not precisely the same for them and for us.

The point regarding conditions or circumstances is introduced by Kant at the end of § 19 of the *Prolegomena* when he says: 'I demand therefore (sc. it is a demand of my understanding) that I myself at all times and also everyone else should necessarily conjoin the same perceptions in the same circumstances.' It is a point

which is worth a little reflection. What is meant when we refer to the necessity of having the same perceptions in the same circumstances? If we only know that there is something outside our consciousness and cannot know its nature or attribute to it any spatial or temporal determinations, the circumstances referred to cannot be the different relations in which we may stand to that which is external to us; for there are no means of differentiating our relations to it, nor even of conceiving a principle of differentiation. Are we then to say that when we refer to having the same perceptions in the same circumstances, no more is meant than having such-and-such perceptions in conjunction with such others? But if so we come back to the point that the necessity of there being certain conjunctions or sequences of particular perceptions occur is no evidence that the particular perceptions do occur in other minds. If we hold that we have knowledge that there are like perceptions in like circumstances and different perceptions in different circumstances, we must believe that we not only know the existence of something external to our perceptions but also have sufficient knowledge regarding what is external to us to distinguish the different relations in which we and others stand to it at various points of time. It is difficult to see how we can have this knowledge if the external is not both temporal and spatial.

The conclusion which seems to follow from these considerations is that Kant's concept of the noumenon is useless for the purpose of explaining how we can be supposed to know what is present in the consciousness of other minds than our own. So far as the principles of thinking are concerned, he himself does not rely on this concept, but is content to say that the individual mind is aware that the principles which govern its understanding are the principles of mind in general. When, on the other hand, we consider not the principles of the understanding but the occurrence in consciousness of particular perceptions, we see that the supposition of the noumenon, as he conceives it, can provide no answer to the question how we know that another mind than our own has this or that particular perception. If the realist position were otherwise tenable it would provide the answer which is required. An idealist doctrine must at least attempt to offer some substitute for the physical object in respect of the function which it fulfils of explaining the similarity of the perceptions of different minds and our knowledge of this similarity. Kant is partly conscious of this in much of what he says regarding the transcendental

object. But the first and most important step is to insist that both space and time are realities which are not internal to the perceptions of particular minds. It is this step which he takes in the second Refutation of Idealism. The antithesis of phenomena and noumena and the contention that all spatial and temporal determinations are appearances are only an impediment to the proper development of his idealism. On what lines it may be developed is another question.

There is, however, one other aspect of the concept of the noumenon which we should notice, in order that we may complete our survey of the matter. It concerns the relation of the concept to the doctrine of the Antinomies and to certain parts of what Kant says regarding the Ideas of Reason. Beginning with the Antinomies we must remind ourselves of what seems to be his line of thought. Kant is perplexed by the difficulty of applying the idea of infinity to what is actual (e.g. the parts of a line) or to what has been actual (the series of past events). On the other hand, he does not find a difficulty in the idea of there being no limit to the exercise of a capacity. If therefore we can substitute for the thought of the infinite components of the line the thought of the mind's capacity to continue without limit the process of division, and for the thought of the infinite series of past event, the thought that the mind can enlarge indefinitely its sense of the past, our understanding will be rid of a serious perplexity. The idea (recurrent throughout the *Critique*) which governs his argument is that our knowledge relates to the unfolding of our own experience, and that there is no limit or totality of what may be the content of this experience.

Now this idea in itself does not seem to demand the existence of noumena. Indeed Kant seems to allow that it does not, when he draws a distinction between what he calls the mathematical synthesis of phenomena to which the first two Antinomies refer and the dynamical synthesis which is the subject of the last two. In A 531 = B 559 he says:

'So it comes about that in the mathematical synthesis of the series of phenomena no condition which is not sensuous can enter, i.e. every condition must be a part of the series.... On the other hand the dynamical series of sensuous conditions allows of a heterogeneous condition which is not a part of the series, but being simply intelligible lies outside the series, with the result that satisfaction is afforded to the reason and

the unconditioned is placed at the head of phenomena, and yet the series of phenomena, as always conditioned, is not disturbed or broken, in defiance of the principles of the understanding.'

If the difficulty of the first two Antinomies is removed when we think only of our experience and understand its regressive nature, the concept of the noumenon can apparently be dispensed with. Yet Kant evidently believes that it is necessary to think of the noumenon even in this connexion.

The reason seems to be as follows. We noticed earlier (see p. 153 above) that he tends to say to himself that if we can be sure that we know the principles governing the content of our consciousness we need ask for no further knowledge. But the reflections of the first two Antinomies being largely concerned with the extension of our experience, on the one hand as regards objects in space and on the other hand as regards past events, force him to realize that we think of what we come to experience as already existing or as having existed. He is thus more ready to moderate, if he can, the subjectivity of his doctrine. In A 494 = B 522 he refers to 'the purely intelligible cause of phenomena' and says that we may call it 'the transcendental object'. 'To this transcendental object' (he continues) 'we may ascribe all the extent and cohesion of our possible perceptions, and we may say that it is given in itself before all experience. . . . Thus we can say that actual things in past time are given in the transcendental object of experience.'

We notice that, as happens so often when Kant uses the term 'transcendental object', his expressions do not suit the strict concept of the noumenon, although the two concepts are evidently identified in this context. It should not be said of the noumenon that it is 'given' or that it is an 'object of experience'. As he goes on, he tries to redress the balance, although it seems to be at the expense of consistency. At the end of A 495 = B 423 he writes:

'If then I present to myself all existing objects of the senses together in all time and all space, I do not place these objects in time and space, prior to experience. This presentation is nothing but the thought of a possible experience in its absolute completeness. In experience alone are these objects, which are nothing but presentations, given. To say that they exist before my experience means only that they are to be found in the portion of experience to which I am always bound to go forward when I start from my perceptions. The cause of the empirical conditions of this progression—consequently what determines the member in the regress which I shall reach or how far I must go—is trans-

cedential and therefore entirely unknown to me. But with this we have nothing to do. Our concern is with the law of progression in experience, in which objects, that is phenomena, are given to me.'

When Kant says that the transcendental object is given or that it is an object of experience he is suggesting that our experience is not simply consciousness of our own presentations. This suggestion accords with his statements elsewhere that it is the object of which we are conscious, although we can only claim to know it as it appears to us and not as it is in itself. If such a position can be maintained he seems to avoid the charge of subjectivity and yet can solve in his own way the puzzles connected with the temporal and spatial character of our experience by detaching the real object from time and space. But his separation of transcendental reality from time and space destroys the suggestion of knowability which his earlier expressions conveyed, and he is bound to adopt the stricter concept of the unknown noumenon. The disadvantages of this stricter concept we have already seen and may briefly recall. No advantage can legitimately be taken of the antithesis of appearance and reality; the ground seems to be cut away as regards the possibility of knowing the experiences of other minds; and while for these reasons the alleged objectivity introduced into Kant's system is valueless, the postulate of a reality external to consciousness introduces a special difficulty. This last difficulty is how to reconcile the function, which Kant attributes to our minds, of constituting the nature of the object with the dictation exerted on our experience by an unknown reality which is independent of them. What these criticisms again suggest is that in the first place we must allow that the objects which are independent of individual minds are temporal and spatial and that secondly they must still be conceived to belong to consciousness, though not to that consciousness which we call individual. On the second supposition it seems that something might be retained of what Kant says in regard to the nature of the infinity which appertains to objects in time and space.

It is worth while to give a little more consideration to the last point. It may well be, as Kant thinks, that no totality or completeness can be attributed to the temporal and the spatial, that we do not need to make the attribution if we regard the temporal and the spatial as the product of the infinite capacity of mind, and that we must look elsewhere if we wish to obtain satisfaction for the idea that reality is in some sense a totality or complete. But

what he fails to consider (at any rate explicitly and consistently) is that it may not be necessary, as he supposes, to look to something external to consciousness for the satisfaction which reason requires. It should be noticed that to assert that the temporal and spatial are the content of consciousness implies the conception of another reality than that of time and space. For the assertion makes it necessary to hold that consciousness is a reality and that it is not temporal or spatial, since if it were so, time and space could not be said to exist only as its content. That it is the nature of consciousness to have a kind of unity and therefore of completeness which is altogether different from the unity of the temporal or spatial is an idea which is often present to Kant's mind. It is found in much of what he says regarding the synthetic unity of apperception, and particularly in his references to what he calls its 'qualitative' unity (cf. B 131). Following this line of thought we can hold that when consciousness exists and has as its internal content the temporal and spatial, there exist both the unity or totality which reason demands and the characteristics of time and space which do not themselves exhibit this unity. But further we must say that when we think thus we are not thinking of two different kinds of reality or of any reality apart from the consciousness which we are considering. The one reality is consciousness with such-and-such a content. Consciousness without its content is not a reality nor is the content without the consciousness. The conception that reality is a unity the nature of which is not expressed in the characteristics of the temporal and spatial, and the conception that no limit can be put to the temporal and spatial, are compatible and conjoined, but not by reference to two kinds of reality, a phenomenal reality which is internal to consciousness and a noumenal reality which is outside it.

Let us now ask how these considerations bear on the position which Kant takes in the Antinomies. It was said above that he does not have them explicitly or consistently in mind. Nevertheless his handling of the first two Antinomies suggests that his thought turned to some extent in this direction. It is noticeable that in his discussion he does not say anything in support or ultimate justification of the thesis of either Antinomy. He is content simply to endorse the antithesis, when it is made clear that it refers only to what we must think about the progressive nature of our experience. On the other hand, in the two remaining Antinomies he is concerned to show that if they are properly interpreted

justice can be done to both the thesis and the antithesis of either Antinomy (cf. A 531 = B 559). No doubt he takes this view deliberately, connecting the distinction with the fact that when we are concerned with causation we can admit the combination of heterogeneous elements, because it is the nature of cause and effect that they should be heterogeneous. Nevertheless it is hard to believe that he could be content with the view that in our apprehension of the world as temporal and spatial, there is no significance in the mind's persistent thought of totality. An explanation of his attitude may be found if we suppose that he realized (thought not clearly or explicitly) that when the temporal and spatial are brought within consciousness, the unity of consciousness is what we should think of as replacing the idea of the totality of its temporal and spatial content. (It may perhaps be suspected that he is feeling his way to this point in the curious passage in A 500 = B 528, where he refers to a logical requirement which has nothing to do with time. The passage, however, is unsatisfactory, as it stands, and cannot be stressed.) Why Kant is unable to follow this line of thought steadily is of course plain. It is because in his reflection on the nature of time and space, he thinks only of the individual consciousness, and is thereby led into a subjective doctrine for which he has to find some compensation. He finds it in the concept of the noumenon as a reality which is independent of our consciousness and incapable of being known by it. When he has reached this point, it seems to him that the noumenon must be the justification for our ideas of totality and completeness which are not applicable to the world of time and space. He does not see how to use the concept in connexion with the infinity of time and space, but he thinks it can be used in connexion with the problems raised by the idea of causality with which the last two Antinomies are concerned. We must now consider whether in this sphere the noumenon really provides the solution which Kant seeks.

Certain aspects of the Third Antinomy were discussed in an earlier chapter (see p. 136 above), but in the present context there are some other points which we should notice. Kant's handling of the thesis is very significant. His argument is that unless there is a cause which is not itself determined, there can be no completeness in the series of causes and effects, and that if it is necessary to accept the concept of an undetermined cause it is also allowable to think that there are undetermined causes of diverse series of

phenomena or in other words a faculty of free action. The argument, we observe, offers no reason why we need to think of this multiplication of spontaneity, and if what prompts the thought is a transcendental idea it is certainly not the idea of totality or completeness with which all the other Antinomies are concerned. Kant himself tells us at the beginning of the Observation on the thesis that the transcendental idea of freedom is far from constituting the whole content of the psychological concept of freedom, and he goes on immediately to say that the psychological concept of freedom is in large part empirical (*grossenteils empirisch* —A 448 = B 476). The implication is that if the question is asked why we need to think of psychological freedom we must answer that we are conscious of something in the nature of the mind and its relation to action which is different from the operation of physical causes. (In referring to the nature of the mind we may include, if we will, besides our purposes and desires our sense of obligation which Kant elsewhere connects with the idea of freedom.) Such an answer would agree with the line of thought which we traced in our earlier discussion of Kant's doctrine of freedom. But if it is the right answer, it seems clear that the concept of freedom finds its justification in our knowledge of our own nature and not in any postulate of an unknowable noumenon. The Third Antinomy seems to offer no more support than the first two for the concept of the noumenon.

There are, however, two points which we should perhaps notice in connexion with Kant's concept of the noumenal self. In the first place this concept is at any rate not a concept of a reality which is altogether beyond the reach of our consciousness, and in this respect is free from some of the objections which apply to the concept of the noumenal object. Secondly, if in referring to the noumenal self Kant wishes to bring out the point that mind cannot be regarded as wholly determined in time, there is much to be said for this contention. His account of the phenomenal self is based on his recognition that our minds are temporal in respect that their operations are manifestly determined in time, and it is right that he should also recognize the other side of the matter, namely there are aspects in which they must be conceived as being outside time or containing it. It is not to this doctrine of the double nature of the mind that objection need be taken, but to the view involved in the concept of the noumenon that its essential nature is unknown and unknowable.

When we come to the Fourth Antinomy we find that it takes up the point which, as we have just seen, was the beginning of the thesis of the Third, and we are occupied once more with the transcendental idea of totality or completeness. As Kant says in the Observation on the thesis, 'the unconditioned is regarded as the necessary condition of the absolute totality of the series' (A 456 = B 484). Now it may well seem at first sight that the considerations bearing on the problem of the totality of the series of conditions are the same as those which bear on that of the totality of the temporal series. This view seems to be strengthened when we notice that the argument of the First Antinomy, in so far as it deals with the problem of a beginning of temporal events, relies on the application of the concept of causality. In the antithesis Kant says that 'in an empty time no beginning of a thing is possible, since no part of such a time contains a distinctive condition of being in preference to that of not-being, whether it is supposed that the thing is self-originated or arises through another cause' (A 427 — B 455). The implication is that the thesis insists on retaining the idea of self-origination despite its difficulties.

But there is a difference between the First and the Fourth Antinomy which Kant points out. When the problem is that of deciding whether the series of events in time is complete or not, we cannot speak of a non-temporal existent being the beginning of the temporal series. But when we are thinking about causation, we can think of a non-temporal existent being the cause of the temporal series and of the nexus which is displayed in its parts. Because cause and effect can be heterogeneous, we can think of there being a cause or reason why the causal series should exist.

The distinction can be allowed, but we may doubt whether it makes the solution which Kant offers of the Fourth Antinomy any more acceptable. Kant seems to think that the idea of a noumenal cause of the causal series justifies the idea of a beginning of the series and so of its totality or completeness. But it is doubtful whether he is right in so thinking. To say that there may be a reason why there should be an infinite series of conditions does not seem in itself to lessen the difficulties of conceiving an infinite series or to meet the demand of reason for a beginning which will make the thought of totality possible. A noumenal cause, as Kant's own argument constantly indicates, cannot in the proper sense be the beginning of the series, because it is non-temporal. The difficulty therefore of a series which has no beginning remains.

Further there is a particular difficulty in the way in which Kant seems to conceive the relation between the non-temporal noumenon and phenomena. We must remember that when we use the term 'phenomena', there are three different connotations which we may be giving to it. We may think of phenomena as objects of consciousness without specially regarding the point that there is a consciousness to which they are internal; in this sense they are almost equivalent to temporal and spatial objects. We may also think of them as presentations or states of consciousness. Lastly we may think of them as contents of consciousness, keeping clearly in mind the distinction between the consciousness and its content. Kant's expressions in the Fourth Antinomy suggest sometimes the first, sometimes the second connotation. We do not find him saying what we should expect him to say if he kept the third meaning in mind, namely that the noumenon is the reason why consciousnesses exist which have the temporal and spatial as their content. It is because he does not sufficiently regard the consciousness which contains the temporal and spatial that he does not notice the function which may be attributed to consciousness of providing the unity for which he seeks. If he had been consistent in his thought throughout the Antinomies, he would have recognized that the same answer was in principle available as that which he used to solve the first two Antinomies, namely the answer that we do not need to think of an infinite series of conditions but of the mind's capacity to think of more and more conditions. If this is correct the same line of reflection which applied to the earlier Antinomies applies also to the Fourth. What the problem demands is not the supposition of a reality external to consciousness, but the recognition that the whole reality may be constituted by the unity of consciousness and the infinite content which it has the capacity of producing. If, however, this is the answer which properly belongs to Kant's line of thought, it is open to the criticism which applied to the similar solution of the problems of the First and Second Antinomies. The criticism is that whether or not such an answer will hold of some other kind of consciousness than individual consciousness, at least it seems clear that it does not hold of the individual consciousness by itself.

In general, then, what we may say about the Antinomies and their relation to the concept of the noumenon is this. It seems that Kant is concerned with the idea of the unity or totality or completeness of the universe which it is hard to reconcile with our

conceptions regarding the temporal and the spatial. His first notion, which has nothing to do with the concept of the noumenon, is that the difficulty is removed if we think of the temporal and the spatial as the content of our consciousness, the capacity of which to have such a content successively or in progression is subject to no limit. This is a view which would cover the first two Antinomies and the last. It implies that our consciousness being the source of time and space is itself non-temporal, besides being non-spatial. It would be legitimate for him to develop such a line of thought in the following way, though he does not do so. He might say that although we must regard our consciousness as embracing or containing time, nevertheless we cannot but think of its activity as occurring and enduring in the time order. For this reason we have not a proper insight into the real nature of our consciousness, and there is some justification for saying that its real nature is noumenal. If the word noumenal is thus used, it would imply that the existent it characterized was imperfectly apprehended and neither temporal nor spatial, but it would not imply that it was something external to us or something about the existence of which we could have any doubt. But instead of using this idea of the real nature of our consciousness to explain and justify the transcendental idea of totality, he does not use it at all in that context but in another which has nothing to do with the problem of totality. It appears only in the Third Antinomy where he discusses the idea of individual freedom. What happens in the first two Antinomies is that the problem of the totality of the temporal and the spatial is carried no further when Kant has stated that they are the content of expanding consciousness. The concept of an unknowable noumenal existent external to consciousness is introduced not to justify the idea of totality but to answer the charge of subjectivity which can be brought against the statement that time and space are the content of the individual consciousness. In the Fourth Antinomy an attempt is made to apply this concept to the problem in hand (the problem of totality), but it does not seem to be successful. Further we notice at this point Kant finds himself constrained to say that the concept of an unconditioned noumenon is 'an arbitrary supposition' (A 562 = B 590). If this fairly represents his attitude to the concept of the noumenon, it is difficult to see how it can be regarded as an essential factor in his theory of our knowledge.

On a review therefore of the whole account it seems right to say

that the section on the Antinomies does nothing to justify the concept of the noumenon in the strict sense. On the other hand, if we ask whether any of Kant's ideas in this section are useful, it seems that there is something to be said for the view that it is only in consciousness that the unity which he seeks can be found.

But time and space cannot be comprehended in the unity of the individual consciousness, because such a doctrine involves a degree of subjectivity which it is impossible to accept. We are led therefore to the concept of some other consciousness which can comprehend time and space, a consciousness which is genuinely non-temporal.

But various difficulties then arise. If this consciousness is altogether external to the individual consciousness it seems as if the concept of the noumenon as an external and non-temporal and non-spatial reality is being reintroduced. Further, if time and space, being the contents of this consciousness, are also external to the individual consciousness, it becomes necessary to abandon the view, for which there are strong arguments, that our minds understand the natures of time and space not through experience but because they are connected with the principles of our own consciousness. Yet again if time is external to the individual mind, it seems that we must be content to say that our consciousness is not merely in appearance but also in reality temporal, and to say this does not seem to do justice to the aspect of non-temporality which our consciousness presents. Lastly, it must be remembered that the starting-point of the argument has been the supposition that the competing claims of the ideas of completeness and infinity may be reconciled if in place of the thought of an actual temporal and spatial infinite we substitute that of the mind's infinite capacity of temporal and spatial experience. But we may well ask whether it is possible to retain the notion of capacity or potentiality except in relation to time, and whether therefore the notion of potential experience can be combined with that of a non-temporal consciousness. The first three difficulties point in the direction of the doctrine, for which we have elsewhere seen some grounds, that the individual consciousness is dual in its nature and is not wholly individual. As regards the last difficulty it is doubtful whether we can hope for any solution. It is part of the larger difficulty that while it is hard to avoid the thought of a non-temporal reality, it is equally hard not to think that what is real must be active; and yet our idea of activity is bound up with that

of time. Kant's own doctrine that time is phenomenal does not escape the difficulty because the concept of the phenomenal itself involves the thought of a non-phenomenal consciousness without which there could be no phenomena.

In conclusion it is interesting to observe the connexion of the doctrines of Kant which we have been discussing with his attitude towards the arguments for the existence of God. His argument regarding the ontological proof seems to be generally taken by those who approve or criticize it to be independent of his other doctrines. But its close connexion with the thought of the Antinomies section is not difficult to see. In the account of the system of Cosmological Ideas where the Antinomies are discussed and in the account of the Ideal of Pure Reason in the following chapter it seems that Kant is considering three aspects of the problem of totality or completeness. He considers first the totality of what is temporal or spatial with reference only to its temporal and spatial nature. This is the subject of the first two Antinomies. Secondly he considers, in the Fourth Antinomy, the totality of the conditions of things, or the totality of existents in their aspect of being at once causes and effects. Thirdly, he considers the totality of every kind of determination which existents can have (*unter dem Grundsatz der durchgängigen Bestimmung*, as he says in A 571 = B 599) in contrast to their particular temporal or spatial and causal determinations. (The Antinomy regarding individual or psychological freedom, as we have seen, is not properly in place.) The main points which he seems to have in mind under the third head are that we can only conceive the full determination of anything in relation to the rest of our experience, that we conceive a thing, as it really is, to be determined in relation to the totality of the universe, that we cannot attach totality to our experience, and that the ideal totality must possess a different kind of reality from that of any limited existent, because it is not itself determined in relation to anything else (cf. A 571 = B 599—A 583 = B 611).

Kant's comment in this opening discussion on the conclusion that the ideal totality exists is twofold. The step from the conception of reason to an objective existence is one for which there is no authority, and further it is not necessary for the complete determination of things, since a sensuous object is completely determined when it is compared with all the predicates of phenomena (A 580-1 = B 608-9). Taking the second point first, it is

worth while to notice that his view here is in contrast to that which he adopted in the Fourth Antinomy. In the Antinomy it seemed to be a point against him that he regarded the existence of a noumenal cause as something which made the regress of causation more intelligible. In what seems the parallel case of the concept of a completely determined or self-determined existent he finds the concept unnecessary for the determination of phenomena. It is, however, the first point which is more important for our purpose. Kant discusses it of course more fully in his next chapter, but the basis of his position seems to be already indicated in a passage at the end of the Antinomies. In A 563 = B 591 he writes:

'The sensuous world contains nothing but phenomena; but these are mere presentations, and since things-in-themselves are not objects to us, we cannot wonder that we are never justified in making a leap from some member of the empirical series, whatever it may be, beyond the world of sense, as if we were dealing with things-in-themselves which existed apart from their transcendental ground and allowed us to search for the causes of their being somewhere outside them. This would be legitimate with contingent *things* but not with mere *presentations* of things, the contingency of which is itself a mere phenomenon and can lead to no other regress than that which determines phenomena, that is, the empirical regress.'

The whole emphasis here is on the impossibility of passing from that which is phenomenal or internal to our consciousness to that which is not, and Kant does not seem to set bounds to what we might know if we could start from consciousness of something which was real in a sense in which the phenomenal is not. It is because he thinks we can be conscious of nothing but the phenomenal that he refers to the idea of an unconditional noumenon as 'an arbitrary supposition', and it is ultimately on the same ground that he conducts his argument against the ontological proof. It needs therefore to be considered how much of his argument remains if the view is rejected that all that we can be conscious of is our own presentations. Kant's criticism of the ontological proof is accepted by many who hold very different views from his, but it should not be ignored that his criticism is logically based on his own particular doctrines.

VI

UNIVERSALS AND THE FORM OF INTUITION IN MATHEMATICS

IN this chapter (which is in the main a paper read to the Jowett Society at Oxford) there is a less direct approach to the consideration of Kant's doctrines than in those which have preceded it. Since it leads, however, to some reflections on matters belonging to his philosophy which have not been considered, its inclusion may not be inappropriate.

The chapter falls into three sections. The first relates to some difficulties which seem to arise when we consider the account, which is attributed to Plato, of the objects of mathematical study (*τὰ μαθηματικά*). Its purpose is not to determine whether the account is rightly attributed to Plato (a question of scholarship) but what it involves and whether it is tenable. The second section considers whether the conclusions reached in the first about the logical status of *τὰ μαθηματικά* justify or not the remarks made by Kant in the Schematism of the Categories about subsumption under a concept, and what else can be learnt about mathematical objects by reflecting on the questions which he raises. The third section contains some brief remarks on the relation of logical and metaphysical status both in its bearing on the points previously considered and in a wider connexion.

§ 1

According to Plato (or according to the view attributed to him) the mathematician's study is not at the highest level. At the highest level (science or *ἐπιστήμη*) the thinker studies 'forms' (*εἶδη*). A form is a character or nature which, itself one, is compatible with being found in many particulars, though in general no particulars can exemplify it perfectly. Now there are forms such as twoness or circularity which are mathematical but they are not what the mathematician studies. The reason for this is that he is concerned with the construction of numbers or the relations of figures, but twoness plainly cannot be added to threeness to produce fiveness nor does circularity intersect circularity. Moreover, if it were so there would be involved a multiplicity of one form which would contradict its singleness. Two twonesses would be required to enter into the construction of fourness, two

circularities in order that there might be intersection. From this it seems that it is particulars not forms with which the mathematician is concerned. But the particulars are not just any particulars, apparently having mathematical properties, which present themselves to the senses. Plato thinks that no sensible particular has that determination or precision which would allow it to be an object of exact mathematical study. Accordingly we must say that the objects of mathematical study are particulars of a certain sort, namely determinate, precise, or perfect particulars which are not sensible. The mathematician, however, in order to apprehend them uses the ordinary imperfect particulars of sense, though he realizes that they are not what his propositions are about. The goal of this thinking is called by Plato *διάνοια* which we usually translate by the word understanding.

It seems open to doubt whether this doctrine is valid or free from ambiguity, but there are at any rate some who do not question it. Thus Cook Wilson's article in the *Classical Review*, 1904, on the *ἀσύμβλητοι ἀριθμοί* implies that the doctrine is true and that Aristotle failed to grasp its significance. H. W. B. Joseph, again, in his comments on what Kant says in the Schematism of the Categories (to which we shall come later), after remarking that 'the confusion between the objects of mathematical study and universals is ancient and common', says: 'Yet it was cleared up by Plato who distinguished τὰ μαθηματικά, the objects of mathematical study, alike from sensibles and from forms (εἶδη) or universals.'¹

But despite the authority, which is great, of these two philosophers, it is difficult to be satisfied about the matter. Neither the notion of the perfect particulars nor that of the imperfect seems to be tenable. Let us begin by considering the former and asking what they are and in what sort of way they exist if they exist at all. If they are supposed not to be sensible things, because it is held that all sensibles must be mathematically imperfect, is the mind apprehending anything real or existent when it is conscious of them? It can hardly be said that they have the sort of existence or subsistence which (rightly or wrongly) is attributed to pure universals which instances only imperfectly exemplify. For the point of the doctrine is that they are not universals, though it may be implied that they are perfect instances of universals. In Joseph's account there is a surprising suggestion. It seems to be

¹ *Essays in Ancient and Modern Philosophy*, p. 271.

the implication of what he says in one passage that these perfect particulars are images in the mathematician's own mind. If this is the suggestion it seems hard to believe that it can be seriously entertained. If we doubt the perfection of, e.g., any circles which we see, we must surely doubt no less the perfection of any images of sensible circles which our imagination forms. Further, we must notice that this handing over of mathematical objects to our imagination seems at least not to minimize (if it does not increase) any difficulty which we may feel about regarding them as real.

Let us turn now to the imperfect particulars of sense. Here again it is perhaps easiest to keep to geometrical examples. Ought we to think that any sensible figure is geometrically imperfect? Let us suppose that some triangle which we see is not a perfect triangle, because one of its sides is not perfectly straight, but bent. This side is thus composed of two straight lines meeting at an angle. In that case the figure is not a perfect triangle but is a perfect rectilinear figure having four sides. This is a simple instance, but we may perhaps generalize from it and suggest that there is no such a thing as an imperfect figure—an imperfect triangle or any other figure. If a figure is not a given figure, it is not that figure ~~imperfectly~~ but some other figure. And whatever figure it is, it is that figure perfectly.

It may be indeed that Plato would have some reply to this, but it would be on lines which are not apparently followed by Cook Wilson and Joseph. His reply might be that we must not press the notion of an imperfect figure, but instead we must think that sensibles have not any determinate figure. We should observe that this would be connected with his difficult doctrine that sensibles are neither non-existent nor yet fully existent.

We need not, however, consider this suggestion now, because it seems preferable to approach the subject from a somewhat different angle. The doctrine on which we have been reflecting regards its problem in the following way. It has enumerated certain entities, namely universals, perfect particulars which are not sensibles and imperfect particulars which are sensibles, and it asks which of these entities are present to the mind of the mathematician. The suggestion may be hazarded that those who put their problem to themselves in this way are not very much disposed to study the mind of the mathematician or even the meaning of the statements in which his thought is expressed, but prefer to speculate about the status of certain objects which he is supposed to contemplate

without regarding what he thinks about them. It is, however, perhaps worth while to try a different approach and reflect rather more on the way in which the mathematician seems to think. As an example of what is meant (though it is not proposed to begin with it) we might consider the obvious point that the propositions in which he is interested are universal propositions and that he would not like to be told that his interest was in the particular.

We can safely begin by supposing that the geometer (whom we may take primarily) is first aware of sensible shapes having spatial relations to each other. The question now to be asked is what form his thought takes when he begins to think about them. At the outset he recognizes that what he thinks about one of them he can think about all or some of the others, each is a shape and some are, e.g., circles. In so thinking he is conscious of a sensible character which is the same in different particulars. But so far the character apprehended is scarcely an intelligible character, although thought is needed in order that the sameness in many particulars may be apprehended. The character of being round or square is in this respect not far removed from the character of being red or green, and the level of thought is probably that which Croce has in mind when he speaks of pseudo-concepts. It is with the analysis of the elements to be found in the character of particulars that thought becomes fully operative, and its measure is greatest when the analysis of the elements involves the formulation of certain necessary relations between them. Doubtless, the operation of thought in this sense has begun in any apprehension of shape, but it becomes explicit in geometrical thinking. Now the analysis referred to is clearly connected with definition; or in other words with making clear what is meant by a circle or a square or what elements, in what relation, must be found in the character of anything which is thought of as a circle or a square. It is in virtue of this process of thinking and only in virtue of it that the geometer can come to think about a figure being really circular or really square and can refer to perfect circles or perfect squares. The result which he attains seems to be explicable if we refer to the progress of his thinking, and we can readily dismiss the notion that it has anything to do with the formation of images which in some unexplained way are superior to sensibles.

There are now certain corollaries which can be drawn from this account. The first is that plainly we cannot say that the mathematician is not concerned with universals. For it is through reflection

on the essential elements (and the relations between them) which he finds in the character of certain particulars that he is able to think about a class of particulars and to entertain propositions about circles or triangles or about *a* circle or *a* triangle. We ought not to doubt that he is genuinely concerned with the *one* no less than with the *many*; for what he thinks about one particular is what he thinks about others also. The theorem of Pythagoras about right-angled triangles is one theorem applicable to all such triangles. It is not a theorem that similar but separate theorems are applicable to each right-angled triangle.

The matter, however, perhaps needs a little more elucidation. Having said so much we can allow that the thought of the geometer is not properly described if it is said to be thought about universals as such. He does not think that circularity in general is intersected by circularity in general or that twoness is added to twoness in the four sides of a square. What then has become of the universal when the geometer theorizes about intersecting circles? The answer is not, perhaps, difficult to find. There is now a fresh class of particulars united by a single or common character, the nature of which it is once more the business of the geometer to analyse. The class is that of the particular spatial situations which have the common character of consisting of intersecting circles, and it is this common character which the geometer studies. But what we have to notice is that this new character is not generated from the relation of universals as such but from the relation of particulars exemplifying universals. Fiveness is not generated by the relation of twoness to threeness but by the relation of twos to threes, which in generating five generate also fiveness. It may be said in passing that this seems to be what Aristotle has in mind in a passage criticized by Cook Wilson. Aristotle says that whatever we say about the relation of the ideal numbers (twoness, threeness, &c.) to each other we must recognize that 'each ideal number consists of units which are added together within the number itself'. If he means that 'twoness' is the universal nature of two combined units, he seems to be right. Cook Wilson's comment is that the considerations which make it impossible to add twoness to twoness, make it also impossible that 'any universal of number should consist of units added together, for that would involve that there should be more than one universal "oneness"'. Notice, however, that Aristotle does not say that each ideal number consists of unities or onenesses added together, but of *units* added together.

This is the point which Cook Wilson ignores, and (as has been said) it seems to be a point about which Aristotle is right.

So much for the mathematician's concern with universals and its relation to his concern with particulars. The next corollary which may be noticed is this: What we should now ask is whether there is any essential difference, in this matter of universals and particulars, between the mathematician's thinking and any other rational reflection. It is allowed that his theorems are not expressed in propositions about universals as such, whether we refer to the universalas, e.g., *the circle*, or circle in general, or circularity; instead, they are about circles, or *a* circle, or it may be *this circle*. But a like remark seems to be applicable to our thought of *the man*, or man in general, or manness. Russell has a sentence in the *Principles of Mathematics*¹ to the effect that we should be surprised if we saw an announcement that there died at Upper Tooting on such and such a date 'Man—the eldest son of Sin and Death'. For man in general does not die. Aristotle is thinking on the same lines when he says in *A* of the *Metaphysics*, that the only thing which could be said to be the cause of the being of man in general is man in general. But this is not anyone. What we think is that *Peleus* is the cause of the being of *Achilles*. This is not to say that universals do not enter into all our thinking, but we may at least suspect that the class of tenable propositions which can properly be made about universals and universals only is strictly limited. However it is not necessary to pursue this question farther, since what has already been said is enough to suggest that it is difficult to draw a line between mathematical thinking and other thinking on the score of a difference in its concern with universals and particulars.

There is one more corollary on which we may touch. If we dislike the contention that any spatial object is geometrically imperfect (for the reasons given above) we can, if we wish, modify part of Plato's doctrine as follows. Instead of saying that the geometer's diagram is geometrically imperfect, we can say that the geometer aids his reflection by taking the diagram to be something which perhaps it is not. He says, 'I will suppose this diagram fulfils the definition of a circle, though probably it is not quite circular.' He can say this, without denying that the diagram, even if it is not a circle, is some other figure which is itself entirely amenable to the principles of geometrical thinking.

¹ Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics*, p. 53.

§ 2

We have now concluded the first part of what we set out to consider. In this second section we will turn to what Kant says in the Schematism of the Categories' about subsumption under a concept, for which purpose he was a geometrical example. It is a passage which will perhaps lead us to one or two further ideas about the nature of mathematical thinking.

Kant is here concerned with what he calls 'subsumption' and its conditions, and the example which he takes is that of subsuming the concept of a plate under the geometrical concept of a circle. He is concerned to maintain that in order that subsumption may be possible, what is subsumed must be homogeneous with that under which it is subsumed. In the particular case of which he is thinking the roundness which we think of in plates must be intuited in the concept of the circle. Joseph, in criticizing the passage, supposes Kant's meaning to be that plates are subsumed under the universal 'circularity' and he denies that a round plate can be said to resemble circularity or to be in any sense homogeneous with it. Kant ought to have recognized, he thinks, that the mathematician is concerned not with circularity but with perfect circles, and that it is only with a perfect circle (or another imperfect circle) that a plate can be homogeneous.

Now if we cannot exclude all reference to universals in describing the study of the mathematician, Kant's account may be preferable to Joseph's, and it seems indeed that Joseph misses an important point which Kant is trying to make.² If we take the geometrical concept of a circle to be that which we have maintained it is, namely, the set of intelligible characteristics which the geometer attributes to anything which is round, we can give the following meaning to what Kant says. Let us suppose it possible to formulate the intelligible characteristics of circles without any reference to roundness (say in an arithmetical or algebraical formula). In that case it would not be possible through seeing that plates were round to know that they possessed these intelligible characteristics. But in fact if we are acquainted with the ideas of geometers about the properties of circles we know that plates have those properties just because we recognize that they are round. Kant's point could

¹ A 137 = B 176.

² Joseph perhaps misses Kant's point because he follows Vaihinger in an amendment of the text which transposes Kant's words and obscures their sense.

also be put in another way. If the arithmetical or algebraical formula which expressed the nature of a circle could be separated from its roundness and was then regarded as being the essence of a circle, anything which complied with the formula would be a circle. Now it does not seem to be inconceivable that, e.g., a system of notes might have the same formula as a spatial figure. But for all that we should be reluctant to say that there was no difference between a system of notes and a figure in space. This is of course an argument for Kant's view that space is intuited.

As we have seen, Kant's remarks about subsumption have led him to the problem of the relation between the sensible and the intelligible character of the objects about which the geometer thinks. On this topic some brief remarks may be made. Their purpose is to suggest that whereas we did not find any difference between mathematical and other thinking in the matter of its relation to universals and particulars, we may perhaps find some differences when we reflect on the topic of the sensible and intelligible elements in consciousness and of their relation.

Let us begin by considering geometrical thought from this point of view. Here it seems not unreasonable to say that what is apprehended sensibly or by sensuous imagination is also that which is understood. The intelligible is the intelligible nature of the sensible, not another character conjoined or concurrent with its sensible character, as red might be conjoined with a square shape in an object. But before we can accept his statement two qualifying remarks must be made, and we must notice also a formidable difficulty. It will be convenient, however, to reserve the difficulty until we have considered not only the thought of the geometer but also the thought of the scientist. The reason for this will be apparent later.

The two qualifying remarks are these. In the first place it clearly is not the whole of a sensible object which becomes thus intelligible. Its various sensibles have no part in the geometer's contemplation, and in the end perhaps we must hold that it is only the space they qualify on which he is reflecting. On these lines we can say that the something which he finds intelligible is allied to the sensible—or, as Kant would say, is intuited—and because space and all its parts are particular it fulfils the requirement for which we contended earlier, that thought must have something particular to think about. This is of course the doctrine of Kant, but it seems also to be the doctrine of Plato and of Aristotle if we may judge

from the *Timaeus* and from Book Z of the *Metaphysics*. In the *Timaeus* Plato says: 'And there is a third nature, which is space, and it is eternal and admits not of destruction and provides a home for all created things, and is perceived without the help of sense, by a kind of bastard reason' (νόθω τινι λογισμῷ) (52 a). Plato calls it 'bastard' evidently because it has characteristics both of the sensible and of the intelligible. The passage from Aristotle is this: 'Some matter is sensible and some intelligible, sensible matter being for instance bronze and wood and all matter that is changeable and intelligible matter being that which is present in sensible things not *quā* sensible, i.e. in the objects of mathematics' (*Met. Z* 1036 a, 10 et seq.). It is easy to see the affinity between this and Kant's doctrine in regard to pure intuition.

The second point to be noticed before we leave the geometer is this. The way in which we have spoken of the relation between that which is sensible and that which is intelligible might seem to imply that a figure or an area or volume of space taken by itself can be made intelligible by reflection. But clearly this needs to be corrected because it is largely by reference to its relation to other points in space or other figures that a spatial area or volume becomes intelligible. We need only remark in this connexion the part played by construction in geometry. This is of course a further argument for the view that besides spaces we must think of space, and that this space is first a unity, and secondly no less individual than spaces.

We can now consider in the briefest possible way the thought of the scientist (or indeed of everyday reflection about the world) in order to see what contrast should be drawn between it and the thought of the geometer. Three points seem to be immediately obvious. First, this thought is concerned with sensibles and not simply with space; secondly, it seeks to find intelligibility by discovering some system or order amongst the sensibles, and it believes that a system or order exists; thirdly, whether there is such an order or not it is not something which is revealed simply by reflection on the nature of a set of sensibles, in the way that a theorem about a right-angled triangle is revealed by reflection on this figure. How we are to suppose that the mind comes to attach the intelligibility of a necessary system to sensibles which in themselves are not such as to make it plain, is one of the problems of philosophy to which many answers are given. To speculate at length about these answers would divert us too much from our

main subject, since all that we aimed at was to make clear to ourselves, if we could, in what respects mathematical and other thinking are alike and in what different. Since, however, we have already glanced at the passage in Kant's Schematism of the Categories which bears on the problem, we may take the opportunity of considering briefly the direction which his thought seems to follow. His view is perhaps more interesting than some of his readers and commentators seem to realize.

Kant's thought is not easy to seize because, having begun by discussing subsumption under a concept, he continues in the same strain about the different problem of the relation between the sensible and intelligible elements within the concept itself. But if we get behind the confusion of his language (and indeed of his thought) we can perhaps say that his idea is this. The problem why it is that sensibles must be thought to be governed by a system which they do not make plain is somehow connected with a third factor, namely the way in which the mind is bound to regard time. From the nature of time Kant thinks he can deduce the necessity of substance or a permanent. This is the task of the First Analogy. The task of the Second is to take the final step of deducing system from substance. Whether Kant's argument is right or wrong is another matter, but at least it seems that the argument of the Schematism of the Categories needs to be studied in this light.

We must, however, return now to geometry in order to touch on the formidable difficulty referred to earlier. It is the difficulty which arises from the existence of other geometries than the Euclidean since they seem to invalidate all that has been said about the sensible element in the geometer's thinking, and it needs to be considered whether these geometries are a difficulty for the whole doctrine which we have been led to adopt or only for a particular part of it. There might seem to be some ground for the view that they do not necessarily refute the contention that intuition of space is essential to geometrical thinking, if it can be held that non-Euclidean geometries are derivative from Euclidean somewhat in the following way. In a geometrical problem which arises from the intuition of space and thought about it, the points to be elucidated are such that they can be dealt with by mathematical thinking, and pure mathematics takes over the problem set by geometry as it might take over a problem set by physics. But mathematics having thus received a problem set to it by geometry

might construct for itself another and a different problem by altering or adding to the factors in the geometrical problem. If there were no more to be said it would not seem necessary to think that the new problem and the methods of solving it were geometrical. The line could be drawn between the two cases by saying that the former was a problem arising from reflection on intuited space and precisely for that reason was geometrical, while the second was not geometrical because it did not concur with and even contradicted what we necessarily think when we intuit space. No competition would arise between Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometrics because only the former would be a geometry.

The difficulty, however, in taking this line is that there appear to be certain events in space which do not conform to what we think about space in terms of Euclidean geometry when it is combined with what we think about time, but do conform to one of the new geometries. We should notice that this situation is different to that which we were considering before. There it seemed that it was possible to contend that a so-called geometry was not geometry because it was a system constructed by pure mathematics without reference to the intuition of space, although it might have been suggested by this intuition. Here the system must be regarded as geometrical because it is offered as an explanation of phenomena in space and is supported by them. But just because this is so, it seems that we have returned to sensibles, and there is no ground for maintaining that geometrical thought is possible without reference to the intuition of space.

What then is the difficulty which has arisen? There is indeed a great difficulty for the view of geometrical thinking which we have discussed earlier, but it is attached not to the contention that the geometer must be concerned with intuited space, but rather to the alleged relation between his intuition and his thought. We supposed that what was grasped by his thought was the intelligible nature of that which he intuited. But this view breaks down if it be admitted that a new geometry not merely is an intelligible system when it is regarded as pure mathematics, but it has to be accepted as something more, namely, as an intelligible account of intuited space. For precisely at this point we are held up in the attempt so to regard it because there is another and a different system (the Euclidean) which seems to have the better claim to be the intelligible account of that which we intuit. Such a difficulty would not arise (though there would be others) if it were possible

for anyone who understands the new geometry to intuit space in such a way that he could regard what he understood as the intelligible presentation of that which he intuited. No such claim, however, seems to be advanced, and indeed it is urged that the geometer must cut himself away from the sensible, although, as we have seen, the title of his geometry to be geometry depends on its relation to observed spatial phenomena.

The purpose of these remarks has been no more than to indicate, without pretending to solve, the difficulty which troubles some philosophers when they reflect on what seems to be the direction of scientific thought. If they could surrender the idea of there being any connexion between the intuited and the intelligible, they would feel no difficulty. But it is just this surrender which it is hard for anyone to make who holds that consciousness must ultimately be an intelligible unity.

This section may be concluded with a few remarks about the study of numbers and of their relations, comparing it with what has been said about the thought of the geometer and of the scientist. They are remarks which are limited to the single problem of what is sensible and what is intelligible in this study and, if both are present, how they are related. Evidently in this field the highest point of abstraction from anything sensible is reached. It would hardly be tenable to suppose that the notion of number is obtained by reflecting on sensible objects and by abstracting the sensibles which we attribute to them. Nor again does it seem correct to think, as Kant sometimes suggests, that number is necessarily connected with the intuition of the parts of time, or with the parts of space. For if it be true that the apprehension of a character which can be thought to be present in other instances or particulars is implicit in our consciousness of anything—whether it be a thought or any activity of mind or a physical object or a part of time or a part of space—it is clear that we already have the thought of a monad or unit and thereby of number. We can still retain the view that no study of number is possible without reference to particulars. But the particulars studied have no more than the common character of being instances of a universal, and, if so, there is no sensible character belonging to them which needs to be taken into account and connected with sensible things or even with intuited space or time. What the mathematician here studies seems to be purely intelligible.

§ 3

As a corollary to this discussion it may be worth while to suggest that there have been some points in it which may have a bearing on metaphysical or epistemological speculations.

It will be remembered that after considering Plato's doctrine and the difficulties which attended it, we decided to alter somewhat the point of view from which we were discussing the matter and instead of considering the objects of mathematical study as entities separable from mathematical thought, we considered more the way in which the mathematician's thought was working. It might be said that in effect we decided to emphasize the logical side of the inquiry and avoided the difficulties which arise for those who concern themselves with the metaphysical status of the objects of thought. Now the point to which it seems desirable to draw attention is that the topic about which we inquired appeared to be easier when we were discussing it in this way. The relation of universals and particulars seems less puzzling when it is expressed in terms of what we think, as indeed we can see if we remember the attractiveness which conceptualism has always possessed. Again, it may be noticed that we are not troubled about the status of universals of which no instances exist or of which all the instances are imperfect. For we *think* of them as existing in instances, and we cannot, without thinking of a perfect instance, think of imperfect instances. Nor do we find ourselves entertaining the doctrine that there are entities which belong to some border-line between existence and non-existence.

Suppose now that we have a metaphysical doctrine which rejects the distinction between logical and metaphysical status and says instead that the logical status of any entity is its metaphysical status, because what is thought about things is what they are. It may be suggested that if, for other reasons, we are disposed to hold this doctrine, it perhaps receives some reinforcement from the discussion in which we have been engaged. This is not to claim that the discussion has proved the doctrine, and indeed it is wisest to hold that no metaphysical doctrine can be proved. For a philosophical position is not confirmed or disproved by an argument here or an argument there. It must be judged by the way in which it seems to make easier or more difficult not one problem but the many problems which perplex the mind of anyone who tries to be a philosopher.

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